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Can a democracy work without liberalism? Or in other 
words, is the concept of governing and being governed in turns 
sustainable without respecting individual rights? Or is a 
democracy doomed to be hijacked by authoritarian rulers, if not 
backed by robust mechanisms of individual rights protection, by 
a rule of law and as system, in which – as James Madison wanted 
– an ambition is made to counteract ambition and the abuses of 
government are controlled? A standard answer of the so-called 
‘Western’ constitutionalism is still a clear ‘no’.  
The present volume offers study material on countries 
and historical situations, in which this clear ‘no’ faces challenges. 
It traces trajectories of democracy’s development as it embraced 
and rejected liberal ideas. The contribution by Timea Drinoczi 
and Agnieszka Bien-Kacała does it with respect to Hungary and 
Poland, while the contribution by Tomasz Milej focuses on Kenya 
and Tanzania. But before embarking on the developments in 
particular countries, Wojciech Włoch takes the reader through the 
contemporary thought on the relationship between democracy 
and liberalism. He argues from the philosophical perspective that 
the liberal ideal of equal rights of individuals enables a democracy 
to thrive and prosper. Tomasz Milej takes up this point showing 
on the examples of Kenya and Tanzania how the attempts to base 
a democratic regime on illiberal pillars eventually lead to a 
collapse of the same. In this vein, Timea Drinoczi and Agnieszka 
Bien-Kacała make a strong case against theorising violations of 
constitutional stipulations and disenfranchisement of judiciaries 
as some new concepts of democracy or political constitutionalism 
as opposed to the legal one; one of the terms they prefer to 
describe the departure from the liberal democracy is abusive 
constitutionalism. On such a dialogue focuses Faith Kabata 
documenting a poor record of Kenya in implementing of the UN 
monitoring bodies recommendations and even obstructionism by 
 
the state executive organs regarding civil and political rights. Her 
study shows that these rights were best implemented when 
individuals took their cases to the courts and that the biggest 
obstacle to the implementation was a lack of social and political 
internalisation of certain human rights provisions. Aren’t those 
internalisation deficits the same ones that derailed the liberal 
democracy – at least temporarily – in Hungary and Poland? One 
could look from this perspective at the failure of the direct 
democracy instruments to enhance people’s participation in 
public matters, as discussed by Zbigniew Witkowski and Maciej 
Serowaniec in the Polish context. 
Those more general accounts are supplemented by three 
case studies on a sensitive area of clash between the collective 
and individual interest. The contributions by Lóránt Csink and 
Réka Török, by István Sabjanics and by Václav Stehlík examine 
the relationship between the national security concerns and the 
individual freedoms. Quite interestingly, Stehlík’s research 
shows that the readjustment away from the individual movement 
rights towards the protection of national security concerns has 
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The Democratic Paradox Revisited - how liberal 




Modern democracy is not a simple and immediate 
realisation of an abstract idea of democracy2. After the 
experiences of World War Two ‘what emerged instead 
might best be described as a new balance of democracy and 
liberal principles, and constitutionalism in particular, but 
with both liberalism and democracy redefined in the light of 
the totalitarian experience of midtwentieth-century 
Europe’3. The model of democracy functioning in the so-
called western states can be defined after F. Fukuyama as a 
combination of the principle of democratic accountability 
and participation, and the liberal principles of the rule of law 
                                                          
* Wojciech Włoch – Assistant Professor, Nicolaus Copernicus University, 
Toruń, Poland, wloch.wojciech@gmail.com. 
1 The article has been prepared as part of the grant ‘Law-making delegation in 
representative democracy’ financed by the National Centre of Science, contest 
Opus 11, registration no. 2016/21/B/HS5/00197. 
2 Cf. R. A. Dahl, On Democracy, New Haven-London 1998, pp. 35-43, 84-99. 
3 J.-W. Müller, Contesting Democracy. Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century 
Europe, New Haven-London 2011, p. 129. 
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and the guarantee of individual rights4. The combination of 
these principles would constitute a systemic optimum for 
which no other alternative is available, as it closely links 
both institutional rationality and political legitimisation. In 
other words, liberal democracy is interpreted as ‘the end of 
history’, i.e. an optimal combination of principles and 
institutions5. And although the development of political 
orders is neither linear nor completely determined when it 
comes to the direction it follows, at the level of ideas liberal 
democracy is seen as the culmination of humanity's search 
for ‘the ideal system of government’. Thus, it would offer a 
solution to the problem identified by I. Kant: ‘the highest 
task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that 
of establishing a society in which freedom under external 
laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with 
irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly 
just civil constitution’6. 
The purpose of this article is to attempt to answer the 
question whether the combination of liberal 
constitutionalism and democracy is accidental, or whether it 
is possible to observe an important connection between the 
two elements. In the first part I discuss the so-called 
democratic paradox resulting from the tension between the 
principle of democratic self-determination and liberal 
limitations connected with the rule of law and the guarantees 
of the rights of an individual. Indeed, modern democracy is 
                                                          
4 Cf. F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York-Toronto 
1992, p. 42 et seq. 
5 Ibid., p. xii. 
6 I. Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, [in:] I. 
Kant, Political Writings, trans. B. Nisbet, Cambridge-New York-Port Chester-
Melbourne-Sydney 2003, pp. 45-46. 
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a mixed system consisting of democratic procedures 
contained in the constitutional framework of the 
representative system. Part two of the article deals with the 
tension between radically understood democracy and 
constitutionalism. From the point of view of democracy as 
such, any – also constitutional – limitation of the democratic 
will is seen as undemocratic. Is constitutionalism therefore 
irreconcilable with democracy? In the third part I point to 
such an understanding of constitutional liberalism as 
emphasises the role of civil rights as constitutive elements 
of the democratic system. In this approach, liberal 
constitutionalism is a form of reinforcement of civic 
subjectivity. Liberal constitutional rights are to facilitate 
democratic participation and the protection of pluralism. 
Thus, an affirmation of pluralism leads to perceiving liberal 
constitutionalism as being closely related to democracy. 
 
2. The paradoxical nature of liberal democracy  
The combination of the two traditions of liberalism and 
democracy does not need to be seen as indispensable or 
inevitable. ‘On one side we have the liberal tradition 
constituted by the rule of law, the defence of human rights, 
and the respect of individual liberty; on the other the 
democratic tradition whose main ideas are those of equality, 
identity between governing and governed, and popular 
sovereignty. There is no necessary relation between those 
two distinct traditions, but only a contingent historical 
articulation’.7. According to Ch. Mouffe, contemporary 
liberal democracies not so much as combine the above two 
principles as rather subject democracy to liberal principles. 
                                                          
7 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, London-New York 2000, p. 2-3. 
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They are characterised by a democratic deficit by 
accentuating the idea of the rule of law and the rights of the 
individual at the expense of the idea of sovereignty of the 
people. ‘For people in the West – as F. Zakaria writes – 
democracy means 'liberal democracy': a political system 
marked not only by free and fair elections but also by the 
rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of 
basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property’8. 
Here, on the other hand, democracy is understood in a 
narrow procedural sense as a process of selection of the 
‘governing’9. From such a point of view, the system 
opposite to liberal democracy, i.e. the so-called illiberal 
democracy, would also be affected by a deficit, only of a 
different kind. Illiberal democracy would constitute a 
political system allowing for free and fair elections, 
however exhibiting a deficit in the area of the rule of law 
and the division of powers, thus failing to ensure protection 
of the fundamental freedoms of speech, association, 
religion, and property. Assuming the position of Ch. Mouffe 
one may say that the choice of a particular model of liberal 
or illiberal democracy entails a deficit in the sphere of 
democracy or liberalism. Mouffe argues that the tension 
between liberalism and democracy is permanent and a full 
reconciliation of these elements is impossible10. Any 
interpretation of the above two components of modern 
democracy points to a specific hegemony that is not ‘natural 
and alternativeless’ and that can be questioned.  
                                                          
8 F. Zakaria, The Future of Freedom, New York-London 2007, p. 17. 
9 Cf. Ibid., pp. 18-19. Cf. the topic of procedural democracy D. Held, Models of 
Democracy, Cambridge 2008, pp. 125-157; cf. also A. Przeworski, Democracy 
and the Limits of Self-Government, New York 2010, pp. 111-112. 
10 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 5. 
T h e  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r a d o x  R e v i s i t e d …  | 13 
A specific threat to democracy is seen in such a form 
of hegemony as negates the dispute between liberal freedom 
and democratic equality11 that is inscribed in the essence of 
democracy and presents itself as the ‘ultimate and natural’ 
form of democratic policy. Its negative effect rests in the 
fact that the possible claims against the current status quo 
are interpreted as anti-democratic, which allows anti-
democratic forces to take them over and direct them not 
towards current hegemony, but against ‘democracy in 
general’. From this perspective, the threat to democracy 
consists in the elimination of antagonisms from the forum 
of democratic policy and placing an exaggerated emphasis 
on the role of deliberation and agreement. Indeed, the nature 
of democratic policy in Mouffe's view is paradoxical and 
should be understood ‘not as the search for an inaccessible 
consensus – to be reached through whatever procedure – but 
as an 'agonistic confrontation' between conflicting 
interpretations of the constitutive liberal-democratic 
values’12. Assuming that Ch. Mouffe's observations are 
correct one may ask whether from the paradoxical nature of 
democratic policy it results that the perspective of 
a ’procedure-based consensus’ should be abandoned in 
favour of ‘agonistics’, or whether what is meant is an 
establishment of a certain form of a balance between them? 
                                                          
11 P. Rosanvallon also notes that the development of modern democracy 
involves an ‘inversely proportional’ development of the importance of political 
and social citizenship, the people in a political and social sense. ‘The 'people', 
understood in a political sense as a collective entity that ever more powerfully 
imposes its will, is less and less a 'social body'. Political citizenship has 
progressed, while social citizenship has regressed’, P. Rosanvallon, The Society 
of Equals, trans. A. Goldhammer, Cambridge–London 2013, p. 1. The process 
of extension of democratic rights would occur at the expense of democratic 
equality. 
12 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 9. 
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Is such a balance at all possible? Does the antagonism that 
makes every agreement inconclusive and impermanent 
mean that any form of policy regulation through liberal 
principles threatens an expression of various positions and 
political postulates? In other words, does liberal 
constitutionalism suppress pluralism or rather establish the 
framework for its peaceful coexistence? 
With respect to the objectives of governance (goals 
of political power) constitutional liberalism means the 
defence of individual autonomy and dignity against 
arbitrary coercion (e.g. social, public or ecclesiastical). It is 
therefore related to a limitation of political power. ‘For to us 
'constitution' means – as Sartori writes – a frame of political 
society, organised through and by the law, for the purpose 
of restraining arbitrary power’13. In Zakaria's interpretation, 
‘liberal constitutionalism’ is liberal because it affirms the 
value of individual freedom, it is constitutional, as it ‘places 
the rule of law in the centre of policy’14. In liberal 
constitutionalism, the division of powers, equal justice 
under law, independent judiciary, the separation of state and 
church are to serve the protection of fundamental freedoms 
of individuals (freedom of speech, assembly, religion, 
property rights...) which are treated as ‘inborn and 
inalienable’. Contemporary western democracies are not 
‘pure democracies’, but are rather an example of a ‘mixed 
system’ where non-elected institutions operate alongside 
democratic institutions. This results from the conviction that 
‘more democracy’ does not automatically lead to ‘more 
                                                          
13 G. Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1962, p. 860. 
14 F. Zakaria, The Future of Freedom, p. 19. 
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freedom’15. Modern liberal democracy, in addition to the 
mechanisms and institutions that enable the implementation 
of the principle of self-government (or self-determination), 
introduces mechanisms and institutions that implement the 
principle of self-control, which has an inhibitory effect on 
the political power and secures the rights of individuals 
against their violation, as well as stabilising the political 
system by making its functioning independent of variable 
‘social moods’, fluctuations of public opinion, or self-
proclaimed ‘spokesmen of the people’16. Institutions 
resulting from the rule of law (e.g. independent courts, 
public services, supervisory institutions) are to have positive 
effects, not only on the stability, but also on the 
effectiveness of the political system, the quality of 
governance, and are to ensure protection against excessive 
informal influences of interest groups on the functioning of 
public institutions17. 
 The question arises whether the principle of self-
control is not too restrictive for the democratic ideal of self-
determination? ‘The ideal of self-determination – as H. 
Kelsen puts it – requires that the social order shall be created 
by the unanimous decision of all its subjects’18. In the 
original form the idea of self-determination does not permit 
diversity and conflict of opinion, and a lack of agreement 
                                                          
15 Cf. Ibid., p. 26. 
16 Cf. J.-W. Müller, Contesting Democracy…, pp. 146 et seq. 
17 Cf. F. Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay. From the Industrial 
Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy, New York 2014, chapters 1, 13, 
27, 36. 
18 H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. A. Wedberg, Cambridge 
1949, p. 285. On the transformation of the idea of self-determination into the 
idea of a representative government, cf. also A. Przeworski, Democracy..., pp. 
17 et seq. 
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with a ‘unanimous decision’ would mean an exclusion from 
society. The principle of a priori unanimity excludes the 
possibility of disagreement. Any change of a unanimously 
established order would be impossible as the groups or 
individuals that defy a particular shape of social order would 
actually resign from being part of it. In practice this kind of 
idea is virtually unworkable if we take into account the 
many forms of social diversification. Attempts at its 
implementation may take a distorted form of obtaining 
unanimity with the use of insistent propaganda and 
coercion. However, this would be a ghastly caricature of 
unanimity as an expression of self-determination. In 
practice unanimity is unattainable. This does not mean that 
the principle of self-determination is impossible to 
implement. The possibility of its fulfilment involves a 
limitation of its applicability: not ‘everyone’, but the 
‘majority’ should define the content of the legal order. The 
principle underlying majority rule is that ‘social order shall 
be in concordance with as many subjects as possible, and in 
discordance with as few as possible’19. Thus, the majority 
rule ensures political freedom to the maximum extent 
possible, i.e. self-determination, as the compliance of the 
will of the individual with the common will. ‘Theoretically, 
democracy is a political or social form in which the will of 
society or – less figuratively – the social order is generated 
by its subjects, the People. Democracy means that the leader 
and those who are led, that the Subject and Object of rule, 
are identical. It means the rule of the People over itself’.20. 
                                                          
19 H. Kelsen, General Theory..., p. 286. 
20 H. Kelsen, The Essence and Value of Democracy, trans. B. Graf, Lanham-
Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth 2013, p. 35. 
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However, the complexity of modern societies as well as 
their greatness causes that direct participation of citizens in 
law-making is practically impossible. Just as the division of 
labour has become indispensable in the economic reality, it 
has also proved necessary in the political sphere. 
Democratic self-determination is in fact implemented in the 
form of participation in the procedure of nominating 
individuals to legislative bodies, i.e. mainly through the 
participation in the elections. ‘The organ authorised to 
create or execute the legal norms is elected by those subjects 
whose behaviour is regulated by these norms’21. 
Contemporary democracy assumes the form of an indirect, 
representative democracy, where individuals selected for a 
particular assembly are treated as representatives of the 
voters22. 
 
3. Constitutionalism versus strong democracy  
The constitution of any institution, as E.-J. Sieyès claims, 
endows it with an organisational framework, forms, and 
laws allowing it to fulfil the functions it was established to 
perform. A representative institution cannot exist without 
a constitution, i.e. an establishment of a representative 
institution is possible only by its appointment in the 
constitution. ‘Thus the body of representatives entrusted 
with the legislative power, or the exercise of the common 
will, exists only by way of the mode of being which the 
                                                          
21 H. Kelsen, General Theory..., p. 289.  
22 R. Dahl notes that the transformation of democracy from direct to 
representative has enabled the implementation of the idea of democracy in large 
and complex societies. Cf. R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, New Haven 
1989, chapter 15. G. Sartori defines the principle of representation as an 
‘intermediate principle’ between the political ideal and reality, G. Sartori, 
Theory of Democracy Revisited, Chatham 1987, chapter 4.5. 
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nation decided to give it. It is nothing without its constitutive 
forms; it acts, proceeds, or commands only by way of those 
forms’23. The said ‘constitutive forms’ establish a 
representative institution, define its functions and the 
manner of conduct and scope of its activities. Without the 
above constitution, the institution has neither authority nor 
competence, and therefore no basis for being both 
a representative and a legislative institution. The 
‘constitutive forms’ are to ensure protection against an 
arbitrary attribution of power and any exceeding of the 
entrusted competences. This way, the nation protects its 
‘common will’ against an abuse of ‘common representative 
will’. The nation is a ‘constituent power’ (pouvoir 
constituant) that defines the fundamental norms for the 
functioning of political institutions. The norms defining the 
organisations and functioning of the political institutions 
within a representative system (legislative and executive 
power) constitute positive constitutional law, which is 
fundamental with regard to ‘constituted power’ (pouvoir 
constitué) and is completely dependent on constituent 
power. ‘The nation exists prior to everything; it is the origin 
of everything. Its will is always legal. It is the law itself’24. 
Constituted power (representative system) is in fact an 
authority delegated by constituent power (nation). A 
delegated authority cannot change the terms of its 
delegation. The will of constituent power is unlimited, 
whereas constituted power is limited by the ‘terms of 
delegation’. From the perspective of Sieyès' theory, the role 
                                                          
23 E.-J. Sieyès, What Is the Third Estate? in E.-J. Sieyès, Political Writings. 
Including the Debatte between Sieyès and Tom Paine in 1791, trans. M. 
Sonenscher, Indianapolis-Cambridge 2003, p. 135. 
24 Ibid., p. 136. 
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of the constitution consists in defining the principles and 
rules of functioning of legislative and executive power. The 
nation itself is not subject to the constitution, as it is a natural 
being and a source of positive law, whilst the existence of 
political institutions depends on the fundamental positive 
law (norms of the constitutional law).  
Sieyès' concept may constitute a kind of a model for 
the theory of the unlimited sovereignty of a nation: a nation 
(constituent power) ontologically precedes constituted 
political institutions and in that sense is independent of 
positive law. Positive law cannot constitute a nation, yet 
without a nation there is no positive law. Similarly, positive 
law cannot bestow on the nation rights that it no longer 
possesses (we may say that it may only declare them). 
Delegated power is fully dependent on the nation, and 
therefore it cannot award it with anything that it no longer 
possesses. Constituted power is subject to the constitution 
established by unlimited constituent power. The constituent 
power itself is not subject to the constitution, for it would 
thus cease to be unlimited and ontologically primary. Any 
limitation of constituent power would lead to contradictions, 
as by the imposition of such limitations it would no longer 
be a constituent power. The nation is in a way permanently 
embedded in the state of nature, for its will as a constituent 
power cannot be regulated and limited. In this sense, the will 
of the nation has an absolute primacy over the positive law, 
for it is its will that ‘is the source and supreme master of all 
positive law’25. Taking Sieyès' radical view, the limitation 
of constituent power of the nation would mean a loss of 
freedom by the nation and would open the way to 
                                                          
25 Ibid., p. 138. 
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establishing a dictatorship. From the thus outlined 
perspective the principles of liberal democracy appear as a 
limitation of ‘true democracy,’ as they not only introduce 
the inviolable rights of individuals, but also define the 
constitutional principles and rules governing the functioning 
of the political system (e.g. principles of the rule of law, 
lawmaking and amendment of the constitution26) which 
limit the freedom of the nation as a constituent power.  
The limitations introduced by constitutionalism are 
evident in the example of ‘the Federalist Papers’, where the 
possibility of direct rule by the people is rejected thus 
differentiating the republican system (today's representative 
democracy) from direct democracy. ‘We may define – 
J. Madison writes – a republic to be, or at least may bestow 
that name on, a government which derives all its powers 
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and 
is administered by persons holding their offices during 
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behaviour’27. 
A republic differs from direct democracy particularly in two 
respects: ‘first, the delegation of the Government, in the 
latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest: 
secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere 
of country, over which the latter may be extended’28. 
A representative system is to provide both political 
                                                          
26 Liberal constitutionalism distinguishes ‘higher lawmaking’, i.e. the law 
established in a particular form whose change also requires maintenance of a 
specific mode of procedure, that is different and more demanding than ‘normal 
lawmaking’. Cf. B. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, The 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 99, No. 3, 1989, pp. 461 et seq., B. Ackerman, We the 
People. Foundations, Cambridge–London 1995, pp. 6 et seq. Cf. also J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, New York 1993, pp. 231-233. 
27 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist with The 
Letters of „Brutus”, ed. T. Ball, Cambridge 2003, p. 182. 
28 Ibid., p. 44. 
T h e  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r a d o x  R e v i s i t e d …  | 21 
legitimacy of the political authorities of choice, as well as a 
means of resolving conflicts between competing interests 
and views functioning in a complex society. Therefore it 
assumes pluralism as a fundamental characteristic of 
a society. ‘As long as the reason of man continues fallible, 
and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be 
formed. As long as the connection subsists between his 
reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will 
have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former 
will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves’29. 
The formation of the so-called factions30 is to a certain 
extent natural, with manifold causes behind it and the main 
one being the uneven distribution of property. Economic 
inequalities and the related conflicts of interest are one of 
the major sources of their emergence. ‘The regulation of 
these various and interfering interests forms the principal 
task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party 
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of 
Government’31. Legislation and the system of 
representation would constitute forms of conflict resolution, 
and thus a specific form of mediation between contradictory 
interests and the pursuit of possibly consensual legislative 
resolutions. In this context, a particularly important issue is 
connected with safeguarding against the dominance of a 
                                                          
29 Ibid., p. 41. Cf. the so-called ‘burdens of judgement’, which cause a discord 
and diversity of opinions to be a cardinal property of a free democratic society, 
J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 54-58. 
30 ‘By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community’, Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist..., p. 41. 
31 Ibid., p. 42. 
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single majority faction that could pursue its interests without 
greater restrictions. According to Madison, in a direct 
democracy it is practically impossible to safeguard the rights 
of the minority against the majority. The limitation of 
factional claims, on the other hand, may take place in a 
republican, i.e. a representative system. It is therefore 
necessary to protect both the rights of citizens as well as 
republican institutions and principles. ‘It is of great 
importance in a republic, not only to guard the society 
against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of 
the society against the injustice of the other part. Different 
interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If 
a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the 
minority will be insecure’32. The mechanisms of dividing 
and balancing the powers as well as the system of guarantee 
and protection of the rights of an individual, both resulting 
from assigning a special role and legal importance to the 
constitution, in a sense restrict the freedom of a democratic 
formation of political will, since it cannot violate 
constitutional principles and rights. Thus, the constitution 
forms a specific kind of a ‘higher law’, which can only be 
modified in a special mode33. Assuming that the democratic 
‘will of the nation’ is diverse, meeting of the legal 
requirements for an amendment or establishment of a new 
constitution is not simple. As a result, forms, procedures, 
and restrictions on the democratic decision-making process 
are more or less ‘rigidly’ normalised in the constitution as a 
‘higher law’. A question arises as to whether such a 
‘limitation’ should be interpreted as the dominance of a 
                                                          
32 Ibid., p. 254. 
33 Cf. footnote 26. 
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liberal element over a democratic one34, or whether the 
relation between them may be perceived through the 
category of interdependence?35 
From the perspective of the theory that democracy 
‘simply’ means participation and self-determination, any 
regulation of their expression in the form of representative 
institutions will be associated with their ‘limitation’. Such 
an interpretation entails an irremovable conflict between 
democracy and liberalism (constitutionalism), as when the 
will of the nation is not absolute (unconditioned), it is 
impossible to speak of democracy. Constituent power, as A. 
Negri points out, is closely linked to democracy. 
‘Constituent power has been considered not only as an all-
powerful and expansive principle capable of producing the 
constitutional norms of any juridical system, but also as the 
subject of this production – an activity equally all-powerful 
and expansive’36. Constituent power is not only a principle 
of political power adopted in the form of the principle of 
sovereignty of the nation, but also an actual entity – 
constituent power is a political entity that in a certain way, 
intrinsically and without intermediaries, ‘produces’ the 
democratic politics. Hence, it constitutes not only an entity 
that establishes a democratic constitution, but a democratic 
policy in general while itself it ‘resists being 
                                                          
34 C. Schmitt points out that ‘a threefold division of powers, a substantial 
distinction between the legislative and the executive, the rejection of the idea 
that the plenitude of state power should be allowed to gather at any one point – 
all of this is in fact the antithesis of a democratic concept of identity. The two 
postulates are thus not simple equivalents’, C. Schmitt, The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy, trans. E. Kennedy, Cambridge-London 2000, p. 36. 
35 Cf. J. Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of 
Contradictory Principles?, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 6, 2001, pp. 766-768. 
36 A. Negri, Insurgencies. Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. M. 
Boscagli, Minneapolis-London 1999, p. 1. 
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constitutionalised’. Democratic constitutions may only 
declare the existence of such an entity in their content. 
Similarly – as Negri further argues – democracy as the 
‘theory of an absolute government’ (the sovereign will of 
the people) ‘resists being constitutionalised’, since 
‘constitutionalism is a theory of limited government and 
therefore a practice that limits democracy’37. There is a 
conflict between constitutionalism and democracy 
(constituent power): ‘constitutionalism poses itself as the 
theory and practice of limited government: limited by the 
jurisdictional control of administrative acts and, above all, 
limited through the organisation of constituent power by the 
law’38. Liberal constitutionalism forms a limitation of a 
radically democratic will and in this sense is undemocratic. 
Constitutionalism is in a way oriented on the past and 
preserves the already established system, whereas 
democracy (constituent power) is a creative and forward-
looking force, thus the conflict between them can be 
interpreted as a conflict between an unlimited creative 
power and a tendency to regulate and stabilise.  ‘Democracy 
means the omnilateral expression of the multitude, the 
radical immanence of strength, and the exclusion of any sign 
of external definition, either transcendent or transcendental 
and in any case external to this radical, absolute terrain of 
immanence. This democracy is the opposite of 
constitutionalism. Or better, it is the negation itself of 
constitutionalism as constituted power – a power made 
impermeable to singular modalities of space and time, and a 
machine predisposed not so much to exercising strength but, 
                                                          
37 Ibid., p. 2. 
38 Ibid., p. 10. 
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rather, to controlling its dynamics, its unchangeable 
dispositions of force. Constitutionalism is transcendence, 
but above all constitutionalism is the police that 
transcendence establishes over the wholeness of bodies in 
order to impose on them order and hierarchy. 
Constitutionalism is an apparatus that denies constituent 
power and democracy’39. Assuming the above 
understanding of democracy, all forms of indirect 
democracy, the rule of law, and the guarantee of individual 
rights are merely a form of wielding control over the 
‘democratic dynamics’. Where does this particular 
preoccupation of liberal constitutionalism with the 
limitations of political power and stability of the political 
system come from? According to B. Barber, liberal 
democracy is a theory that focuses on a conflict within the 
society, which is the main problem of the policy40, thus the 
fundamental postulates of liberalism stem from the attempts 
to deal with social and political discord. However, according 
to critics, because of it the hidden constructive forces of a 
society are underestimated, hence liberal democracy should 
be confronted with a different concept of democracy. 
‘Strong democracy is a distinctively modern form of 
participatory democracy. It rests on the idea of a self-
governing community of citizens who are united less by 
homogeneous interests than by civic education and who are 
made capable of common purpose and mutual action by 
virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions 
rather than their altruism or their good nature’41. One could 
                                                          
39 Ibid., p. 322. 
40 B. R. Barber, Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age, 
Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 2003, p. 5. 
41 Ibid., p. 117. 
26 | W o j c i e c h  W ł o c h  
ask here whether the ‘productive forces of democracy’ 
operating within ‘participatory democracy’ without 
stabilising and limiting institutions are not in fact going to 
turn into a permanent conflict? Will the perpetual 
revolution, that the constituent power indeed is to follow 
Negri's interpretation, lead to the dominance over that part 
of society which is best organised as a ‘productive 
movement’? Will a completely unrestricted democratic 
participation not lead to the hegemony of the majority, and 
thus (similarly as the principle of unanimity) deprive the 
minority of the right of participation and consequently 
eliminate pluralism? 
 
4. Liberal ‘constitutional essentials’ of democratic 
constitution 
The answer to these questions does not have to be 
affirmative to demonstrate that liberalism constitutes an 
indispensable element of modern democracy. Indeed, the 
aim of political liberalism is to establish the basic principles 
of a democratic system that would provide all citizens with 
equal political subjectivity and enable the maintenance of 
democratic disputes on equal terms. It aims towards the 
formulation of basic principles underlying the system of 
constitutional democracy that would be adequate for a 
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society characterised by (reasonable42) pluralism43. Ch. 
Larmore defines the problems faced by the theory of 
liberalism as follows: (a) formulation of moral conditions 
for limiting political power (defined by the idea of a 
common good); (b) formulation of conditions under which 
people with different concepts of good would be able to live 
together in a political association44. The solution would 
consist in the formulation of a ‘minimal moral conception’ 
that expresses the idea of a common good that could be 
supported by a broad spectrum of doctrines and conceptions 
of a good life. Such an idea would be neutral in relation to 
various worldviews, which does not mean that it would be 
neutral in moral terms45.  
Therefore, what kind of an idea does liberalism 
propose as a ‘minimal moral conception’ for the democratic 
                                                          
42 ‘The diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a mere historical 
condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture 
of democracy’, J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 36. Reasonable pluralism does 
not only mean that people accept various holistic doctrines within the 
democratic system but that such doctrines are also reasonable, although 
individuals may perceive only their own ‘doctrines’ as ‘true or right’, cf. J. 
Cohen, Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus, [in:] J. Cohen, Philosophy, 
Politics, Democracy: Selected Essays, Cambridge Massachusetts 2009, p. 53. 
43 ‘Liberalism assumes that in a constitutional democratic state under modern 
conditions there are bound to exist conflicting and incommensurable 
conceptions of the good’. J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not 
Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1985, p. 245. 
‘Liberalism as a political doctrine supposes that there are many conflicting and 
incommensurable conceptions of the good, each compatible with the full 
rationality of human persons, so far as we can ascertain within a workable 
political conception of justice. As a consequence of this supposition, liberalism 
assumes that it is a characteristic feature of a free democratic culture that a 
plurality of conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the good are 
affirmed by its citizens’. Ibid., p. 248. 
44 Ch. Larmore, Political Liberalism, Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1990, p. 
340–341. 
45 Cf. Ibid., p. 341. 
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system? As claimed by R. Dworkin, every coherent political 
programme contains two elements: ‘constitutive political 
positions that are valued for their own sake, and derivative 
positions that are valued as strategies, as means of achieving 
the constitutive positions’46. It is possible to speak of a 
continuity of a political doctrine, if the transformations that 
it is undergoes affect the derivative positions and not the 
constitutive ones. In other words, constitutive positions 
remain the same, whereas the means towards their 
achievement change along with social, economic or other 
changes. Liberalism shares numerous constitutive principles 
with other doctrines (such as the principle of freedom which 
is shared with conservatism), however it assigns them a 
different rank. The constitutive position of liberalism 
consists in the defined concept of equality47. It is possible to 
distinguish between the principle of treating the citizens ‘as 
equals’ (in terms of being entitled to the same care and 
respect) and treating them ‘equally’ (in the same way), 
however ‘equally’ does not always mean the same as the 
expression ‘as equals’ (for instance, a tax can be imposed 
equally on all citizens, but it does not mean that they are 
treated as equals, as the cost incurred by citizens with the 
lowest income is relatively higher than the burden placed on 
high-income citizens), therefore the first meaning is 
constitutive whilst the other derivative48. What really 
distinguishes liberalism from other political doctrines is the 
thesis that individuals should be treated ‘as equals’ 
(neutrally), and thus regardless of their understanding of 
                                                          
46 R. Dworkin, Liberalism, [in:] R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, New York 
1985, p. 184. 
47 Cf. Ibid., p. 188. 
48 Cf. Ibid., p. 190. 
T h e  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r a d o x  R e v i s i t e d …  | 29 
good (or life goals, what a good life is to them)49. In order 
to ensure equal treatment of individuals with different 
concepts of the good, preferences, or aspirations, it is 
necessary to establish institutions ensuring the stable 
functioning of a diverse society (e.g. representative 
democratic institutions, free market, redistribution 
mechanisms), which on the one hand recognise the 
inequalities arising from the diversity of goals and concepts 
of the good, whilst on the other hand eliminate arbitrary and 
unjustified inequalities, thus treating citizens ‘as equals’.  
A liberal protection of citizens' treatment ‘as equals’ 
by social and political institutions consists of a system of 
guaranteed rights and freedoms. From such a perspective, 
liberalism is associated with the recognition of diversity 
resulting from an equal treatment of persons pursuing 
different concepts of the good, different goals, and having 
varying interests. The existence of a universal system of 
rights and freedoms would guarantee the treatment of such 
persons as equals. Thus it is the equality that constitutes the 
‘minimal moral concept’, which is the basic principle of a 
political system that affirms pluralism. B. Ackerman lists 
six elements of response of political liberalism to the fact of 
pluralism: (a) political principles should not be ‘hostage’ to 
one of the many ideas of a good life operating in a society; 
(b) political liberalism adopts such a strategy of justification 
of political principles as could be adopted by representatives 
of various comprehensive doctrines; (c) political liberalism 
strives to remain independent of holistic philosophical 
                                                          
49 Cf. Ibid., pp. 191–192. This would distinguish liberalism from conservatism, 
which connects equal treatment with a specific concept of the good, similarly to 
socialism. 
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doctrines and base itself on its own principles and ideas; (d) 
emphasises the primary commitment of maintaining public 
dialogue between the different parties; (e) introduces the 
principle of conversational constraint – until a citizen makes 
a specific argument publicly, it cannot be deemed 
convincing; (f) before particular institutions of the basic 
structure become legitimate, they must undergo a rigorous 
test of a public dialogue of free and equal citizens50. From 
the thus outlined perspective, the basic principles of 
constitutional democracy and its basic institutions are not 
treated as ‘granted’, but as the subject of a consensus of free 
and equal citizens, reached as a result of a public 
deliberation of arguments in favour of them (an ideal 
representation of such a public debate is the idea of an initial 
situation). ‘Problem of political liberalism is: How is it 
possible that there may exist over time a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by 
reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctrines? Put another way: How is it possible 
that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines may live together and all affirm the political 
conception of a constitutional regime?’51. 
According to J. Raz, the essence of political 
liberalism, in relation to the fact of pluralism, is a specific 
‘epistemic abstinence’: it should not refer to the question of 
the truth or falsehood of comprehensive doctrines professed 
by citizens52. If it were to be a true theory, it would have to 
                                                          
50 B. Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 91, No. 
7, 1994, pp. 365-368. 
51 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xviii. 
52 Cf. J. Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, Philosophy 
& Public Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1990, p. 4. 
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be based on a certain comprehensive doctrine accepting 
certain fundamental positions as justified, however then it 
would not be a theory formulating the ‘minimal concept of 
principles’, it could not serve as a theory adequate for the 
democratic system characterized by the fact of pluralism. 
Therefore, the main problem of political liberalism is seen 
in the principles which cause that democratic political power 
to be legitimised by virtue of such principles. ‘We ask: when 
is that power appropriately exercised? That is, in the light of 
what principles and ideals must we, as free and equal 
citizens, be able to view ourselves as exercising that power 
if our exercise of it is to be justifiable to other citizens and 
to respect their being reasonable and rational?’53. In 
response to this question, J. Rawls formulates the ‘liberal 
principle of legitimacy’: ‘our exercise of political power is 
fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with 
a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
reason’54. Political liberalism points to the particular 
importance of a constitution in the democratic system. The 
legitimisation of political power occurs when it respects the 
‘constitutional essentials’, i.e. the principles expressing the 
idea of democratic equality, which can be accepted by 
citizens in the conditions of pluralism. Rawls indicates that 
from the point of view of political liberalism, a democratic 
constitution should contain two elements that are 
understood as ‘constitutional essentials’: 
                                                          
53 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. 
54 Ibid., p. 137. 
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a) fundamental principles that specify the general 
structure of government and the political process: 
the powers of the legislature, executive and the 
judiciary; the scope of majority rule; and 
b) equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that 
legislative majorities are to respect: such as the right 
to vote and participate in politics, liberty of 
conscience, freedom of thought and of association, 
as well as the protections of the rule of law’55.  
These are not equivalent elements in the sense that their 
meaning is the same. The second important element of a 
constitution is contained in the very sense of a constitution 
of a democratic state, while the first is related to the 
pragmatism of exercising political power. If the rights and 
freedoms contained in the second constituent of the 
constitution are preserved, it can be presumed that the way 
of organising the power respects the principles of 
democracy, whereas even the most rational organisation of 
a system of political power cannot be considered democratic 
in the absence of political rights of participation and 
fundamental freedoms of the individual. Without ensuring 
fundamental subjectivity we cannot speak of free and equal 
citizens, and when this is the case we cannot speak of 
democracy either. Equal rights of participating in the 
democratic process constitute a sort of democratic ‘rights of 
rights’56. Liberal democracy defined by the above 
constitutional essentials would be a system functioning 
                                                          
55 Ibid., p. 227. 
56 Cf. J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford-New York 2004, p. 156, cf. 
also chapter 11. 
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according to the ‘logic of equality’57. In other words, with 
the constitutionalisation of political rights, citizens acquire 
political subjectivity and are able to establish a real political 
entity. Regardless of whether the ontological primacy of 
constituent power is recognised before constituted power, it 
is only with the constitutionalisation of equal rights of 
participation in the democratic process that the civic 
subjectivity assumes a real and normative meaning. In such 
an interpretation the principle of liberalism is linked to 
democracy, as the liberal rights of political participation 
may only be realised in a democratic system, whilst 
democracy itself is based on these very rights58.  
                                                          
57 Cf. R. A. Dahl, On Democracy. p. 10. Rosanvallon points to equality as a 
constitutive idea for a democratic society: ‘I therefore propose to begin by 
reexamining the spirit of equality as it was forged in the American and French 
Revolutions. Equality was then understood primarily as a relation, as a way of 
making a society, of producing and living in common. It was seen as a 
democratic quality and not merely as a measure of the distribution of wealth. 
This relational idea of equality was articulated in connection with three other 
notions: similarity, independence, and citizenship. Similarity comes under the 
head of equality as equivalence: to be ‘alike’ is to have the same essential 
properties, such that remaining differences do not affect the character of the 
relationship. In dependence is equality as autonomy; it is defined negatively as 
the absence of subordination and positively as equilibrium in exchange. 
Citizenship involves equality as participation, which is constituted by 
community membership and civic activity. Consequently, the project of equality 
as relationship was interpreted in terms of a world of like human beings (or 
semblables, as Alexis de Tocqueville would say), a society of autonomous 
individuals, and a community of citizens’, P. Rosanvallon, The Society of Equals, 
p. 10. 
58 If we assumed the above stance ‘illiberal democracy’ would be internally 
contradictory, cf. also J. W. Müller, What is Populism?, Philadelphia 2016, 
chapter 2. Cf. Habermas's attempt to combine democracy and liberalism, i.e. 
presentation of their relationship as ‘non-paradoxical’, J. Habermas, 
Constitutional Democracy..., pp. 776-778. ‘The sought-for internal relation 
between popular sovereignty and human rights consists in the fact that the 
system of rights states precisely the conditions under which the forms of 
communication necessary for the genesis of legitimate law can be legally 
institutionalized’, J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a 
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The close relationship between fundamental 
freedoms and the democratic political procedure causes 
fundamental rights and freedoms to be interpreted by Rawls 
as an expression of the principle of equal participation. It is 
to express the idea of civic equality with the condition for 
its realisation consisting in ensuring equal rights and 
freedoms to citizens. ‘Since the constitution is the 
foundation of the social structure, the highest-order system 
of rules that regulates and controls other institutions, 
everyone has the same access to the political procedure that 
it sets up. When the principle of participation is satisfied, all 
have the common status of equal citizen’59. An ideal form 
of demonstrating such an inclusive procedure of 
establishing the constitution is the social agreement: each 
party has an equal voice in the procedure for the 
establishment of the system. On the lower level of 
deliberation, i.e. the level of participation in a ‘regular’ 
political process, the principle of participation ‘requires that 
all citizens have equal rights to take part in, and to determine 
the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes 
the laws with which they are to comply with’60. Of course, 
within the context of a modern democratic system this 
occurs in the form of representative democracy, which 
guarantees the citizens the right to participate in the form of 
specific electoral rights, parliamentary law, party system, 
expression of opinions, etc. 
 By emphasising the importance of constitutional 
rights of participation in the political process, political 
                                                          
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg, Cambridge 1996, p. 
104, cf. pp. 118-131. 
59 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge 1999, p. 200. 
60 Ibid., p. 194. 
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liberalism in a way refers to the republican affirmation of 
politics as an area in which the specific human nature is 
fulfilled61. H. Arendt divides fundamental human activities 
into labour, work, and action. In general, labour is linked to 
the biological side of humanity, work is an expression of the 
creative side (production of the ‘artificial’ world of things), 
action is a form of activity, which occurs exclusively 
‘between people’ and therefore has a specifically social 
character (intersubjective)62. ‘Human plurality, the basic 
condition of both action and speech, has the twofold 
character of equality and distinction. If men were not equal, 
they could neither understand each other and those who 
came before them, nor plan for the future and foresee the 
needs of those who will come after them. If men were not 
distinct, each human being distinguished from any other 
who is, was, or will ever be, they would need neither speech 
nor action to make themselves understood’63. The area of 
specifically human matters is situated in the ‘interpersonal’ 
sphere, where action constitutes the proper form of activity. 
It occurs in the public sphere and is concerned with public 
affairs. The rights of political participation allow for an 
occurrence of a specifically human form of activity, and the 
value of the constitution is that it organises a space in which 
various forms of human activity may be manifested. Thus, 
it allows fulfilment of this element of human nature that is 
specific for it (i.e. distinguishes humans from other beings), 
                                                          
61 Of course, it does not issue strong ethical claims concerning citizens' 
preferences of the public good, cf. Habermas's criticism of republicanism and 
narrowly understood liberalism (limited to private rights) in Three Normative 
Models of Democracy, [in:] Democracy and Difference. Contesting the 
Boundaries of the Political, ed. S. Benhabib, Prncteon 1996, pp. 21-23, 26, 29. 
62 Cf. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago-London 1998, pp. 7 et seq. 
63 Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
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namely acting in a public forum and for public purposes. In 
such an interpretation liberal constitutionalism provides the 
principles by which a specific form of human activity may 
take place according to the principles of democratic 
citizenship and social co-operation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
According to Mouffe, a specific value of liberal democracy 
is that ‘it creates a space in which this confrontation is kept 
open, power relations are always being put into question and 
no victory can be final’64. For modern liberal democracy, 
the acceptance of pluralism is of a constitutive meaning. It 
relates not only to the very fact of diversity, but to the 
recognition of diversity as a desirable state and awarding 
equal rights to all persons. Properly understood political 
liberalism65 should ‘cherish’ such pluralism, thus allowing 
for the widest possible discussion and public debate and 
questioning of both current affairs (e.g. ordinary legislation 
or government decisions) and the very bases of the political 
system66. This means that liberalism indeed enters into 
a conflict with democracy when it limits pluralism by 
                                                          
64 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 15. 
65 This article is concerned with the theory of liberal constitutionalism and not 
with political practice, therefore this theory can also serve as a criticism of a 
practice that is called ‘liberal’ yet does not pursue fundamental liberal ideas. 
66 ‘Within our tradition there has been a consensus that the discussion of general 
political, religious, and philosophical doctrines can never be censored. Thus the 
leading problem of the freedom of political speech has focused on the question 
of subversive advocacy, that is, on advocacy of political doctrines an essential 
part of which is the necessity of revolution, or the use of unlawful force, and the 
incitement thereto as a means of political change’, J. Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, p. 343. ‘To repress subversive advocacy is to suppress the discussion 
of these reasons, and to do this is to restrict the free and informed public use of 
our reason in judging the justice of the basic structure and its social policies. 
And thus the basic liberty of freedom of thought is violated’, Ibid., p. 346. 
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formal restrictions in the possibility of participating in 
public discourse67. ‘In a democratic policy, conflicts and 
confrontations, far from being a sign of imperfection, 
indicate that democracy is alive and inhabited by 
pluralism’68. Rawls's ‘constitutional essentials’ should 
therefore allow citizens to participate equally in public 
discourse regardless of their political power. In other words, 
they should make the democratic system open to change and 
re-interpretation both in terms of common legislation as well 
as with regard to basic principles. However, such changes 
should take place while being embedded within the 
framework of democratic principles and not violating them, 
therefore an actual (and not only declared) refusal to 
recognise the civic equality of certain classes of citizens 
would breach both liberalism and democracy. Taking into 
account the pluralism of a democratic society, awarding all 
citizens with equal rights of political participation makes the 
content of democratic legislation variable or open to change. 
C. Lefort argues that democracy is connected with a process 
of calling things into question, which is endless and is a 
presumed part of social practice69. If various aspirations and 
conflicts cannot be resolved within the framework of a 
symbolic practice of questioning things, movements seeking 
to ‘define society’, making it ‘one’ may occur, which on the 
                                                          
67 In the above interpretation liberalism is not far from Mouffe's radical and 
pluralist democracy, i.e. the political project assuming the existence of conflict 
and violence, calling for the establishment of a group of institutions that would 
‘limit and contest’ dominance and violence, yet would not eliminate conflict and 
diversity, Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 22. Cf. Ch. Mouffe, 
Agonistics. Thinking the World Politically, London-New York 2013, chapter 1. 
68 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 34. 
69 C. Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. D. Macey, Cambridge 
1988, p. 19. 
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other hand leads to totalitarianism. The functioning of a 
democracy depends on allowing an open ‘practice of 
questioning’ within the context of ‘an institutionalised 
conflict’. ‘The exercise of power is subject to the procedures 
of periodical redistributions. It represents the outcome of a 
controlled contest with permanent rules. This phenomenon 
implies an institutionalization of conflict. The locus of 
power is an empty place, it cannot be occupied - it is such 
that no individual and no group can be consubstantial with 
it – and it cannot be represented’70. A democratic-liberal 
constitution does not fill the said ‘empty place of power,’ 
but maintains an ‘institutionalisation of conflict’, thus 
ensuring an open and inclusive way of operating of the 
system, i.e. giving citizens an opportunity to participate in 
the ‘practice of questioning’ of the existing status quo ‘as 
equals’. If the above interpretation is correct, the democratic 
paradox is that democracy indeed needs liberal 
constitutionalism in order to function as an open and 
pluralistic system.  
.
                                                          
70 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Liberal democracy’s rocky path – the cases of 




The present paper’s objective is to shed light on the extent, 
to which the idea of a liberal democracy has taken root in 
Kenya and Tanzania. The paper very briefly outlines some 
distinctive features and assumptions of liberalism and how 
the same relates to the idea of democracy, before putting 
both concepts – the liberalism and the democracy – into 
Kenyan and Tanzanian contexts. In so doing, it focuses on 
the historical development, in particular the views of the 
leading independence figures: Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; these leaders had decisive 
impact on the development path, which the both states chose 
after securing independence in the 1960’s. The paper closes 
with some recent examples of legal practice from Kenya and 
Tanzania, discussed in the light of the respective 
constitutional framework. Given the attempts to 
conceptualise some forms of democracy that are not liberal, 
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e.g. in Poland and Hungary, the East African experience can 
prove valuable for comparative studies. 
 
2. Liberalism  
Individualism or primacy of the individual over collective 
interests is the core value to which liberalism subscribes. 
Accordingly, the individual has a dignity; she cannot be 
treated as an instrument to other policy aims; rather, she is 
an end ‘in itself’. Liberalism further assumes that 
individuals are equal and may have different conceptions of 
what a good life is; identifying, selecting and pursuing a 
conception of good is left to individuals, whose interest may 
conflict and who may disagree on values.1 For this reason, 
in the liberal view, there cannot be an ‘official conception 
of good’. A liberal view suggests that such a conception, 
once established and enforced by the state, leads to injustice 
and oppression.2 
Societies are regarded as voluntary associations of 
individuals and appraised as good, only if they are good for 
individuals. In the classical liberal view, the state actions are 
based on the harm principle: As John Stuart Mill puts it, 
preventing harm to others is the only purpose for which the 
power can be exercised in a civilised community.3 Mill 
emphasises that ‘over himself, over his own body and mind, 
                                                          
1 It was Immanuel Kant, who gave this shape to the idea of human dignity. See 
generally George Fletcher, 'Loyalty' in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and 
Legal Theory, ed. Dennis Patterson, 2nd ed. (Chichester: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2010), p. 516; Robert Talisse, Democracy after Liberalism. Pragmatism 
and Deliberative Politics (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 80-81; John Rawls, 
‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical' Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 
(1985): pp. 223–251, p. 245. 
2 Rawls, (supra note 1), p. 247. 
3 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York and Melbourne: The Walter Scott 
Publishing, 1901), 17. 
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the individual is sovereign’4, an assumption which places 
protection of individual rights at the core of the liberal 
concept.  
As the most important attribute of this individual 
sovereignty, John Stuart Mill regards the freedom of 
conscience or freedom of thought and by extension also the 
freedom of expression. Although the latter – as Mill claims 
– belongs to the sphere of individual conduct affecting other 
people, it is of the same importance as the freedom of 
thought and it rests on the same reasons.5 Silencing opinions 
is ‘robbing of the human race’, since ‘If the opinion is right, 
they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for 
truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, 
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, 
produced by its collision with error.6 For Mill, lack of debate 
is harmful, as it supresses the ‘high scale of mental activity 
which has made some periods of history so remarkable’.7 
The freedom of opinion is thus necessary for the ‘mental 
well-being of the mankind’.8 It is also necessary for the 
pursuit of truth, for even erroneous opinions may contain a 
portion of it, and the prevailing opinion is never the whole 
truth. Moreover, the prevailing opinions, if not vigorously 
contested and discussed, may degenerate into mere 
prejudice, formal dogmas, deprived of vital effects 
inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 22. 
6 Ibid., 31. 
7 Ibid., 63. 
8 Ibid., 97. 
42 | T o m a s z  M i l e j   
preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, 
from reason or personal experience’.9  
 
3. Liberalism and Democracy 
The relationship between liberalism and democracy is an 
ambivalent one. On one hand, democracy and liberalism 
converge on the level of values. ‘One man, one vote’ – one 
of the most basic democratic principles – and the inclusion 
of those affected by collective decisions and actions into the 
decision making processes exemplify the liberal idea of 
equality of individuals and their equal moral worth.10 The 
freedom of expression becomes particularly important, 
since otherwise the free and equal individuals cannot voice 
their individual preferences and autonomous choices, which 
can be aggregated fairly in the society, or – according to 
deliberative democratic theorists – the individuals cannot 
contribute to collective judgements, which should be 
reached by argument and persuasion rather than be imposed 
by elites.11 Moreover, as a matter of empirical observation, 
democracies seem to have better record when it comes to 
protection of individual rights – cherished by liberals – than 
other, especially authoritarian forms of government.12  
                                                          
9 Ibid., 98. 
10 See Mark E. Warren, ‘Democracy and the State’ in The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Theory, ed. John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 382–399, 383-394; Talisse (supra note 1), 24; 
The fact that in a democracy, the 'free and equal citizens' are the source of 
political power is emphasised by John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded 
Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 137 and 217. 
Democracy and Liberalism are however juxtaposed by John Skorupski, ‘Rawls, 
Liberalism, and Democracy’ Ethics 128 (2017): 173–98, 178.  
11 See Talisse, (supra note1), 23 and 81; Warren, (supra note 10), 391. 
12 See Ian Shapiro, Politics against Domination (Campridge MA & London: The 
Belknap Press, 2016), 68 et seq. arguing that democratic government is the best 
protector against domination. 
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But on the other hand, when it comes into translating 
basic values into political arrangements, the decision-
making by a majority entails risks for the outvoted minority; 
democracy understood as a rule of the majority may turn to 
a tyranny of majority, in which the rights of individuals are 
not respected.13 Therefore, in liberal democracies the 
individual and the state are juxtaposed: A government in a 
liberal democracy is a limited government respecting 
individual rights – an idea traceable to John Locke.14 The 
latter are safeguarded by multiplication of veto points 
designed to counter the political action of the majority. This 
is also where the separation of powers comes in and the role 
of courts and judicial review becomes important. 
In this sense, the liberal democracy as a political 
arrangement does not reflect a comprehensive political 
philosophy,15 but is rather a result of an on-going struggle 
between the liberal tradition on one hand and the democratic 
tradition on the other: Whereas the former in classical form 
emphasises the individual freedom and personal self-
determination as a source of a normative order, the radical 
democrats point to the supremacy of the general will, 
through which the individuals become citizens of a 
                                                          
13 See most notably Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America: Historical-
Critical Edition of De La Démocratie En Amérique, ed. Eduardo Nolla, trans. 
James T. Schleifer, vol. 2 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010), 412 (‘I believe 
liberty is in danger when this power encounters no obstacle that can check its 
courser and give it time to moderate itself’). But see also the critical analysis in 
Shapiro, Politics (supra note 12), 68 and 78-79. 
14 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Hanckett 
Publishing Company, 1980), paras. 139 and 149, see also the editor's 
introduction p. vii et seq. 
15 As a matter of political theory, it was John Rawls, who attempted the most 
notable fusion of the democratic and the liberal tradition, in which free and equal 
citizens, whose political power is rooted in a public reason, engage in a social 
cooperation on fair terms. See in particular Rawls, (supra note 10), 290-301.  
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democratic republic and acquire rights which they did not 
have before.16 Keeping this tension alive and 
accommodating the liberal standpoint in constitutional 
arrangements aims at assuring that the democracy does not 
degenerate into a populist autocracy. 
 
4. Liberalism, Democracy and East Africa 
In East Africa, the liberal concept of democracy, as outlined 
above has been facing two types of challenge; the first type 
of challenge may be dubbed ‘philosophical’ while the other 
one is of a socio-economical nature. 
 
4.1. The philosophical challenge 
It was Jomo Kenyatta – and the country’s first president –, 
whose views appear to be on the opposite to what the 
liberals hail as primacy of the individual. Kenyatta’s 
political stance, which eventually calls into question this 
very fundamental liberal assumption, is informed by his 
anthropological views. According to the first Kenyan 
president the ‘African society traditionally revolves around 
the family tree, the wider pattern of blood and brotherhood, 
and the wider network of clans and tribes’.17 To an African 
‘The traditional tribal council was at once a Government and 
an expression of the very personality if each and every 
citizen’18. Kenyatta goes on to explain, that ‘by obeying the 
Tribal Councils the people maintained that they obeyed 
themselves and their true will’.19 He further seems to reject 
                                                          
16 See Skorupski, (supra note 10), 175 and 177. 
17 Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya 
Nation (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1968), 229. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.  
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the idea of limited government claiming that ‘We do not 
subscribe to the motion of the Government and the governed 
being in opposition to one another, the one clamouring for 
duties and the other crying out for rights’.20  
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania takes a similar position. 
According to him ‘[the] African has always been a free 
individual, but seeing no conflict between his own interests 
and those of his community. This is because the structure of 
his society was, in fact, a direct extension of his family. First 
you had a small unit; this merged into a larger ‘blood’ 
family, which in its turn merged into a tribe’.21 Clearly, the 
authors of these words do not look at societies as at 
voluntary associations of individuals. Quite on the contrary, 
it is the embeddedness of the individual in the society and 
the obedience to its traditional authorities, which helps the 
individual to her true self. However, Nyerere also points out 
that the affairs of the community were traditionally 
conducted in ‘free and equal discussion’.22 Hence, he does 
not seem to regard his model of an ‘African community’ as 
being completely at odds with liberal ideals.  
Most obviously, liberalism is not the only school of thought 
shaping today’s democracies. Originating from the mid 
1960’s, the quotations of Jomo Kenyatta to some extent 
coincide with the ideas underlying the communitarian 
concept of democracy, still very much alive in the 
contemporary political thought. According to scholars in the 
communitarian tradition, the liberalism misreads the social 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 227. 
21 Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity - Uhuru Na Umoja. A Selection from 
Writings and Speeches 1952-65 (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 
105 and 170. 
22 Ibid., 105. 
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nature of individuals.23 What constitutes individuals, as 
beings are collective norms and practices and characters; 
those norms are the true ‘sources of the self’; they supply 
the life with telos, meaning, and value.24 Consequently, 
individual rights are subordinated to collective conceptions 
of good, of which the sense of belonging is the most basic.25 
The role of the state is not just harm avoidance, but 
empowerment of its citizens.26 Thus, in a nutshell, while 
individuals make societies according to the liberal view, the 
communitarian view holds that it is the other way round: it 
is the societies which ‘make’ individuals. As Michael 
Sandel emphasises, justice is not about maximising utility 
or respecting freedom of choice, as the liberals would want 
to; rather, it requires ‘to reason together about the meaning 
                                                          
23 On the communitarian tradition see generally, Talisse, (supra note1), 21 et 
seq. and Ian Shapiro, The Moral Foundations of Politics (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 151 et seq. 
24 This element of communitarian tradition is emphasised by Shapiro (supra note 
23), 170; see also most notably Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in 
Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2007), in particular 33-34, 112, 135, 258. According to MacIntyre, there is an 
objective conception of good forming a basis for the authority of virtues and 
law; it is entrenched in the relationships within a given community as 
‘fragmented survivals from the past’. And it is a membership in the community, 
which provides the individuals with the understanding of such a conception. The 
individual occupies a certain space within a set of social relationships. 
According to MacIntyre ‘to know oneself as such a social person is however not 
to occupy a static and fixed position. It is to find oneself placed at a certain point 
on a journey with set goals; to move through life is to make progress – or to fail 
to make progress – toward a given end’ (at 34). 
25 See Shapiro (supra note 23), 153, 177 with further references and 183 (‘We 
might say that ‘‘I belong, therefore I am’’ is the communitarian alternative to 
the Cartesian cogito’), see also Talisse, (supra note 1), 24 and 93. 
26 See generally Talisse, (supra note1), 24 and 93. As stressed by Michael 
Sandel, a leading communitarian tradition scholar, ‘If a just society requires a 
strong sense of community, it must find a way to cultivate in citizens a concern 
for the whole, a dedication to the common good’ Michael J. Sandel, Justice. 
What Is the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 
485.  
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of the good life, and to create a public culture hospitable to 
the disagreements that will inevitably arise’.27 
Siding with what one would call today a communitarian 
view in terms of political morality, Jomo Kenyatta – as 
opposed to Nyerere – does not advance radical economic 
solutions. In particular, he does not deny to the individual 
the property rights. For him, the need for protection of 
property rights does not originate from the human nature, 
but is rather a question of necessity; acknowledging that 
private property is an element of pride and hard-won 
freedom, Jomo Kenyatta warns that lack of respect for it 
would lead to ‘utter chaos, total injustice, destruction of the 
state’.28 And even if Kenya did not eventually embark on 
communist experiments, Kenyatta’s take had to face the 
challenge from his influential former independence struggle 
comrade Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, who put forward a much 
more radical programme, including nationalisations. 
Following a split with Kenyatta, Odinga established his own 
party – the Kenya People’s Union (KPU), which was 
eventually abolished by the government in 1969.29  
In the course of history, the Kenyan reality exposed some 
risks of the communitarian view.30 The emphasis on respect 
                                                          
27 Sandel, (supra note 26), 480-481. 
28 Kenyatta, (supra note 17), 310. 
29 See William Ochieng, ‘The Kenyatta, Odinga and Mboya Wars: 1963-1969’ 
in A History of Independent Kenya. A Celebration of Kenya’s Fieftieth 
Aniversary, ed. William Ochieng (Kusumu: Lake Publishers and Stationers, 
2013), 55-57. 
30 Ian Shapiro points out that ‘[…] claims of the form ‘‘the American people 
believe’’ or ‘‘the Jewish people must stand together’’ may be attempts to 
mobilize group support vis-à-vis an out group, but they can also operate to 
suppress internal dissent and opposition’ and further ‘[i]n practice, ‘‘respecting 
traditional communal practice’’ may amount to validating a system of internal 
oppression that would be difficult to justify on any grounds other than blunt 
appeal to existing practice’. See Shapiro (supra note 23), 183. The developments 
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of communal norms, practices and authorities was translated 
into a authoritarian and later even dictatorial rule, which – 
as it will be explained – came to an end only in 2002. 
Another Kenyan characteristic, which the communitarian 
perspective does not adequately address, is the lack of the 
only one single collective national identity, the one sense of 
belonging, which supplies the life with meaning. Being a 
multi-ethnic society,31 the national ‘Kenyan’ collective 
identity has always coexisted, even if not necessarily 
competed, with the ‘ethnic’ one. Jomo Kenyatta and his 
successor in office Daniel arap Moi addressed the plurality 
of identities emphasising the need of the nation-building 
project and its prevalence over tribal divisions.32 Yet, the 
political practice was to a large extent at odds with this 
approach.33 The ethnicity-based inclusion of some 
individuals into the circles of power has led to exclusion of 
others; and ethnic mobilisation of communities not once 
ended up in a dramatic political unrest.34 
 
 
                                                          
in Kenya and Tanzania support Shapiro’s point; the hospitability to 
disagreements postulated by Sandel kept dwindling with time.  
31 In Kenya, the five largest ethnic groups constitute 70% of population, whereas 
in Tanzania the largest ethnic group accounts for 13% and this is the only group, 
whose share in the Tanzanian population exceeds 5% - see East Africa Living 
Encyclopaedia available africa.upenn.edu. The multitude of smaller ethnic 
groups could be one of the reasons, why ethnic identity in Tanzania has not 
competed with the national identity to such a large extend as it did in Kenya. 
32 See Kenyatta, (supra note 17), 310; Daniel arap Moi, Kenya African 
Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles (Nairobi: MacMillan, 1986), 21. 
33 See Pius O. Cokumu, ‘Jomo Kenyatta and the Politics of Transition, 1866-80’ 
in A History of Independent Kenya. A Celebration of Kenya’s Fieftieth 
Aniversary, ed. William Ochieng (Kusumu: Lake Publishers and Stationers, 
2013), 87. On the practices of the Moi regime see further below.  
34 The 2007/2008 Post-Electoral Violence, which left around 1,100 people killed 
and thousands displaced is perhaps the best-known example. 
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4.2. The socio-economic challenge 
Going through the thoughts of Kenyatta and Nyerere, one is 
inclined to conclude that according to both statesmen, the 
liberal ideology is simply at odds with social and economic 
necessities in the region, especially with those, which 
prevailed on independence in the early sixties. As Kenyatta 
claimed, ‘the evils of colonialism and imperialism left mass 
poverty, illiteracy, disease and ignorance in our midst’.35 
Nyerere’s diagnosis of Tanganyika is not different.36 
However, Nyerere seems to be more explicit on what he 
regards as gross economic inequalities. In his account on the 
early years of independence, Nyerere observes that the 
economy was based on subsistence agriculture, in which the 
masses of people were living ‘a life of poverty and 
insecurity […], while a small number of farmers from 
Europe were obtaining a comfortable life – often at expense 
of their exploited workers’.37 This is attributed to the 
policies during the colonial era, when the society ‘was 
organised so as to separate people form different races, give 
privilege to those of European origin, and make the African 
people feel that they were inferior’.38 
Those socio-economic conditions prevailing in the first 
decades after independence were invoked to cast doubt on 
                                                          
35 Kenyatta, (supra note 17), 310. 
36 Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Development - Uhuru Na Maendeleo (Dar es 
Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1973), 296 (’[W]e inherited a society which 
was basically illiterate, and where the number of people with even secondary 
school education was very small indeed. Thus, for example, in 1961 there was a 
total of only 11,832 children in the secondary schools in Tanganyika and only 
176 of them were in the Sixth form!’. 
37 Ibid., 264. 
38 Ibid., 266. 
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the relevance of political rights in African context.39 Instead, 
the imperative of development carried the day. According to 
the underlying ideology of developmentalism, the economic 
development was to take precedence over everything; the 
politics – and one must also add individual political 
freedoms – were regarded as at best secondary in relation to 
economic development; politics was to be replaced by 
government.40 In a situation of little control of capital and 
skills, the government was seen as an economic resource, 
perhaps even as the most important one. According to 
Kenyatta ‘Through this Government the African controls 
and directs land use, commerce and industry, power and 
communication, finance and employment. If we weaken the 
Government, we weaken the only major force for African 
advancement’. The party was regarded as another important 
resource; praising the idea of a ‘one-party democracy’, 
Nyerere observes that allowing for competition of different 
political organisations ‘the nation was wasting one of the 
few resources it had – a mass organisation which the people 
trusted and through which they could both express their 
views and co-operate with the projects being executed 
through the state machinery’.41 Kenyatta also supports the 
idea of a one-party state, claiming, however, that such a state 
does not have to be authoritarian; he does not oppose multi-
                                                          
39 Claude Ake juxtaposes human rights in ‘procedural liberal sense’ with those 
in ‘concrete socialist sense’, Claude Ake, ‘The African Context of Human 
Rights’ Africa Today 34 (1987): 5–12, 7; see also Reginald Herbold Green, 
‘Vision of Human-Centred Development: A Study in Moral Economy’ in 
Mwalimu. The Influence of Nyerere, ed. Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari 
(London: James Currey, 1995), 80. 
40 Gamaliel Mgongo Fimbo, Multipartyism, Constitutions & Law in Africa (Dar 
es Salaam: lawAfrica, 2013), 21.  
41 Nyerere, (supra note 36), 275. 
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partism in principle, but does not regard it as fitting into 
Kenyan conditions at independence.42 
Nyerere is generally more radical than Kenyatta. Whereas 
Kenyatta declares respect for private property,43 Nyerere 
makes very far-reaching claims obviously inspired by the 
communist ideology. Even if he asserts that the term 
development in its proper sense means ‘a growth for a 
people in freedom, and a growth of a society, which upholds 
and protects that freedom’,44 he does not equate the 
‘freedom’ with primacy of individual in the liberal sense. He 
means ‘development of justice’ among the people and links 
it with socialism, rather than with a democracy; he also 
regards socialism and freedom as ‘indivisible’.45 A political 
democracy under conditions of gross economic inequalities, 
which according to Nyerere were prevailing in the early 
independence years, is ‘at best imperfect and at worst a 
hollow sham’. Freedom for Nyerere seems to be in first 
instance freedom from economic exploitation.46 Nyerere’s 
political imperative was therefore to ‘prevent the growth of 
a class structure in our society’.47 Accordingly, Nyerere 
wants to embark on a state-led formative project of ‘building 
socialism’ which does not only entail a complete 
transformation of the economy, but also – and here the 
contrast to the liberal approach cannot be more striking – 
some sort of a mind-set transformation; for Nyerere it is not 
                                                          
42 Kenyatta, (supra note 17), 227 and 231. 
43 Kenyatta, (supra note 17), 310. 
44 Nyerere, (supra note 36), 259. 
45 Ibid. 
46 James S. Read, ‘Human Rights in Tanzania’ in Mwalimu. The Influence of 
Nyerere, ed. Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari (London: James Currey, 1995), 
132. 
47 Nyerere, (supra note 21), 210 
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only about ‘building socialism’ but also ensuring that the 
people ‘act like socialists’.48 In his view, due to the fact that 
the ‘productive forces’ are developed only to a little extent 
‘a revolutionary consciousness is not developing in a 
spontaneous manner. It has to be induced from above by a 
political leadership that is willing and anxious to overthrow 
remnants of the past’.49 
The entire developmentalist ideology – as implemented both 
in Kenya and even more in Tanzania - seems to rely on an 
unwritten assumption that liberal democracy entails 
economic costs, thus putting development at risk. From 
today’s perspective, the empirical evidence suggests that 
rather the opposite is true.50 Back then however, the liberal 
idea of limiting the government or countering the 
government action through various veto players for the sake 
of individual rights was at odds with the prevailing 
paradigm of a government-led development. 
 
4.3. Political consequences 
The idea of government and party based development 
ushered in a concentration of power in the executive, which 
was controlled by a monopolist party.51 The ‘executive 
presidency’ became soon an ‘imperial presidency’. In 
addition, according to what the leaders declared, achieving 
                                                          
48 Nyerere, (supra note 36), 284-285 
49 Cited after John J. Okumu, Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 107. 
50 Shapiro (supra note 23), 165 with further references. 
51 In Tanzania the one-party system was officially introduced in 1965. In Kenya 
the KANU established itself as a de facto one party regime in 1969. It was 
sanctioned by a constitutional amendment in 1982. See William Tordorff, 
Government and Politics in Africa, 4th ed. (Houndmills and New York: palgrave 
macmillan, 2002), 110. 
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some sort of national unity appeared more important than 
promotion of individual freedom, as a core postulate of 
liberalism. In Kenya, the national coherence and unity was 
meant to overcome tribal divisions; in Tanzania it was more 
about avoidance or eradication of class cleavages. The 
practical result was a dictatorship, of which both states were 
held in grip for a long time. There were no serious veto 
players. Also the judiciary, whose independence guarantees 
were systematically eroded, abdicated as a protector of 
individual rights against the ruling party elite.52 The 
independence constitution, being a product of negotiations 
between a part of Kenyan elites with the colonisers lacked 
the necessary authority and its guarantees were soon 
watered down or abolished through a series of constitutional 
amendments.53 The imperial presidency was fully 
established under Kenyatta’s authoritarian rule before he 
died in 1978.54 
But the most difficult days for Kenya’s democracy were yet 
to come. Jomo Kenyatta’s successor, president Daniel arap 
                                                          
52 See Makau Mutua, ‘Justice under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial 
Subservience in Kenya’ Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001): 96–118, 101; Joe 
Oloka-Onyango, ‘Human Rights and Public Interest Litigation in East Africa: A 
Bird’s Eye View’ The George Washington International Law Review 47 (2015): 
763–823, 774-775. Both authors emphasise that the tradition of a subdued 
judiciary has its roots in the colonial era. According to Oloka-Onyango ‘the 
judiciary viewed itself much more as an appendage to the goals of achieving 
colonial (in)justice than as a bastion for the protection of the indigenous 
population’, ibid., 774. See further Gordon Obote-Magaga, ‘The Nyayo Era & 
Single Party: 1978-2002’ in A History of Independent Kenya. A Celebration of 
Kenya’s Fieftieth Aniversary, ed. William Ochieng (Kusumu: Lake Publishers 
and Stationers, 2013), 131 et seq. with further references. For ‘many particularly 
shocking instances of judicial timidity and complicity with the executive’ during 
the Moi regime era, see Mutua, ibid., 114 et seq. 
53 See PLO Lumumba and Luis G Franceschi, The Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
An Introductory Commentary (Nairobi: Strathmore University Press, 2014), 30 
et seq. 
54 See Cokumu (supra note 33), 87 et seq. 
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Moi installed in Kenya a quite harsh dictatorship, especially 
in the period following the attempted military coup in 1982. 
Political criticism was supressed, the security of tenure of 
judges and civil servants removed and Moi’s political 
opponents oppressed, detained – often without trial – and 
terrorised.55 Ironically, Moi championed an official state 
ideology of ‘peace, love and unity’ called Nyayo – a 
Kiswahili word for ‘footsteps’. It was the footsteps of Jomo 
Kenyatta which were to be followed. 
Officially, the Nyayoism aimed at ‘continuous process of 
the consolidation of the elements which integrate people 
into a common wholeness’. This was according to Moi an 
important task to fulfil, since, as Moi pointed out, 
‘throughout the colonial period Kenya was never a nation’. 
The state was to be engaged in ‘continual upgrading and 
achieving of the sense of commitment to a common goal’; 
Kenyans had to share ‘a cause for togetherness’, ‘identify 
common principles’ and develop ‘a common philosophy of 
life’. Needless to say, this is not liberal, but also not for what 
the scholars in communitarian tradition advocate: the civic 
virtues should be forged through public engagement with 
moral disagreements,56 and not through imposition of one 
particular state-sponsored philosophy of life. Moi’s 
profoundly anti-liberal programme emphasised integrative, 
trans-tribal forces. Yet in practice, especially after return to 
a multi-party system in 1991, in order to stay in power, Moi 
incited violent clashes between ethnic communities which 
                                                          
55 Obote-Magaga, (supra note 52), 127-130. 
56 See Sandel, (supra note 26), 495. The difference to the liberal approach lies in 
the fact that latter leaves moral convictions to the citizens, and, as a matter of 
the constitutional set-up, looks only for an overlapping consensus among those 
convictions.  
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left – according to different estimations – between 100057 
and 300058 people dead; the Nyayo ideology actually 
became what John Stuart Mill thought that would happen to 
uncontested opinions: a mere prejudice without vital effects. 
The so-called ‘negative ethnicity’ mobilised by politicians 
led to the post-electoral violence of 2007/2008.59 Also 
today, the Kenyan politics is organised along ethnic 
cleavages and the dominant ethno-centric narrative 
competes with the liberal idea of the primacy of the 
individual. Regarding the development paradigm under 
Moi, it is best summarised by the words of one of his 
ministers and close confidents: ‘So much time is wasted for 
elections, while people should be engaging in 
development’.60 
While Kenya remained a market economy, Tanzania 
underwent an attempt of a Marxist or even Maoist redesign 
of the society. The agenda for it was set in a so-called 
Arusha declaration of 1967 made by the central committee 
of the ruling party. It included nationalisation of economy.61 
The state was to become the major supplier, as – according 
to Nyerere – private sector cannot provide services 
affordable to poor people. The vocabulary became 
militarised and could not have been further from Mill’s 
harm principle justifying state action. The state embarked 
                                                          
57 According to Obote-Magaga, (supra note 52), 129. 
58 According to Kibe Mungai, ‘The Law and Ledership - The Post-Colonial 
Experience in Kenya’ in Governance and Development. Towards Quality 
Leadership in Kenya, ed. Kimani Njogu (Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 
2007), 84. 
59 See supra note 34. 
60 Cited after Mungai, (supra note 58), 77. 
61 On nationalisations in Tanzania see generally Chris Maina Peter, Foreign 
Private Investments in Tanzania. A Study of the Legal Framework (Konstanz: 
Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 1989), 20 et seq.  
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on a ‘war against poverty’62, the economic policies were 
designed as ‘frontal attacks’ and ‘operations’ and raising 
agricultural production became a ‘matter of life and 
death’.63 The redesign of the society did not go without 
human rights violations. An example is the villigisation 
programme aiming at establishment of so-called ujamaa 
villages where people were supposed to live and work on 
state-owned farms. Between 1973 and 1976, around 10 
million people had to leave their homes and were forcefully 
moved to work on the ujamaa farms,64 whose economic 
efficiency turned out to be very low and environmental 
impact (land degradation) precarious.65 On the political 
plane, the ruling party’s control was omnipresent; the local 
boards of the party were overseeing judiciary and the party 
also installed a parallel system of arbitrage. In 1983, the 
National Anti-Economic Sabotage Tribunal was 
established. It could impose harsh penalties for certain 
economic ‘crimes’, such as ‘hoarding of commodities’ 
under very weak procedural safeguards for the defendant.66 
The political opponents were oppressed using a Preventive 
Detention Act and according to the Tanzanian Penal Code 
‘intimidation of the Executive, Legislative or Judiciary of 
the United Republic’ amounted to high treason and was 
                                                          
62 Nyerere, (supra note 36), 286. 
63 See Okumu, (supra note 49), 107. 
64 Read, (supra note 46), 133. According to Donatus Komba, ‘Contribution to 
Rural Development: Ujamaa & Villagisation’ in Mwalimu. The Influence of 
Nyerere, ed. Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari (London: James Currey, 1995), 
40; by mid 1976 nearly ninety per cent (!) of the Tanzanian population was 
settled in the ujamaa villages. 
65 Komba, ibid.; see also Idris S. Kikula, Policy Implications on Environment. 
The Case of Villagisation in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University 
Press, 1996), 211-213. 
66 Read, (supra note 46), 134-135. 
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punishable by death.67 Clearly and ironically, ‘soon after 
independence, African governments talked of the threats to 
the integrity of their states as well as their plans for 
development as justification for authoritarianism, when not 
long previously they had demanded independence and 
human rights for the people from the colonies’.68 
 
4.4. Back to liberal democracy? 
 
4.4.1. Political change 
In the early nineties, Kenya and Tanzania were engulfed by 
the ‘democratisation wave sweeping across Africa’.69 The 
wave was triggered by a combination of internal and 
external factors: The fall of communism in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Western donors conditionality 
approach linking financial assistance to the respect of 
human rights and democratic principles added to the 
frustration of African citizens with oppressive and corrupt 
regimes, delegitimised by economic decline and appalling 
human rights record.70  
As Obote-Magaga puts it, ‘despite the [Moi] regime’s 
authoritarianism, the call for change never died amongst 
Kenyans’.71 The national pressure groups were already 
formed in the eighties and the society’s clamour for 
democratisation supported pressure of donors culminated in 
                                                          
67 Fimbo, (supra note 40), 64. 
68 Yash Ghai, ‘Constitutionalism: African Perspectives’ in The Gallant 
Academic. Essays in Honour of H.W.O. Okoth Ogendo, ed. Patricia Kameri-
Mbote and Collins Odote (Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 2017), 153. 
69 Tordorff, (supra note 51), 197. 
70 Tordorff, (supra note 51), 198 and Mungai, (supra note 58), 78. 
71 Obote-Magaga, (supra note 52), 128. 
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1991 the repeal of section 2(a) of the constitution;72 a 
provision enacted in 1982 turning Kenya to a de jure one 
party state. Yet, the 1991 events dubbed ‘second liberation’ 
did not lead to the change of the regime. The latter 
responded ‘adopting forms and not substance of 
democracy’.73 Moi remained in power until 2002 and it was 
only in 2010 that after a long and cumbersome process, full 
of dramatic twists,74 that Kenyans passed a new 
constitution, which according its preamble recognises ‘the 
aspiration of all Kenyans for a government based on 
essential values of human rights, equality, freedom, 
democracy, social justice, and the rule of law’. 
In Tanzania, the post-Arusha declaration policies led to an 
economic disaster and were abandoned in mid-eighties.75 
The introduction of a multi-party system came not without 
resistance in 1992; it was – differently than in Kenya – 
driven more by the ruling elite than by the general clamour 
for democracy, and one of the substantial reasons for 
abandoning a one-party system was pressure by foreign 
donors.76 The Tanzanian President appointed a commission 
under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Francis Nyali (the 
so called Nyali-Commission), which was tasked to 
                                                          
72 Peter O. Ndege, ‘Multi-Partyism and the Struggle for Constitutional Change, 
1991-2002’ in A History of Independent Kenya. A Celebration of Kenya’s 
Fieftieth Aniversary, ed. William Ochieng (Kisumu: Lake Publishers and 
Stationers, 2013), 141. 
73 Mungai, (supra note 58), 81. 
74 See PLO Lumumba and Luis G Franceschi (supra note 53), 41-49. 
75 In mid-eighties the salaries in public sector stood at only 20% of what they 
had been in the seventies and the inflation stood at 30%; the standards of living 
in general fell by 40-50% and the country’s foreign reserves by 70%. See 
Kivutha Kibwana, Chris Maina Peter, and Joe Oloka-Onyango, eds., In Search 
of Freedom and Prosperity. Constitutional Reform in East Africa (Nairobi: 
Claripress, 1996). 36-37. 
76 Ibid., 37. 
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deliberate on the question of ‘one or many parties’; the 
commission recommended the introduction of a multi-party 
system although, according to its records, 80% of 
Tanzanians preferred a one party system advocated by 
Nyerere.77 Nyerere himself stepped down as a president in 
1985 and as party chairman only in 1990. By 1992, 
opposition parties were of no political significance. 
Although Tanzania’s presidents always observed the two-
terms rule, the country’s ‘cautious democracy moves’78 
have up to now not produced any change of regime in sense 
of replacing the ruling party by an opposition party, even 
though the opposition parties are currently firmly 
established. Also, the constitution in force is still an 
amended document from 1977. An elite-driven, but at least 
initially inclusive constitution-making process was set in 
motion in 2011, but collapsed under allegations of being 
hijacked by the top-ranks of the ruling party in 2015.79 
 
4.4.2. Constitutional setting 
Both constitutions – the Kenyan and the Tanzanian – as they 
stand now, may be regarded as embracing the liberal 
principles; the former, however, to a much greater extent as 
the latter. 
The Kenyan constitution of 2010 contains an extensive bill 
of rights combined with robust judicial review, which 
incorporates the idea of public interest litigation; 
accordingly, the access to the court is not dependent on a 
                                                          
77 Ibid., 38.  
78 Ibid., 39. 
79 See Edwin Babeyia, ‘New Constitution-Making in Tanzania: An Examination 
of Actors’ Roles and Influence’ African Journal of Political Science and 
International Relations 10 (2016): 74–88, 86.  
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personal grievance.80 In applying the Bill of Rights the 
courts should also ‘develop the law’ when it does not give 
effect to individual rights and adopt interpretation that most 
favours the enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms 
(Article 20 (3)(a) and (b)); Article (20)(4) directs the courts 
to promote the ‘values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human rights, dignity, equality, equity and 
freedom’ as well as ‘the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights’; according to the directive of Article 259 (1)(b), 
the entire constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that 
‘advances the rule of law, and the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights’. Further, the 
2010 Constitution associates itself with the liberal idea of 
individual rights preceding statehood, proclaiming (Article 
19 (3)(a)) that the rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
Bill of Rights ‘belong to each individual and are not granted 
by the State’. Although the Constitution adopts a 
presidential model of government, it does not leave the 
executive branch unchecked. One may even claim that the 
numerous safeguards against tyranny, independent offices 
and commissions are a striking feature of Kenyan 
constitutionalism.  
Yet, the emphasis on the individual rights has its limits. In a 
bid to strike some balance between individualism and 
communitarian commitment to tradition, at least in two 
instances the constitution looks at individuals not through 
the prism of their primacy, but as members of certain rural 
communities. Firstly, it gives a lot of space to traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms; the promotion of such 
mechanisms is declared as one of the principles for 
                                                          
80 See in particular Article 22 (2)(c) of the Kenya 2010 Constitution.  
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exercising of judicial authority.81 And even if the 
constitution restricts the use of such mechanisms, so that 
might not be used in a way that contradicts the Bill of 
Rights, is repugnant to justice an morality or is inconsistent 
with the Constitution or any written law,82 there is no 
legislation in place, which would operationalize this caveat. 
Secondly, the constitution acknowledges community land 
ownership, which involves jurisdiction over community 
land to be exercised according to long standing customs.83 
Due to failure to adopt a new constitution in Tanzania, a 
declaration of core liberal values, which would be as 
powerful as Kenya’s 2010 constitution, is not in place; a 
clear signal that the illiberal practices belong to the past has 
not been sent. The current constitutional framework in 
Tanzania is based on the amended 1977 constitution, which 
has some built-in tensions: On the one hand it embraces 
some liberal ideas, defining in Article 9 Tanzania as a nation 
of ‘equal and free individuals’. On the other hand, the very 
same provision places the enjoyment of ‘freedom, justice, 
fraternity and concord’ under the caveat of a state ideology, 
namely the pursuit of the policy of ‘Socialism (Ujamaa) and 
Self-Reliance’ and ‘application of socialist principles’.84 On 
the one hand, Article 9 obligates the state to ensure that 
‘human dignity and other human rights are respected and 
cherished’ and ‘preserved and upheld in accordance with the 
                                                          
81 See Article 159 (2)(c) of the Kenya 2010 Constitution. 
82 Article 159 (3) of the Kenya 2010 Constitution. 
83 Article 63 of the Kenya 2010 Constitution. 
84 The definition of Socialism or Ujamaa (the equivalent Kiswahili term) is in 
itself quite ambiguous. According to Article 151 of the Tanzanian Constitution, 
socialism stands for ‘the society’s life principles for building a Nation that 
observes democracy, self reliance, freedom, equality, fraternity and unity of the 
peoples of the United Republic’. 
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spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, but on 
the other hand Article 30 suggests that the human rights are 
subordinated to the ‘public interest’. The latter provision 
seems to work as a limitation clause, but its wording is 
unusual. Rather than authorising the government – acting in 
public interest - to limit the rights and freedoms of 
individuals under certain conditions (e.g. proportionality), it 
prohibits ‘a person’ from exercising those rights and 
freedoms ‘in a manner that causes interference with or 
curtailment of the rights and freedoms of other persons or of 
the public interest’. This may be read as imposing on an 
individual a burden of proof that she exercises her rights and 
freedoms in line with the public interest. The balance 
between the individual rights and freedoms and the public 
interest is thus struck quite differently than in the case of the 
Kenyan constitution. Also, the Public Interest Litigation is 
not explicitly embraced in the Tanzanian legal order. 
Although Article 26 (2) generally stipulates that ‘every 
person has the right, in accordance with the procedure 
provided by law, to take legal action to ensure the protection 
of this Constitution and the laws of the land’, article 30 (3) 
provides for a right to institute proceedings in the High 
Court only ‘concerning his right or duty owed to him’.85 
Yet, as explained in the following section, the Tanzanian, 
judiciary did adopt a restrictive stance, which the wording 
of the cited provisions seems to imply.  
 
 
                                                          
85 Similarly, the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act – BRADEA (Act 33 
of 1994) provides for a legal action only when a provision of the Bill of Rights 
‘is being or is likely to be contravened in relation’ to the petitioner. 
L i b e r a l  d e m o c r a c y ’ s  r o c k y  p a t h  …  | 63 
4.4.3. Examples from the judicial practice 
Both Kenyan and Tanzanian courts adopted quite resolute 
stance acting as veto players on many occasions, the Kenyan 
Supreme Court decision of the 1st of September 2017 
annulling presidential election being perhaps the most 
striking example. But also apart from this judgement there 
are numerous cases, in which the judiciary lived up to its 
task as a protector of individual freedoms; the following 
section will depict some examples, in which the reasoning 
of judicial decisions advance liberal positions. These 
examples do not purport to paint a full picture, for which a 
comprehensive study, going beyond the scope of the present 
paper, would be necessary. Obviously, there are decisions, 
which clearly do not regard the individual as an ‘end in 
itself’.86 The point here is rather to demonstrate that the 
Kenyan and Tanzanian judiciary are capable of playing a 
role of a credible protector of individual liberty and a free 
public debate as envisaged by the liberal concept of 
democracy. 
Looking at those examples one must be aware of difficult 
conditions under which the Kenyan and Tanzanian courts 
                                                          
86 In the case COL & GMN v. Resident Magistrate Kwale Court & 3 others 
[2015] eKLR, the High Court of Kenya had inter alia to determine, if a court 
order of forced anal examination to find out whether the accused committed an 
offence of having carnal knowledge against the order of nature – this is the term 
the Kenyan Penal Code uses for homosexual contacts between males (see 
below) – amounts to a degrading treatment, prohibited by Article 25 of the 
Kenyan Constitution. The High Court denied this. For the judge, a forced anal 
examination is an examination as any other. The judge points out that in case of 
sexual act an examination of the vagina and in case of sodomy (this is the term 
the judge actually uses) – of the anus is the only way to find out, if the acts were 
committed. In this ruling, the autonomy of individual is a non-issue. The court 
does not look at the individual rights of the accused and the reasons to restrict 
those rights; it does not even identify any rationale of penalising homosexual 
acts and consequently, it does not balance it against the need to preserve human 
dignity. 
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embark on the role of freedom guardians. The difficulty 
starts with judiciary’s colonial heritage and it is one of a 
subdued judiciary, of an institution designed to enforce the 
interests of colonial powers, rather than protecting Africans 
from power abuse, and whose shape did not change much at 
independence.87 As the present account suggests, the years 
of one party rule in Kenya and in Tanzania did not 
contribute to its assertiveness; the trend was rather to 
strengthen the executive power than confront it with veto 
players. Also today, the judiciary faces a style of 
governance, which is sometimes still at variance with the 
concept of a liberal democracy. This is particularly true for 
the attitude of the current Tanzanian government of 
President John Pombe Magufuli to the freedom of speech 
and freedom of assembly: the broadcasting of parliamentary 
proceedings was stopped, political rallies were banned, 
numerous magazines were shut down, the journalists are 
harassed by the police, over 400 members of the main 
opposition party were arrested within the past two years and 
one prominent critic of the president was subject to an 
assassination attempt.88 John Stuart Mill would now perhaps 
                                                          
87 The courts kept being partly manned by the so-called ‘expatriate judges’ for 
years. See Oloka-Onyango, (supra note 52) p. 774. 
88 See the report of the regional weekly ‘The EastAfrican’ (No. 1196, 2017 
September, 30 – October, 6) titled ‘Governance crisis: State of democracy’). See 
also the statement of International Press Institute of 2017 May, 9th (‘Tanzanian 
President John Magufuli's aside on ‘limits’ of press freedom raises fears’), 
available at http://ipi.freemedia.at. One of the recent examples of a newspaper 
ban concerns the newspaper Mwanahalisi suspended for 2 years for publishing 
a letter saying that Magufuli ‘claims to be a patriot but questions the patriotism 
of anyone who opposes him. This is hypocritical’ (see Daily Nation (Nairobi), 
2017 September, 17th). On Magufuli’s crackdown on LGBT persons 
accompanied by harassment of NGO’s and advocacy groups. See the 
‘Washington Post’ report ‘Tanzania suspends U.S.-funded AIDS programs in a 
new crackdown on gays’, 2016, November, 23rd. 
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ask how Tanzanian history could be made remarkable, if so 
much of mental activity is supressed?  
But also the state of liberal democracy in Kenya is a cause 
for concern. Only recent media reports quote excessive 
police violence, verbal attacks on independent institutions 
set up by the 2010 constitution, especially on the Supreme 
Court following the latter’s decisions on annulment of 
August 2017 presidential polls, unconstitutional ban on 
foreign travels for all public servants including university 
lecturers and attempts to change electoral laws four weeks 
before the polling day.89 
Yet, the picture becomes less distressing, if one takes a look 
at the judiciary.  
Generally speaking, there is not much case law available 
related to the recent attempts to suppress the freedom of 
expression in Tanzania. One example of a court decision 
opposing such attempts is the ruling of Resident 
Magistrate’s Court in Arusha in the case Republic v. Allan 
Harold Mbando.90 The defendant was accused on the basis 
of a section 16 of the 2015 Cybercrimes Act, a draconian 
provision designed to curb any opinion, which displeases 
the government. It reads as follows: 
‘Any person who publishes information, data or facts 
presented in a picture, text, symbol or any other form in a 
computer system where such information, data or fact is false, 
deceptive, misleading or inaccurate commits an offence, and 
shall on conviction be liable to a fine not less than three 
million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not less than 
six months or to both’. 
                                                          
89 See ‘The EastAfrican’(supra note 88). See also the Nairobian ‘Sunday Nation’ 
of 2017 October, 1st.  
90 Republic v. Allan Harold Mbando, Criminal Case No. 141 of 2016. 
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The defendant was charged for publishing ‘misleading 
information relating to political affairs of the United 
Republic of Tanzania’ on a social media portal. He wrote: 
‘The son of Munyage should overthrow the government, for 
it cannot be that people are left out of power’.91 Even though 
the High Court dismissed the charge, it did not purport to be 
a defender of the freedom of expression. It merely stated that 
the law does not refer to such ‘trivial issues’ and ‘no court, 
worth a name, can hold the evidence available to have made 
a prima facie case against the accused person’. In another 
case, 92 the High Court of Tanzania quashed a provision of 
the very same Cybercrimes Act, which authorised the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to impose fines for a 
violation of the Act’s provision in case of ‘a voluntary 
admission of the commission of offence under this Act’, 
however, excluding the right to appeal against the DPP’s 
decision. The High Court established a violation of the right 
to be heard. The section 16 of the Cybercrimes Act cited 
earlier was not challenged in this case and it still remains on 
the statutes book. 
And it was the Tanzanian courts, which in much quoted 
jurisprudence paved a way for application of East African 
constitutions in the spirit of liberalism. In 2001, in the case 
Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo v. The Attorney 
General93 for example, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania 
                                                          
91 The Kiswahili word ‘Munyage’ could be a designation of a person or a place. 
The court itself held that it is not clear, to whom exactly this message relates. In 
the original Kiswahili version, the message reads as follows ‘Mwamunyage 
Pindua nchi, haiwezekani wote wawe nje halafu hakuna aliyepewa mamlaka 
kukalia kile kiti’. 
92 Jebra Kambole v. The Attorney General, Misc. Civ. Cause No. 32 of 2015. 
93 Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo v. The Attorney General, Civ. Appeal 
No. 64 of 2001. 
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quashed a provision that made an electoral petition 
dependent on a security for costs of 5 Million Tanzanian 
Shillings, as sum, for which, as the Court noted, a civil 
servant working on a minimum wage would have to work 
for eight years. Ruling that there was an infringement of the 
right to access to justice, the Court held that fundamental 
rights ‘have to be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner, 
thereby jealously protecting and developing the dimensions 
of those rights and ensuring that our people enjoy their 
rights, our young democracy not only functions but also 
grows, and the will and dominant aspirations of the people 
prevail’.  
Tanzanian judiciary relied on this judgement in the case 
Christopher Mtikila v. The Attorney General of 2005 
(Mtikila II),94 in which the High Court of Tanzania 
invalidated a constitutional amendment seeking to bar 
independent candidates from running for the office of the 
president of Tanzania, holding that such an amendment 
would alter the basic structure or essential features of the 
Constitution and in so doing impose disproportionate limits 
on the representative democracy.95 The main argument was 
that the amendment would contravene the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights introduced in 1984 into the Tanzania 
constitution, in particular the provisions safeguarding the 
freedom of association and the freedom to participate in 
public affairs – articles 19 and 21 of the Tanzanian 
                                                          
94 Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. Attorney General, Misc. Civ. Cause 10 of 2005. 
95 This amendment was a response to a judgement of a High Court from 1994 
(Rev. Christopher Mtikila v. the Attorney General, Civil Cause No. 5 of 1993 – 
Mtikila I), in which the Court invalidated a statutory provision with the same 
content. The legislator sought to thwart the Court ruling by amending the 
constitution. 
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Constitution respectively. The court qualified those 
provisions as elements of constitution’s basic structure and 
its essential features, for in a quest to move away from the 
one-party rule, they ‘expand the arena of democracy and the 
right to participate in the government of the state’. In both 
rulings the judiciary embraced the liberal idea of individual 
rights as a fundament for democracy. The liberal 
pronouncements of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania 
attracted also very much attention in the Kenyan case law.96 
The Tanzanian courts are well positioned to withstand the 
current political pressure and keep up this tradition, which 
is rooted in the 1990’s democracy wave. 
In Kenya, there have been many High Court judgements, 
especially following the adoption of the 2010 constitution 
which may even sound like a liberal manifesto. In the case 
L.N.W v Attorney General & 3 others,97 the High Court 
declared unconstitutional a provision of the Registration of 
Births and Deaths Act concerning the registration of the 
name of a child born out of wedlock. The Act, which dates 
back to 1928, provided in section 12 that the child’s father’s 
name can be entered in the register only upon the joint 
request of mother and father or if there is evidence that the 
mother and father were married. If those requirements were 
not met, ‘XXXX’ marks would be entered into the birth 
certificate as father’s name. The government claimed that 
the provision would still be having some rationale, namely 
                                                          
96 The High Court of Kenya describes the Court of Appeal of Tanzania ruling as 
a ‘celebrated case’, see Brenda Achieng Okwach & 2 others v Charles Rotich 
SP, OCPD, Nyeri Central & 3 others [2015] eKLR. It is also quoted as the 
leading case for the application of the Kenyan Constitution’s Bill of Rights by 
PLO Lumumba and Luis G Franceschi (supra note 53),131. 
97 L.N.W v Attorney General & 3 others [2014] eKLR. 
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preventing ‘unscrupulous mothers from vindicating any 
man of their choice for personal reasons’ and also keeping 
proper birth records. The High Court ruled that the provision 
violates the constitutional prohibition of discrimination, 
invoking the liberal idea of equal worth of every person: 
‘What I read from these provisions is a desire to transform 
society, to recognize the inherent dignity and worth of all 
persons; to protect those who have hitherto been marginalized 
and to ensure that they enjoy the human rights guaranteed to 
all on the same basis as others. Further, that the best interests 
of the child, whatever its status of birth, must be the primary 
consideration in every matter concerning the child. 
In my view, these constitutional aspirations, in so far as they 
apply to children born outside marriage, far outstrip in 
importance the need to keep official records, or the desire to 
‘protect’ men from ‘unscrupulous’ women, assuming that one 
accepts that this was the purposes that section 12 was intended 
to serve’. 
Furthermore, the court criticised stereotypical thinking 
about women and emphasised the need to take responsibility 
for one’s actions: 
‘The second alleged purpose, protecting the putative father 
from the alleged machinations of unscrupulous women is, in my 
view, based on an unapologetic but unacceptable patriarchal 
mind-set that wishes to protect men from taking responsibility 
for their actions, to the detriment of their children. In my view, 
balancing the two interests, that of the men and the rights of 
children, I see no contest. I need not add that such a stated 
purpose, the alleged protection of men from unscrupulous 
women, is premised on a negative, discriminatory stereotyping 
of women as dishonest people who will latch onto a man for 
child support with no basis’. 
The commitment to liberal values is even more visible in the 
case Eric Gitari v Non- Governmental Organisations Co-
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ordination Board & 4 others,98 where the High Court of 
Kenya had to strike a balance between individual freedom 
on one hand and moral views, to which – according to the 
Kenyan NGO Co-ordination Board – the majority of 
Kenyans would subscribe on the other. And of these two, it 
preferred the former.  
The petitioner was trying to register an NGO advocating for 
rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Intersex and Queer 
(LGBTIQ) persons. He was doing it in a legal environment, 
which includes criminal provisions against homosexuals. 
According to section 162 of the Kenyan Penal Code, ‘any 
person who (a) has carnal knowledge of any person against 
the order of nature; or (b) has carnal knowledge of an 
animal; or (c) permits a male person to have carnal 
knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, is guilty 
of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years 
[…]’. Needless to say, this long-standing provision does not 
reflect the liberal approach, as it positions the state as a 
guardian or a custodian of some official conception of the 
order of nature – contrary to the Mill’s harm principle and 
sovereignty of mind of every individual. In this vain, the 
NGO Co-ordination Board refused to register petitioner’s 
NGO claiming that it was ‘hell-bent on destroying the 
cultural values of Kenyans’; the Board was citing moral 
convictions, which it alleged, the Kenyan society would 
hold (‘Homosexuality is largely considered to be a taboo 
and repugnant to the religious teachings, cultural values and 
morality of the Kenyan people’), also suggesting that they 
should prevail over the freedom of association which was 
                                                          
98 Eric Gitari v Non- Governmental Organisations Co-ordination Board & 4 
others [2013] eKLR. 
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here at stake. It is the very (illiberal) idea of an official 
conception of morality, which the High Court rejects. 
According to the judge, ‘in a representative democracy, and 
by the very act of adopting and accepting the Constitution, 
the State is restricted from determining which convictions 
and moral judgments are tolerable’. As the judge continues, 
‘it does not matter if the views of certain groups or related 
associations are unpopular or unacceptable to certain 
persons outside those groups or members of other groups’. 
Finally, the High Court makes a clear commitment to the 
liberal idea of the primacy of the individual: ‘democratic 
societies approach the problem from the standpoint of the 
importance of the individual, and the undesirability of 
restricting his or her freedom. However in striking the 
balance certain controls on the individual’s freedoms of 
expressions may in appropriate circumstances be acceptable 
in order to respect the sensibilities of others’. Very much in 
the liberal spirit, it also emphasises the importance of a free 
public debate, pointing out that the ‘the constitution is to 
protect those with unpopular views, minorities and rights 
that attach to human beings – regardless of majority views’. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In Kenya and Tanzania, an ill-liberal democracy or one-
party democracy was a short-lived phenomenon, which 
quickly gave way to autocracy. Democracy without 
liberalism did not prove to be a sustainable form of 
government. The one party ‘illiberal’ democracy was to a 
large extent based on anthropologic theories put forward by 
Kenyatta and Nyerere. Those accounts on African 
psychology were either not quite accurate or underestimated 
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the latter’s dynamic nature. Regarding the economic 
development, a lot of faith was put in an omnipotent national 
government; this faith did not prove warranted and paved 
the way for human rights violations.  
Although the constitutions of Kenya and Tanzania in 
principle embrace the liberal principles, the liberal 
democracy still has to take roots. In Kenya the liberal ideas 
seem to be more entrenched, as Kenya has never adopted the 
Arusha-like communist approaches. It also has a new 
constitution, which aims at transforming the country in the 
direction of a liberal democracy. 
Like in Eastern and Central Europe, it is difficult to expect 
that politicians, whose careers started in the one-party state 
will change their attitude overnight; the establishment of a 
liberal democracy is a long-term project and an every day 
struggle that is not free from setbacks. And unlike in Eastern 
and Central Europe, the former ruling parties – and this is 
especially true for Tanzania, where the former monopolistic 
political grouping is still holding power – have not been 
outright delegitimised. But also unlike in Eastern and 
Central Europe those parties were not brought on the Soviet 
army bayonets; they were authentic popular movements 
against ruthless colonial subjugation.99 Back then they stood 
for a clamour for political change, for ideals, which they 
started supressing once they assumed power. Yet, in the 
hearts of many Kenyans and Tanzanians, the clamour for 
change and for freedom remained alive.  
 
                                                          
99 On the nature of the latter in Kenya, see only Caroline Elkins, Imperial 
Reckoning. The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 2005), 43 et seq. 
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Hungary and Poland share mutual constitutional history, 
especially after the Second World War. Beyond the having 
the same king and being bound by the personal union in the 
Middle Ages,1 during the Soviet era, these then socialist 
states, being under the influence zone of the Soviet Union, 
were forced to adopt a communist constitution that was the 
basis of the socialist legal system. In the late 1980s, these 
states followed similar transition processes from socialism 
to democracy, thereby strengthening the new constitutional 
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1 The personal union between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of 
Poland was achieved twice: in 1370–1382 under Louis I of Hungary and in 
1440–1444 under Vladislaus III of Poland. 
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regime2 based on the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights,3 essentially with the assistance of their constitutional 
courts. Both the Hungarian Constitutional Court (CC) and 
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (CT) embraced an activist 
approach towards constitutional interpretation, which was 
required by both the fact and fragility of the transition, and 
some vague constitutional provisions. Both states joined the 
European Union in 2004, which meant that they had 
acknowledged mutual interests and values shared by the 
Member States, and had adapted their legal systems to the 
accession.  
The first decade of the 21st century brought new changes, 
the rise of populism and another transformation from liberal 
                                                          
2 Poland adopted the so-called Small (Interim) Constitution in 1992 and started 
to work on the new one that was finally approved in 1997. Hungary, mainly due 
to the features of the transition, decided not to adopt a new constitution but 
almost entirely changed the socialist one during a series of constitutional 
amendments. Nowadays, Yaniv Roznai and Stephen Gardbaum name changes 
which resulted from the regime changing constitution-making and constitution–
changing processes as the ‘revolutionary constitutionalism’ (Y. Roznai paper 
resented in Copenhagen, ICON S Conference, June 2017 and S. Gardbaum, 
Revolutionary constitutionalism, 15.1 I-CON (2017): 173-200). The first major 
amendment to the Hungarian (socialist) Constitution was adopted by the still-
socialist Parliament in 1989 and created a legal frame which allowed the 
evolvement of a Western type democratic state and a new Parliament could be 
elected in a free and democratic election in 1990. In the same year, the new 
Parliament adopted the second major formal constitutional amendment package 
which formally finalised the transition at constitutional level. Coming back to 
the Polish situation, in April 1989, the first transformative change was 
introduced to the Constitution of 1952, and in December 1989, the entire 
socialist system was changed by the incorporation of the rule of law into the 
very same constitution. The first free election in transition period was conducted 
in 1991. More about the transitionary constitutional changes A. Bień-Kacała, 
Rewizja czy zmiana konstytucji? (Charakter prawny nowelizacji konstytucji z 
1989 r.) [Revision or amendment? Legal character of the constitutional 
novelizations of 1989],7 Studia Iuridica Toruniensia (2010): 90-104.  
3 Both states joined the Council of Europe (Hungary in 1990, Poland in 1991) 
and ratified the European Convention of Human Rights (Hungary joined in 
1992, and the ECHR entered into force in Hungary in 1993, Poland joined in 
1993, and the ECHR is entered into force in 1993). 
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to illiberal democracy.4 This transformation seems to have 
been completed in Hungary, whereas in Poland, it may be 
still considered as an ongoing process. The last 7 years in 
Hungary and 3 years in Poland are seen as dismantling the 
former legal system and constitutional arrangements. The 
newest type of constitutionalism, which we call illiberal 
constitutionalism,5 has been rising in our states and can be 
described by none of the existing classifications. Referring 
to Bellamy’s phenomena, it is not really legal 
constitutionalism and completely different from political 
constitutionalism.6 The new system in Hungary and Poland, 
even though labelled by us as ‘new’, obviously does not 
belong to the states representing new constitutionalism, as 
characterized by Gardbaum (UK, New Zealand, Canada, 
etc.)7 where, according to Lavapuro and his co-authors, also 
fits Finland.8  
                                                          
4 For the appearance of illiberal democracy in political communication see 
Viktor Orbán’s speech about the illiberal state in Bálványos, 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-
speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-
summer-free-university-and-student-camp (31.10.2017). See also Kaczyński’s 
slogan: ‘there will be Budapest in Warsaw’ in in 2011 when PiS lost the 
parliamentary election, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/przyjdzie-
dzien-ze-w-warszawie-bedzie-budapeszt,186922.html (31.10.2017). After 
2015, when PiS won elections, it was made clear that the slogan was meant to 
become a philosophy http://pis.org.pl/dokumenty?page=1, p. 7, 12 
(31.10.2017).  
5 For a conceptualization of illiberal constitutionalism from a legal perspective 
see T. Drinóczi, A. Bień-Kacała, Constitutions and constitutionalism captured: 
shaping illiberal democracies in Hungary and Poland (in publication). 
6 R. Bellamy, Political constitutionalism: a republican defence of the 
constitutionality of democracy, Cambridge University Press (2007): 2-5. 
7 S. Gardbaum, The Case for the New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism, 12 German Law Review 14(2013): 2230-2248. 
8 J. Lavapuro, T. Ojanen, M. Scheinin, ‘Rights-based constitutionalism in 
Finland and the development of pluralist constitutional review’, 2 ICON (2011), 
T. Ojanen, Constitutional amendment in Finland, in X. Contiades, (ed.), 
Engineering Constitutional Change, Routledge (2016): 107-109. 
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Ran Hirschl,9 basing on Bellamy’s binary code and 
observing creation of the new constitutionalism located in 
between its legal and political equivalents, found that 
juristocracy, as opposed to the more benevolent political 
processes, endangers efficiency of redistributive politics. In 
this context, when legal constitutionalism seems to alternate 
its political counterpart, there is a growing suspicion of the 
inevitable rise of juristocracy.10  
Although Carlos Closa criticised Hirschl’s book based on 
excellent reasons,11 Hirschl’s theory on juristocracy and the 
                                                          
9 R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism, Harvard University Press (2004). 
10 Blokker pictures Hungary and Poland as representing communitarian 
constitutionalism or even constitutional nationalism completed with populism. 
He stated that ‘in the communitarian perception, the community and its identity 
are paramount. The constitution itself is less important than the pre-political 
values and history of the community that the constitution reflects, and the 
integrative and symbolic function of the constitution is stressed. The emphasis 
is on safeguarding the political sovereignty of a specific national group’. P. 
Blokker, From legal to political constitutionalism?, VerfBlog, 2017/6/04, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/from-legal-to-political-constitutionalism/, DOI: 
https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20170604-190459. Although we can see the 
strength of this opinion, from our perspective it does not properly grasp the 
underlying legal problems. It emphasises more the political and societal 
sentiments which are indeed the very (non-legal) foundation of the new illiberal 
constitutionalism which is being built. Blokker also relates to L. Morawski’s 
idea of republican tradition. According to Morawski, this tradition gives a deep 
respect for democracy, human rights and freedoms with strong attention to: 
patriotism, solidarity, a strong state as a guardian of human rights, the role of 
the Catholic Church and religion in public life, the traditional family model and 
rejection the right to abortion, L. Morawski, A Critical Response, VerfBlog, 
2017/6/03, http://verfassungsblog.de/acritical-response/, DOI: 
https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20170603-165621.  
11 Closa asks many reasonable questions. ‘And, on a different front, it seems fair 
to ask if the hegemonic-preservation claim actually holds true as a general 
explanation for the emergence of constitutionalism. Is it plausible to claim that 
countries in Southern Europe, such as Spain and Portugal, develop their charters 
because of reasons related to preserving the hegemony of elites? Did the 
countries in Eastern Europe follow this path to protect their elites?’, C. Closa, 
Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism, Harvard University Press, 2004, 4 ICON 3 (2006): 581–586.  
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idea of political constitutionalism seem to be embraced by 
many Hungarian and Polish scholars and members of 
constitutional court.12 In this paper, by reviewing the recent 
constitutional history of Hungary and Poland and 
contrasting them with the ideas developed by Bellamy and 
Hirschl, we simply argue that the ‘newest’ Hungarian and 
Polish constitutionalism is not a political constitutionalism. 
Furthermore, we argue that the label of ‘juristocracy’ is not 
applicable when describing the period of 1990-2010/2015, 
but its reverse form, which is the judicialization of politics 
as theorised by Armen Mazmanyan13, is emerging in the 
post 2010/2015 era. 
To justify our claims, firstly we provide a general context 
for our analysis (point II), in which we discuss the recent 
constitutional history of Poland and Hungary and the role of 
the constitutional courts. This is the foundation, based on 
which we claim that juristocracy is not a proper concept 
here, and that our countries experience something else than 
political constitutionalism. To support our opinion, we 
present arguments for (point III) and against (point IV) 
relating to the presence of political constitutionalism in 
Hungary and Poland, and explain how the judicialization of 
politics, instead of juristocracy emerges in both Hungary 
and Poland (point V). The final conclusions of our research 




                                                          
12 See the works of B. Pokol on juristocracy and A. Antal and others on political 
constitutionalism.  
13 Judicialization of politics: The post-Soviet way, 13 I-CON 1 (2015): 200-218. 
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2. Context: constitutional law  
We base our analysis on liberal democracy, or simply 
democracy, which characterised Hungary and Poland since 
1989/1990. We conceive the abovementioned system as 
constitutional democracy that assures the most important 
values, such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy 
consisting of, among others, competitive elections and 
guaranteeing the rights of minorities.  
In our opinion, a political system is democratic as far as it is 
able to provide substantial meaning of the mentioned values 
and not only their formal dimension. Moreover, every 
element of such system and mutual relations among its 
components should be described in the constitution, no 
matter whether it is a political or a legal document. The most 
important aspect of constitutional democracy is the 
existence of a proper and functional constitutional defence 
mechanism.  
Both political and legal constitutions have long, history-
based, and separate ways of development. Sometimes, the 
need to replace the actual models may be a necessity.14 
Nevertheless, it should be an organic development, it should 
embrace an inclusive constitutional process and should 
reflect societal needs and demands. This means that 
replacing the existing political or legal constitution(alism) 
cannot be based only on a decision of the ruling majority 
even if it is a constitutional majority.  
 
 
                                                          
14 See the transformative nature of the Community Act and the Human Rights 
Act, and the Brexit in the UK. 
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2.1. Systemic backgrounds: contextual constitutional 
history  
After turning from the totalitarian/Communist system, 
constitutional democracies were set up in the CEE region. 
In our understanding, the new solutions pursued to comply 
with or, depending on the national needs, even exceeded the 
minimum standards of the rule of law, human rights and 
democracy expectations in Europe, under the regime of the 
CoE and the EU demands.15 Constitutional democracy 
requires a constitution in a legal sense that encompasses all 
of the important principles, which arose during the (Western 
European) constitutional development as the most 
fundamental values for the societies in our era. As a counter 
effect of the Socialist regime (as previously Nazi and 
Fascism regimes), the legal procedures and legal 
constitutions were preferred over any political 
considerations of the public power.16 The constitutions, 
based on Kelsenian tradition and relying on the very notion 
and function of the legal understanding of a constitution, 
were considered to be senseless unless defended and 
enforced.  
A constitution, constitutional situation without having a 
written constitution (UK) or a Treaty considered as a 
                                                          
15 On these impacts in general, see R.R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or Basic 
Law? The Decline of the Concept of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. (2001): 253-296. 
16 This preference seemed to be more adequate after the totalitarian period. 
Moreover, following the approach and concept of the political constitution 
requires a long period of political and constitutional evolution. From a 
comparative perspective, one can evaluate political constitutionalism as 
evolutionary type system and legal constitutionalism rooted in revolutionary 
traditions, see L.F.M. Besselink, Constitutional Adjudication in the Era of 
Globalization: The Netherlands in Comparative Perspective, 2 European Public 
Law 18(2012): 232–234. 
80 | T í m e a  D r i n ó c z i ,  A g n i e s z k a  B i e ń - K a c a ł a  
constitution (EU) may in many ways be defended and 
enforced. Depending on the concept of a constitution, 
whether it is a political, as defined by Bellamy17 concerning 
the UK, or a legal notion applied mostly in Europe, different 
procedures (political processes such as elections and public 
discourse, UK) or institutions, such as constitutional courts 
(Hungary, Poland), ordinary courts (e.g. in the Nordic 
countries, US), or even Council of State-type institutions 
(Netherlands) may be used for this purpose. In states having 
common law traditions (e.g. UK, Canada and New Zealand), 
human rights, which are regulated by different types of legal 
sources, are defended by ordinary courts. This phenomenon 
is called new constitutionalism.18  
In the case of Hungary and Poland (as in other CEE 
countries), a written (legal) constitution was and still is 
preferable. Independent Constitutional Court and 
Constitutional Tribunal were established in 1989 (Hungary) 
and 1982/199719 (Poland) to effectively ensure 
implementation of the constitutions. Until 2010 (CC) and 
2015 (CT), these bodies could exercise their wide powers 
independently, with an erga omnes effect: they could 
provide an abstract interpretation of any provision of the 
constitutions,20 interpret specific constitutional rules that 
had been challenged, annull unconstitutional laws, ensure 
conformity of international obligations with national law, 
                                                          
17 R. Bellamy, supra note 6. 
18 S. Gardbaum, supra note 7. 
19 Under the Constitution of 1952, in 1985 the Sejm passed the first Law on the 
CT and in 1986 the CT delivered its first judgement. The Court became fully 
independent two years after the Constitution of 1997 entry into force, when Sejm 
forfeited the competence to reject some of the CT judgements (Art. 239 of the 
1997 Polish Constitution). 
20 In Poland it was possible until 1997. 
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declare unconstitutionality of legislative omission, require 
Parliament to adopt the necessary legislation, etc. These 
constitutional courts could (and formally still can) annul 
laws with an effect of ex nunc and pro futuro, which was the 
very intention of the legislative power, due to the need to 
remove (older, socialist) laws that could no longer be 
constitutional because of the new systemic order, and in 
order to preserve the achievements of the transition. This 
latter involved a political agenda which intended to prevent 
earlier state parties from regaining power and thereby 
reversing the transition process. This was quite unusual and 
opposed to the original legislative intention of other 
jurisdictions, e.g. Belgium, Germany, Austria, where, due to 
the different focus of powers (either protecting an individual 
or observing a proper division of power between the federal 
government and the states),21 the main rule has always been 
to ensure an ex tunc effect.22  
As already pointed out, these Polish and Hungarian courts, 
from the very beginning, have had the power, to interpret 
vague constitutional provisions on democracy, rule of law 
and certain fundamental rights. The Hungarian CC 
facilitated legality of the transition. In one of its landmark 
decisions, determining understanding of the transition, it 
stated that the rule of law cannot be weighed against the rule 
of law: the CC cannot allow to disregard the rule of statutory 
                                                          
21 T. Drinóczi, P. Schneider, ‘The legitimation of a re-enactment of former law 
and temporal effect of judgments in a constitutional democracy. Comparative 
study in the light of recent jurisprudence of Croatia’s Constitutional Court’ 
Prvani Vjesnik GOD 32, BR 3-4 (2016): 29-44. 
22 It was the constitutional courts which in it jurisprudence developed the idea 
of diversion form this main rule. See P. Popelier, S. Verstraelen, D. Vanheule, 
B. Vanlerberghe, (ed.), The Effects of Judicial Decisions in Time, Cambridge 
(2014).  
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limitation and to get it restarted because the system has been 
changed. (Interestingly, the Czech Constitutional court 
came to the opposite view on the very same issue.)23 Until 
the Polish Constitution was adopted in 1997, the 
Constitutional Tribunal had delivered necessary gap-filling 
provisions, the essence of which was later incorporated into 
the new constitution.24 Undoubtedly, there have been many 
constitutional interpretations by the constitutional courts 
which might be seen as informal constitutional 
amendments.25 However, the political power has always 
been free to act, provided that it had constitutional majority 
(independently or with coalition partners),26 or could make 
a compromise with the opposition due to the importance of 
the issues27 to address them in the formal constitutional 
amendment. Therefore, if there had been a widespread 
disagreement about an active or dynamic interpretation by 
the constitutional courts, and a consequent fear of 
‘juristocracy’ or ‘governance by constitutional courts’, the 
constitution-amending power (the constitutional majority) 
                                                          
23 See decision 11/1992. (III. 5.) of the CC and its Czech counterpart: Pl. ÚS 
19/93. 
24 L. Garlicki, Polskie prawo konstytucyjne [Polish constitutional law], 
Warszawa (2016): 76-78 and I. Wróblewska, Zasada państwa prawnego w 
orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego RP [The rule of democratic state 
ruled by law in judgements of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal], Toruń (2010): 
48-50. L. Sólyom, ‘Alkotmányértelmezés az új alkotmánybíróságok 
gyakorlatában [Constitutional interpretation in the practice of new constitutional 
courts]’,2 Fundamentum (2002): 18-20.  
25 T. Drinóczi, F. Gárdos-Orosz, Z. Pozsár-Szentmiklósy, Formal and Informal 
Constitutional Amendment. Report on Hungary and J. Trzcinski, M. Szwastm, 
Formal and informal amendments to the Constitution. Both are national reports 
(manuscripts) for the Comparative Law Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, 2018. 
26 See a more detailed account T. Drinóczi, Constitutional politics in 
contemporary Hungary, 1 ICL (2016). 
27 It happened with the formal constitutional amendment on the NATO and EU 
accession. 
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could have changed it.28 However, what usually occurred 
was that the constitutional majority respected the courts’ 
ruling to the extent that it incorporated the most essential 
findings into the new constitutions. In this regard, we have 
already mentioned the Polish case, whereas with respect to 
Hungary, we can refer to the constitutional interpretation of 
the CC on the powers of the President of the Republic and 
the relation between the direct and indirect exercise of 
popular sovereignty (referendum vs. representative 
republic) as stipulated in the former Constitution. The core 
of these findings was incorporated into the Fundamental 
Law in 2011. 
Against this background, it is clear that what Hirschl asserts 
in connection with the reason why constitutional rights and 
judicial review are established in some common law states, 
does not simply hold true in Hungary and Poland, or even 
more broadly, in the former socialist states of Central and 
Eastern Europe. He claims that the political origin of the 
introduction of judicial review to protect fundamental rights 
was only the intention of the elite to preserve their 
hegemonic status (‘hegemonic preservation’).29 In our 
region it was clearly not. The driving force was to establish 
constitutional democracy that had not existed before. At the 
same time, one of the core assumptions was to introduce and 
implement human rights protection, and as a correlating 
duty, to join international human rights systems. Another 
constituent part was the protection of the constitution that 
was perceived back then as a legal and not only a ‘paper’ 
document, a political manifest of the ruling Communists. To 
                                                          
28 As occurred in 2013 in Hungary with the Fourth Amendment. 
29 Hirsch, supra note 9: 16. 
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achieve these goals and accommodate themselves among 
other European constitutional democracies, Hungary and 
Poland, by establishing their constitutional courts, created a 
fully-fledged constitutional review system and process. In 
the 1990s, the activism of these courts, e.g. the doctrine of 
the invisible constitution of the Sólyom Court, was criticised 
by some scholars who, using the labelling of Hirschl, 
claimed that the interpretative activity and annulment power 
of the CC resulted in a juristocracy in Hungary, which 
endangered the free political formation power in Parliament. 
In Poland, the situation is slightly different. The CT was set 
up in 1982, as a consequence of demands of lawyers and the 
Solidarność (Solidarity) movement.30 Therefore, the 
Tribunal was perceived as a Communist relic (which 
preserved the Communist elite). Nowadays, the ruling 
power uses this terminology and ideology just to weaken the 
CT’s position. However, it is neither a valid claim, nor a 
common opinion. What is widely acknowledged is that the 
jurisprudence of the CT enabled the Polish transformation 
process (systemic changes) by establishing and 
safeguarding the rule of law (which, as mentioned before, 
was constitutionalised in December 1989).  
Thus, the above-described phenomenon is not juristoracy 
but one of the features of the ordinary operation of 
constitutional democracy established after a socialist and 
autocratic period in Central and Eastern Europe.  
The transition and the roles of the CT and the CC during this 
process have caught special attention by scholars. Siems 
argues that in the CEE countries, the so called Third Legal 
                                                          
30 The Law on the CT dates to 1985 and first judgement was delivered in 1986. 
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Tradition emerged after the transitory period.31 Uzalec 
identifies this as the ‘socialist legal tradition without 
socialism’32. We disagree with the mentioned opinions. 
Taking into consideration what we presented above, it 
seems to be justified to claim that Siems’s and Uzelac’s 
views falsely describe the period of 1989/1990-2010/2015, 
but they seem to be more accurate to explain post 2010/15 
era. Our argument is made on the basis that Poland and 
Hungary use law as an instrument to protect political elites 
and reject the liberal understanding of constitutionalism, 
which focuses on the rights and freedoms of individuals and 
promotes their protection against any state abuse and 
intrusion. 
 
2.2. Systemic backgrounds: current context  
The instrumentalisation of law resulted in the ruthless 
disabling (Poland) and packing of the constitutional courts 
(Hungary and then Poland). Abusive constitutionalism 
(Hungary) and violating the constitution (Poland; 
Verfassungsbruch)33 are also in the political-legal tool-box 
of those who are in power.  
The series of events does not really fit into the explanation 
offered by the scholarly literature on the Third Wave of 
Democratization. According to these views, liberal 
democracy that emerged in the worldwide process, named 
the ‘third wave of democratization,’ led to three results. The 
first one is constitutional democracy that still has not shown 
                                                          
31 M. Siems, Comparative Law, Camebridge (2014): 78-79.  
32 A. Uzelac, Survival of the Third Legal Tradition, 49 Supreme Court Law 
Review (2010), S.C.L.R. (2nd): 377-396. 
33 See more about it under point IV.2 
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any sign of regression.34 Secondly, it resulted in an 
authoritarian (re)consolidation, which, according to Steven 
Levitsky and Lucan Way, is not to be seen as a democratic 
rollback.35 Alternatively, it reverted to a more or less 
authoritarian form, as Alina Rocha Menocal and others 
observe, based mainly on Latin-American and African 
experiences which, however, may be adapted to the case of 
Hungary and Poland.36 Whereas the second of the presented 
effects would not feature the CEE states, because the power-
holders of the regime from which the democratic transition 
emerged (the communist-socialist party) differ from those 
having the power now (conservatives), the third one could 
fit in the CEE context, regardless of the label we attach. 
Even if we assume that the current party in power is 
different from the previous one (i.e. the one before the 
systemic changes), being defined as its totally opposite 
(anti-communist), it still uses similar structures (monolith 
society, powerful and privileged partisans, strong 
centralised state and powerful party leader, hierarchy of 
organs and people) and means (force, army, limitation of 
freedoms, non-inclusive democracy). Yet, one can identify 
dissimilar objectives (national identity, national state 
without ‘sovereignty-loss’) to those that were embraced by 
communist regimes. All the abovementioned solutions are 
possible, because the power-holders were schooled and 
                                                          
34 See e.g., the Baltic states, especially Estonia.  
35 S. Levitsky, L. Way, The myth of democratic recession, 1 Journal of 
Democracy 26 (2015): 48-52. 
36 A. R. Menocal, V. Fritz, L. Rakner, Hybrid regimes and the challenge of 
deepening and sustaining democracy in developing countries, 1 South African 
Journal of International Affairs 15 (2008): 30-35. 
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socialised in the previous, socialist regime.37 We claim that 
the socialist way of thinking has become more visible after 
2010/2015, as compared to the pre-2010 era.  
The reason of the democratic erosion in Hungary and Poland 
is simple, as stated by Menocal and co-authors about the 
countries of their interest: the main political players, forces, 
and institutions do not accept democracy as ‘the only game 
in town’38. However, in our cases, the only game in town is, 
due to the constitutional and historical development of 
modern Europe, liberal democracy. Nevertheless, the 
system is not taken seriously at all by the Hungarian and 
Polish actors and - in consequence - it has been transformed 
to something else.39 
 
2.3. Legal constitutionalism  
As we stated above, the Third Wave of Democratization 
brought legal constitutionalism, together with Kelsenian 
model of law and the defence of constitution as the most 
suitable concept for the CEE countries with communist and 
totalitarian tradition. Legal constitutionalism40 is 
conceptualised as a system where democracy, democratic 
processes, the will of Parliament (in place of the popular 
                                                          
37 As F. N. Fesnic stated: ‘the civic skills and the political values acquired in 
schools are retained into adulthood’, ‘the effects of civic education are long 
term’, F.N. Fesnic, Can Civic Education Make a Difference for Democracy? 
Hungary and Poland Compared, 4 Political Studies 64(2016): 966. The most 
visible example is Mr. Piotrowicz, a former prosecutor before 1989 who is 
responsible for the CT ‘reform’ during legislative procedure. 
38 Menocal, Fritz, Rakner, supra note 36: 31. 
39 Labelled as authoritarianism at borderline, illiberal regimes, ‘grey-zone’ 
countries, the transition away from democracies, democracies in regression, 
competitive authoritarianism, or authoritarian constitutionalism. Hungarian 
events are even considered as counter-constitutional revolution and abusive 
constitutionalism. 
40 R. Bellamy, supra note 6. 
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representation), which is constrained by referring to and 
applying the superior constitutional rules, and which thus 
undermines legitimacy and efficacy of law and the courts. 
Due to the structural changes or the newly created 
constitutional settings (e.g. the CEE), legal constitutionalists 
generally place more trust in the judge to decide on 
reasonable disagreements instead of political actors and 
citizens who should be equally treated. For the legal 
constitutionalists, it is the constitution which represents a 
fundamental structure for reaching collective decisions in a 
democratic way. The constitution is a legal document which 
is binding to all and which is protected by the constitutional 
review mechanisms. 
However, the features of legal constitutionalism challenge 
the position of Parliament, which is the body of popular or 
national representation. Constitutional interpretation 
delivered by constitutional courts sometimes prevails and 
limits the will of the people. It can cause tensions between 
the constitutional interpretation and the will of the people 
aggregated and highly influenced by populist political 
parties. Therefore, the concept of political constitutionalism 
is used in Hungary and Poland (post 2010/2015) to justify 
the disabling and the capture of constitutional courts.  
This attitude of the power-holders is not without precedent. 
Before the transition, the socialist states had started to 
pretend to have a prescriptive constitution which needed 
protection. Socialist types of constitutional courts had been 
established with far less powers as compared to their 
modern counterparts. To give an example, there had been no 
annulment power, so the Parliament could just ignore the 
rulings. Both in Hungary and Poland, it was the Parliament 
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which was named not only as the supreme representative 
body but also, and most importantly, the supreme organ in 
the state hierarchy. Both the Constitutional Tribunal in 
Poland and the Constitutional Court in Hungary, during 
their short existence in the 1980s, were subordinated to 
Parliaments in the systems which did not recognise the 
principle of separation of powers. The supremacy of the 
political will prevailed in these one-party systems. 
However, after the transition, the CT and the CC functioned 
differently and became symbols of a democratic change (as 
well as for example, ombudsmen and the Polish Supreme 
Administrative Court). From a binary perspective of 
political and legal constitutionalism, and disregarding 
another binary system of autocratic and democratic systems, 
the socialist constitutional courts did not obstruct the free 
policy formulation and lawmaking of the party and 
Parliament. It was not their mission.  
 
3. Towards political constitutionalism? 
In the post 2010/2015 period, the almost mythical concept 
of the ‘will of the people’ (or that of the Nation) to which 
populist politicians try to relate, has been more and more 
supported by scholars, first in Hungary and then in Poland. 
There are several scholarly works advocating the concept of 
political constitutionalism in their respective states.41 Thus, 
one can notice that even the academia to a certain extent 
                                                          
41 A. Antal, Politikai és jogi alkotmányosság Magyarországon [Political and 
legal constitutionalism in Hungary]’ 3 Politikatudományi Szemle (2013), A. 
Czarnota, The Constitutional Tribunal, VerfBlog, 2017/6/03, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/the-constitutional-tribunal/, DOI: 
https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20170603-164015 (31.10.2017). 
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supports the ruling majorities in their efforts to justify their 
political actions.  
 
3.1. The concept of political constitutionalism 
For political constitutionalists, the constitution is a 
democratic process itself, representing a political, rather 
than a legal system. Thus, due to the fact that the idea 
emerged in the UK, the constitution is not treated as a 
superior norm. Disagreements are to be solved within this 
political framework, which obviously rejects the idea of any 
kind of review conducted by apolitical, independent and 
non-elected but otherwise selected actors, such as judges. 
This way of solving disagreements seems to be a good 
theoretical explanation to provide academic background for 
disabling and packing constitutional courts.  
 
3.2. The misunderstanding in scholarly works 
(arguments pro political constitutionalism) 
With respect to Hungary,42 Attila Antal describes43 the 
period 1990-2010 as legal constitutionalism whereas the 
period following 2010 as political constitutionalism. Other 
scholars share this point of view. Year 2010 is perceived as 
a dawn of a political constitutionalism in Hungary. Antal 
evidently misuses Bellamy’s concept. He arguably states 
that both legal and political constitutionalism are present in 
                                                          
42 See T. Drinóczi, Does the constitutional review breach the principle of 
separation of powers? A shifting perspective. In Iulia Motoc , Paulo Pinto de 
Albuquerque , Krzysztof Wojtyczek eds.: New Developments in Constitutional 
Law: Essays in honour of András Sajó. Eleven international publishing 2018. 
pp. 75-96. 
43 A. Antal, supra note 41. Antal’s position is referred to e.g., I. Stumpf, Erős 
állam – alkotmányos korlátok [Strong state – constitutional restrictions], 
Századvég, Budapest (2014): 239, 247. 
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Hungary at the same time and they are able to feasibly form 
a healthy political and public law culture together.44 By 
taking this position, which is similar to the model of new 
constitutionalism, Antal explains and even justifies recent 
constitutional changes including the theory of Bellamy, 
which - despite his criticism45 - is coherent in his own logic 
and framework. Antal, however, neglects to consider 
whether constitutional, political and social preconditions of 
political constitutionalism are present in Hungary. As 
mentioned, these requirements encompass among other 
things: the existence of competitive elections, which were 
doubtful in Hungary in 2014 at least to a certain extent; the 
genuine participation in the legislative processes, on which 
Hungary also features some defects.  
In addition, one can say that the theory of political 
constitutionalism is political in nature, since it considers the 
constitution itself as a product of political processes, which 
needs to be protected by legal and other, conventional means 
and not because the political decision-maker has an 
omnipotent role without any restraint and legal limitation. 
For that reason, the strong Hungarian judicial review model 
should not be forgotten when evaluating the type of 
constitutionalism applied by this state and when considering 
the best means of the CC for defending the Fundamental 
Law (FL). It is constitutionally mandated expressis verbis 
that the CC has the power to annul unconstitutional laws, 
other normative acts and judicial decisions.46 If the CC 
                                                          
44 Antal, supra n. 41: 66.  
45 See e.g. Turtles all the way down? Is the political constitutionalist appeal to 
disagreement self-defeating? A reply to Cormac Mac Amhlaigh,1 I-CON 
14(2016). 
46 Art 24 (3) a) c) points FL. 
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considers itself as a body functioning in a system where also 
political constitutionalism applies, then this Court may 
come to the conclusion not to annul unconstitutional pieces 
of legislation but to reinforce the efforts of the political 
decision-maker by using softer measures, as it was openly 
suggested by one of its former presidents. In this case, the 
CC will indeed be an engine of governance by not blocking 
its rapid reactions47 and will spare the prestige and authority 
of Parliament, which is the supreme organ of popular 
representation.48 However, it will do this at the cost of not 
properly performing its constitutional duty as being the 
‘principal organ for the protection of the Fundamental 
Law’49 and constitutionalism.50 
The scholarly works in Poland still have not been elaborated 
to this extent. Many Polish authors, due to the short period 
of time which has elapsed since 2015, describe the ongoing 
situation with almost no theoretical reflection.51 
Nevertheless, there are also essays mixing theoretical 
                                                          
47 Interview with Barbabás Lenkovics, president of the CC, March 2015 in Radió 
Kossuth. Summary can be found in Hungarian at http://nol.hu/belfold/lenkovics-
az-ab-feladata-hogy-ne-blokkolja-a-kormanyzati-munkat-1519643. See also in 
English at http://hungarianspectrum.org/2015/07/18/chief-justice-lenkovics-on-
the-fidesz-constitutional-court-part-i/ (18.05.2017). 
48 Art 1 (1) FL. 
49 Art 24 (1) FL. 
50 See e.g. decisions on the integration of credit institutions set up as cooperative 
societies in decision 20/2014 (VII. 3.) and on the mentioned decision 3194/2014. 
(VII. 15.) of the CC. For an analysis see http://helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/EKINT-HCLU-





51 A. Bień-Kacała, Polish Constitutional Tribunal: a systemic reform or a hasty 
political change, 1 DPCE online (2016), J. Fomina, J. Kucharczyk, Populism 
and protest in Poland, 4 Journal of Democracy 27 (2016): 58-65.  
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perspectives52 or trying to justify the government’s 
decisions under the laws in effect.53 According to the latter 
claims, the will of the people and, in consequence, justice is 
more important than the law, and this can be seen as the 
realisation of political constitutionalism. 
The recent assessment on the current CT’s activity 
(including the delivery of judgements along with the 
recognition of the supremacy of Parliament and the exercise 
of judicial restraint) also supports the assumption that 
political constitutionalism is in the rise in Poland. However, 
such conceptualization on the emergence of political 
constitutionalism and fading the legal constitutionalism is 
not needed when (the CC and) the CT act as a mere 
supporter of the political majority. Instead, this is the 
judicialization of politics. If the CT (and the CC) is captured 
and acts according to the political will of the party in power, 
then no argument in favour of political constitutionalism 
deems necessary. The more adequate expression of legal 
constitutionalism is still applicable with ‘benefits’. The 
system pretends to uphold legal constitutionalism, with its 
written constitution and enforcing mechanism, but the 
rulings of the constitutional courts are nothing else but the 
assertion of the political will.54  
                                                          
52 A. Mrozek, A. Śledzińska-Simon, Constitutional Review as an Indispensable 




53 B. Szmulik, Opinia w sprawie uwag do nowelizacji ustawy z dnia 25 czerwca 
2015 r. o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym przygotowanych przez Komisję Wenecką 
[Opinion on the comments to the amendment of the Act of 25 June 2015 on the 
Constitutional Tribunal by the Venice Commission], 5 Przegląd Sejmowy 
(2016): 81-100. 
54 More about it see under point 6. 
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4. Dismantling the democratic commitment (arguments 
against political constitutionalism) 
So far it has been argued that the events starting from 2010 
(Hungary) and 2015 (Poland) have clearly not lead to 
political constitutionalism as understood by scholarly 
works. They are based on abusive constitutionalism and 
unconstitutional informal constitutional change. These 
actions cannot build a new fair system. This is clear when 
we consider the Hungarian CC statement regarding the legal 
assessment of the transition that the rule of law cannot be 
weighed against the rule of law.  
 
4.1. Abusive constitutionalism  
In Hungary, all changes have been made by the constitution-
making and -amending power, for which it was enough to 
have the constitutional majority, i.e. a two-third majority 
votes of the MPs in Parliament. The formal constitutional 
amendment process, save for the two-third majority, is not 
entrenched in the FL; there are neither any special 
procedural rules (e.g. referendum) nor eternity clauses 
established. In the course of adopting the Fundamental Law, 
the constitution-making power did not organise a 
referendum even though it could have done so. At the end 
of the day, the ruling elite clearly monopolised not only the 
constitution-making process but - by the prohibition of 
referendum on constitutional amendments - also the 
constitution-amending process. None of the amendments to 
the FL was supported by referendum, including those 
overruling the then recent rulings of the CC. The most 
known example is the case of the retroactive taxation that 
led to the curtailment of the powers of the CC, and the 
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Fourth Amendment, which generated debates both within 
the CoE and the EU. The case of the Seventh Amendment 
is outstanding. It had been preceded by a referendum on the 
so-called quota decision of the European Council,55 which 
had been invalid, because less than the required statutory 
number of voters had participated. It is true, however, that 
their overwhelming majority (98%) did not want to accept 
the ‘quota decision’. Therefore, it did not trigger any legal 
response, but still, the political decision-maker decided to 
initiate a constitutional amendment, which was 
communicated as the implementation of the will of the 
people that had been expressed in the referendum. There 
was no constitutional majority in Parliament, so this 
amendment failed, and was followed by the decision 
22/2016 (XII. 5.) of the CC, which assisted to informally 
constitutionalise one of the essential components of the 
failed formal amendment, i.e. constitutional identity of 
Hungary. 
In Poland, the ruling political power cannot amend the 
constitution by itself because it has no constitutional 
majority.56 Nevertheless, in certain circumstances,57 an 
abuse of constitutional power is still possible: if the 
opposition is absent or if it blocks the legislative process. 
This indeed happened in December 2016 during the 
                                                          
55 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing 
provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of 
Italy and Greece (OJ 2015 L 248), p. 80 
56 See Art. 235(4) of the Polish Constitution.  
57 Art. 235(4) A bill to amend the Constitution shall be adopted by the Sejm by 
a majority of at least two-thirds of votes in the presence of at least half of the 
statutory number of Deputies (half of statutory number of Deputies is 230 and 
PiS has 235 Deputies which means that when opposition is excluded PiS can act 
by itself), and by the Senate by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of 
at least half of the statutory number of Senators (PiS has 64 Senators). 
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legislative procedure. The voting took place outside of the 
main chamber, because the room was blocked by the 
protesting opposition. Thus, the opposition had only a 
restricted access to the new chamber and the voting process. 
It shows how the political majority, which assumes itself as 
representing the will of the Nation, can act in an abusive way 
and exclude not only an individual MP but also the 
opposition from a parliamentary process.  
In addition, we can predict that after gaining the 
constitutional majority in the next parliamentary election, a 
new constitution might be adopted in a non-inclusive way, 
similarly to Hungary. The draft is apparently in 
preparation.58 
 
4.2. Breaching the constitution: informal 
unconstitutional constitutional change  
Since 2015, it has been a frequent practice in Poland, 
particularly in politically sensible issues, e.g. the CT or 
judiciary reforms, that new laws ‘breach the Constitution’ 
instead of trying to amend it formally. Thus, it is not what 
David Landau describes as abusive constitutionalism,59 and 
what were employed in Hungary. The reason is that the PiS 
did not get the constitutional majority in 2015. However, it 
still managed to act in a way that has led to the 
                                                          
58 A questionnaire on the rules of a new constitution was sent by PiS to the 
academia members. At the same time, the Polish President revealed his 
willingness to initiate a referendum on the rules of the new constitution, which 
is not connected with the PiS questionnaire 
http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/art,635,prezydent-rozmawial-
o-referendum-z-marszalkami-sejmu-i-senatu-.html.  
59 D. Landau, Abusive constitutionalism 3 UC Davis Law Review (2013), 
Forthcoming; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 646, SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2244629. 
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transformation of the constitutional system by causing and 
upholding the long-lasting constitutional crisis and 
incapacitating the proper implementation and enforcement 
of the constitution. What the Polish political decision-
makers did with the CT (refusal of accepting the oaths, not 
publishing the judgments) was based on one kind of 
constitutional interpretation and the disregard of the rulings 
of the CT.  
Such practice can be marked as an ‘informal constitutional 
change’.60 In Poland, however, this informal constitutional 
change is at the same time unconstitutional,61 as it has been 
achieved by the political power (the legislative and the 
executive) through the ordinary legislation and has led to 
change in the meaning of the constitution’s text without a 
former amending procedure. Additionally, the government 
created a legal basis for not publishing the decisions of the 
CT which runs counter to its role in the Polish legal system 
and the constitutional obligation to release judgments in the 
official journal.62 Although lacking the constitutional 
                                                          
60 It is theorised by R. Albert with regards to the US constitutional law, or D. 
Oliver and C. Fusaro, or X. Contiades and A. Fotiadou with regards to selected 
European and common law tradition states. None of the latter however focus on 
the theory of informal constitutional amendments. See recently e.g., R. Albert, 
How unwritten constitutional norms change written constitutions, Dublin 
University Law Journal 38 (2015); Boston College Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 364. D. Oliver, C. Fusaro (eds.), How constitutions change? 
A comparative study. Hart Publishing. Oxford (2013), X. Contiades (ed.), 
Engineering Constitutional Change. Routledge (2016). 
61 This phenomenon is labelled as constitutional dismemberment by R. Albert, 
Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Research paper 424. November 
25 (2016).  
62 See e.g, Opinion 860/2016, Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, 
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 108 the Plenary Session (Venice, 14-
15 October 2016), 16. An overall description can be found in A. Bień-Kacała, 
supra note 51. The possibility that the next election might bring a change in the 
government will not change the fact that serious unconstitutional actions have 
been already taken. 
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majority, the party in power tends to apply this practice 
using other political instruments. By having 
unconstitutional pieces of legislation in effect, the meaning 
of the text of the constitution is changed or even emptied, 
because it is not the constitutional but the statutory provision 
that is to be applied. These events weaken the rule of law, 
democracy and the protection of human rights. 
In Hungary, beyond the formal constitutional amendments 
since 2010,63 we can also experience an informal 
constitutional amendment as a result of the constitutional 
interpretation of the CC concerning the constitutional 
identity of Hungary, which is deduced from the 
constitutional text, in which it had no textual basis. This 
decision is the one that helped the political elite 
constitutionalise the identity concept, which could not be 
achieved by using the formal amendment process.64  
 
5. Disabling mechanism of defending a constitution  
The practices of both the abusive constitutionalism and the 
informal unconstitutional constitutional change aim at 
weakening the constitutional courts and other independent 
institutions. Therefore, the ‘new system’ in none of the 
countries can be perceived as a political constitutionalism. 
Neither is it, as already said, a legal constitutionalism 
compared to the pre-2010/2015 period. The main reason is 
that the system currently lacks in an efficient defence 
mechanism of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. 
First, in Hungary, the nomination of the CC judges was 
modified by shifting from the parity to proportional 
                                                          
63 T. Drinóczi, supra note 26. 
64 See the ‘quota referendum case’ and the failed Seventh Amendment. 
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representation in the nominating committee in Parliament. 
This was caused by the fact that the parity system made the 
nominations impossible or degraded them to a simple 
political bargaining. In the course of preparation of the new 
constitutional rules and powers of the CC (constitutional 
complaint), the number of judges was increased from 11 to 
15 and the CC’s President was decided to be elected by a 
2/3 majority of Parliament, departing from the prior 
regulation providing for an election by the members of the 
CC.65 The principal ideas of the change, i.e. ensuring the 
functioning of the Court and transforming it to a more 
juridical-type organ are legitimate goals. The chosen means, 
however, are not necessarily acceptable, as it - by 
monopolizing the nomination process - excludes a 
possibility of any political compromise as far as there is a 
two-third political majority.  
On the other hand, in Poland, after the over-two-year long 
crisis,66 the CT still cannot fulfil its function as it is partially 
captured by the PiS with the election of the PiS-friendly 
judges and the new CT President. Additionally, as a 
consequence of the extreme polarisation and disagreement 
caused by the new composition, the CT cannot properly 
deliver any judgements. CT judges are split into two groups. 
New judges tend to recognise the supremacy of the political 
                                                          
65 Act LXI of 2011 on the modification of the Constitution. See T. Drinóczi, 
Węgry, in A. Michalak, J. Sułkowski, A. Chmielarz (ed.), Powoływanie sędziów 
konstytucyjnych w wybranych państwach europejskich [Appointment of 
constitutional judges in the selected European countries], Wolters Kluwer 
Polska, Warszawa (2017). 
66 Which is described in detail by M. Wyrzykowski, Antigone in Warsaw, in 
Human rights in contemporary world, Esseys in Honour of Professor Leszek 
Garlicki, M. Zubik (ed.), Warszawa (2017): 370-390 and by T. T. Koncewicz at 
Verfassungsblog, http://verfassungsblog.de/constitutional-capture-in-poland-
2016-and-beyond-what-is-next/ (31.10.2017). 
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majority and reject the supremacy of the constitution which 
is supposed to be safeguarded by the CT. Others stick to the 
well-established constitutional rules. This situation 
deteriorated after the election of the CT President (20 
December 2016).67 The paralysation and capture of the CT 
ruins its reputation68 and legitimization69. Putting the CT in 
the middle of the political conflict brings lack of an 
appropriate support which is essential to oppose the political 
pressure. So, the neutral (as expected) organ is unjustifiably 
involved in the political decision-making process.  
As a result of these events in both states, the newly elected 
persons are still politically biased (and sometimes less 
qualified but politically reliable) and therefore they act as 
servants of the political will. Furthermore, the constitutional 
court itself does not take the constitution into account but 
serves the will of the government (Hungary70), or their 
                                                          
67 M. Matczak, http://verfassungsblog.de/polands-constitutional-tribunal-under-
pis-control-descends-into-legal-chaos/ (31.10.2017). 
68 T. Ginsberg, When courts compete: a reputational perspective, in Human 
rights in contemporary world, Esseys in Honour of Professor Leszek Garlicki, 
M. Zubik (ed.), Warszawa (2017): 61-70 and P. Pasquino, Neutrality in 
constitutional conflicts’ resolution. Preliminary observations, in Human rights 
in contemporary world, Esseys in Honour of Professor Leszek Garlicki, M. 
Zubik (ed.), Warszawa (2017): 180-193. 
69 Created by proper, reasonable, clear and short (as far as language of statements 
of reasons is concerned) justification. A. Młynarska-Sobaczewska, Rytualne 
ofiary a moralność publiczna. Analiza argumentacji Trybunału 
Konstytucyjnego (K 52/13) i Sądu Najwyższego USA (508 U.S. 520.1993) 
[Ritual sacrifices and public morality. Analysis of arguments of the 
Constitutional Tribunal (K 52/13) and US Supreme Court (508 U.S. 520.1993),], 
4 Państwo i Prawo (2017) and A. Młynarska-Sobaczewska, Wybór sędziów 
konstytucyjnych jako element legitymizacji sądu konstytucyjnego [Election of 
the constitutional judges as an element of legitimacy of the constitutional court], 
(in publication), p. 8. 
70 22/2016 (XII.5) on the limits of the EU law, Decision 3194/2014 (VII. 15.) 
on the monopolization retail trade of tobacco products (the right of those 
formerly carrying out tobacco retail activities was restricted, and in the future, 
they could continue their business only if they get a concession the tender for 
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decisions are not considered at all (Poland71). Thus, one can 
presume that the real mechanism of safeguarding 
democracy does not exist.72  
 
6. Judicialization of politics  
The Polish CT started to act as its Hungarian counterpart, 
thereby safeguarding the limitless power of the 
parliamentarian (political) majority. Such behaviour is 
known as the special kind of judicialization of politics.73 An 
ostensive example of this practice is the already-mentioned 
decision 22/2016 (XII.5) of the Hungarian CC.74 One can 
observe here a constitutionalisation of the will of the 
political power (Fidesz) that could not get the necessary 
parliamentary support in an earlier time. As said before, this 
                                                          
which was very limited in numbers; the objective criterion of a kind of ‘numerus 
clausus’ was considered subjective limitation allowing more room for the 
legislative power to restrict the fundamental right to enterprise). 
71 The following still not published judgments concerning the statutory 
provisions on the CT: 9 March 2016 r. (K 47/15); 11 August 2016 r. (K 39/16); 
7 November 2016 r. (K 44/16).  
72 And the mechanism cannot be fixed by taking over constitutional review by 
the ordinary courts. R. Balicki, Bezpośrednie stosowanie konstytucji [Direct 
application of a constitution], 4 Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (2016): 13-19; P. 
Kardas, M. Gutowski, Konstytucja z 1997 r. a model kontroli konstytucyjności 
prawa [1997 Constitution and a model of constitutional review], 4 Palestra 
(2017): 11-30; L. Garlicki, Sądy a Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
[Courts and the Constitution of the Republic of Poland], 7-8 Przegląd Sądowy 
(2016): 23-25; L. Garlicki, Z.A. Garlicka, External Review of Constitutional 
Amendments? International Law as a Norm of Reference, 44 Israel Law Review 
(2011): 343-368. 
73 A. Mazmanyan, supra note 13. 
74 T. Drinóczi, The Hungarian Constitutional Court on the Limits of EU Law in 
the Hungarian Legal System, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 29 December 2016, 
< http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/12/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-
on-the-limits-of-eu-law-in-the-hungarian-legal-system>. For criticism, see T. 
Drinóczi, Hungarian Constitutional Court: The Limits of EU Law in the 
Hungarian Legal System, 1 Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 
(2017): 139-151. 
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formal amendment (Seventh) to the FL intended to create a 
‘constitutional identity’ clause as a defence mechanism 
against the Council decision on a refugee quota (Council 
decision, 2015/1601 of 22 September 201575). However, 
shortly after the invalid referendum on the EU’s quota 
decision76 and just one week after the Seventh 
Constitutional Amendment had failed,77 the already packed 
CC,78 informally amending the FL, declared as follows: by 
exercising its competences, the CC can examine if the joint 
exercise of competences infringes, among others, 
Hungary’s self-identity based on its historical constitution.79 
On 16 March 2017, the Polish CT delivered the judgement 
on freedom of assembly, thereby exercising ex ante 
constitutional review (Kp 1/17).80 President of the Republic 
of Poland, before signing a bill, challenged the amendment 
to the Law on assemblies before the CT. The main scope of 
the change is a preference to the cyclical (repeatable in 
certain period of time, e.g. every 10 day of each month) 
assemblies, which the CT upheld. This judgement was the 
                                                          
75 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2015/1601/oj. 
76 There are many voices of criticism (on moral ground, political objections and 
constitutional problems) concerning this referendum. For a collection of them 
and a legal analysis see Z. Szente, Analysis: The Controversial Anti-Migrant 
Referendum in Hungary is Invalid, https://iacl-aidc-blog.org/2016/10/18/the-
controversial-anti-migrant-referendum-in-hungary-is-invalid/ (18.05.2017).  
77 See e.g., G. Halmai, Constitutional Court Decision on the Hungarian 




78 See e.g. http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/EKINT-HCLU-
HHC_Analysing_CC_judges_performances_2015.pdf.  
79 Although there are other similar examples, this paper does not allow on their 
further elaboration 
80 See also A. Bień-Kacała, Gloss to the judgement of Constitutional Tribunal 
of 16 March 2017 (Kp 1/17), 4 Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego (2017): 255-
262.  
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first sign of the judicialization of politics in Poland, not only 
because of its merit, but because of the procedural issues. It 
is important to recall here the motion of the Prosecutor 
General (PG) for excluding from this adjudication some 
judges (who joined the CT in 2010 due to the flaws of their 
election). Moreover, in the same case, another judge 
(elected in 2017) was not excluded despite his own motion, 
in which he expressed his impartiality. Under these 
circumstances, it is clear that the guiding idea of 
adjudication was the political loyalty of the judges. 
Therefore, the question arises whether the judgment (Kp 
1/17) is a mere acceptance of the political agenda of the 
leading majority.  
Political loyalty of the judges and the judicialization pattern 
are more ostensive in another judgement from 20 June 2017 
(K 5/17) because of its merit (substance).81 The decision is 
connected to the judiciary reform.82 The said bill intended 
to change the constitutional character of the National 
Council of Judiciary (NCJ), the terms of office of its 
members and its organisation. Taking into consideration 
that the Constitution only contains provisions regulating the 
main role of the NCJ (i.e. to safeguard the independence of 
the courts and judges)83 and determines its composition,84 
                                                          
81 M. Matczak, How to Demolish an Independent Judiciary with the Help of a 
Constitutional Court, VerfBlog, 2017/6/23, http://verfassungsblog.de/how-to-
demolish-an-independent-judiciary-with-the-help-of-a-constitutional-court/ 
(31.10.2017). 
82 However, this reform has been slowed down by the veto of the President 
http://www.president.pl/en/news/art,508,president-to-veto-two-judicial-bills-
says-will-sign-bill-on-common-courts.html. At the moment of writing the paper 
(November 2017), the reform is in preparation by the President and is consulted 
with J. Kaczyński. 
83 Article 186(1) of the Constitution of 1997.  
84 Article 187 of the Constitution of 1997. 
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such reform would be legally possible. The detailed 
regulations are to be adopted by Parliament.85 Nevertheless, 
it must be emphasised that only independent and politically 
non-biased organ can safeguard independence of the courts 
and judges. In case of Poland, however, the said reform 
might politically influence the NCJ, because the draft 
intends to create two units within this body – a political 
(composed of, for example, the Minister of Justice, an 
individual appointed by the President, 4 Deputies and 2 
senators) and a judicial (composed of judges elected by 
politicians, for example the Sejm which indirectly means the 
party in power). The draft legislation on the reform 
(especially in scope of the NCJ) has been criticised by 
different entities (e.g. the Ombudsman) from a 
constitutional perspective. Therefore, on a motion of the 
Prosecutor General (simultaneously acting as the Minister 
of Justice who prepared the draft legislation of the reform), 
the CT delivered the judgement concerning currently 
binding regulations. In the ruling K 5/17, the CT created a 
legal basis for the reform. According to the interpretation of 
the Constitution, the legislative power is authorized to create 
an almost totally different organ from the current NCJ as 
intended in the draft. This position, equalling to an informal 
constitutional change by constitutional interpretation, and it 
is also a perfect example of the judicialization of politics.  
These examples enlighten that the constitutional courts act 
as agents of politicians who exploit them for their own 
strategic purposes. In consequence, this judicialization of 
                                                          
85 Article 187(4) of the Constitution of 1997- The organizational structure, the 
scope of activity and procedures for work of the National Council of the 
Judiciary, as well as the manner of choosing its members, shall be specified by 
statute.  
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politics in both countries is more often than not a product of 
political instruction and manipulation of constitutional law. 
Constitutional courts allow the realization of the 
Parliaments’, thus the peoples’ will.  
 
7. Conclusion  
As far as the representative democracy is concerned, it 
seems to be clear that the Hungarian and Polish practices are 
procedurally or formally similar to what political 
constitutionalism represents. This is, however, a façade, 
because neither the constitutional basis nor substantive 
preconditions exist, which would allow us to consider the 
Hungarian and Polish newest constitutionalism as political 
constitutionalism. If we seek any typology for both the 
Hungarian FL and the Polish Constitution or constitutional 
practice since 2010 or 2015, it is misleading to employ the 
theory of political constitutionalism, mostly since it may 
lead us to the ill-founded impression that the prerequisites 
of political constitutionalism are also valid in these states 
and we do not have a legal constitution but a political one, 
which is neither de facto nor de iure true. The Hungarian 
and the Polish constitutions are the products of the 
constitution-making process, even if this process can 
justifiably be criticised from many perspectives. This fact 
alone makes it a written constitution, which according to its 
own rules is the foundation of the legal system, binding for 
everyone, including the state power. The constitutions 
prescribe that it is the CC (explicitly) or the CT 
106 | T í m e a  D r i n ó c z i ,  A g n i e s z k a  B i e ń - K a c a ł a  
(implicitly86) which is the principal organ for the protection 
of the constitution. Our systems show some features 
departing from legal constitutionalism. They are less than 
legal constitutionalism as well: both the Polish and the 
Hungarian constitutions ceased to be legal and prescriptive 
documents and along with the constitutional courts, mostly 
in certain, politically sensitive cases, they cannot limit 
public power. 
The events in Hungary and Poland show clearly that the 
systemic changes in both states cannot be perceived as 
bringing political constitutionalism. In our countries, we 
still observe a kind of legal constitutionalism which can be 
best described by the label of ‘illiberal constitutionalism’87. 
The illiberal constitutionalism, the ‘newest 
constitutionalism’, is the result of a peaceful constitutional 
development, in which democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights are not respected in the same way as before, in 
the context of constitutional democracy. Additionally, one 
can observe the selective and arbitrary application of the 
constitution and the non-inclusive character of the 
constitution-making process. In case of both states, the 
illiberal democracy was and still is formed by capturing the 
constitution and constitutionalism in a legal way by a 
populist political majority lacking self-restraint, with formal 
and informal constitutional change and packing or 
paralyzing the constitutional courts. The process of 
capturing constitutionalism is supported and theorised by 
                                                          
86 Compare Art. 24 FL and Art. 188 of the Polish Constitution. There is a 
consensus in Poland that the CT is the principal organ for protection of the 
Constitution. 
87 T. Drinóczi, A. Bień-Kacała, supra note 5.  
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the misunderstood concepts of political constitutionalism 
and constitutional identity.  
Illiberal democracy is not in opposition to liberal 
democracy. It rather refers to a state in which the political 
power relativizes the rule of law, democracy, and human 
rights in politically sensitive cases, constitutionalises 
populist nationalism as well as the identity politics. 
Consequently, constitutional democracy still exists but its 
formal implementation overweighs the substantial 
realization. The three pillars of liberal constitutional 
democracy (the rule of law, human rights and democracy) 
are defectively worded in a constitution or poorly 
implemented or enforced. This means, that the states are 
developing constitutional democracy in a mere formal sense 
but it does not amount to political constitutionalism. 
Notably because they still have a written constitution and 
they maintain and allow the functioning of the constitutional 
review mechanisms, even if the mechanisms are defective.  
The constitutional courts in both countries were designed for 
defending the (liberal) constitutional democracy as a 
reaction to totalitarian and non-democratic regimes. Thus, 
the most visible element of the illiberal system is capturing 
the constitutional courts by changing the judges’ nomination 
process (Hungary, capture de iure) and annulment of the 
election and the election of new judges (Poland, capture de 
facto). In consequence, the states face the ‘judicialization of 
politics’ which means that the constitutional courts are 
servants of the ruling political parties.  
Against this background, the ‘juristocracy’ or the 
estrangement of the citizens from the constitution, which 
they might have never had an affection for, thus 
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constitutional patriotism88 could have never arisen,89 cannot 
be a reason of turning aside from the constitutional regime 
established in the 1990s. Employing these otherwise 
feasible and applicable concepts and descriptions for the 
Polish and Hungarian situation is misleading and cover up 
how the power-holders actually behave and legitimize their 
actions. This use of doctrinal works, as presented in this 
paper, has a potential to become a mere politically motivated 
indoctrination.  
Thus, juristocracy as identified by Hirschl, and understood 
by us (as a phenomenon that can be linked to the legal 
constitutionalism) cannot be applied to Hungary and Poland 
1990-2010/2015. In the post 2010/2015, we experience 
exactly its opposite: the judicalization of politics which 
cannot result in a juristocracy as the constitutional court 
judges are the servants of the political will. 
                                                          
88 See e.g., J.-W. Müller, A general theory of constitutional patriotism. 1 I-CON 
(2007): 72–95. 
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between constitutional state organs but also in disputes 
between the subjects of the political scene, which is 
reflected in the targeting of the activities of public 
authorities according to the will expressed via a referendum.  
The Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 provides for holding 
a referendum in three following cases:  
1) in matters of particular importance for the state (art. 
125); 
2) in a matter of expressing a consent to the ratification 
of an international agreement on whose basis Poland 
will transfer onto an international organisation or an 
organ with the competences of a national authority 
certain matters (art. 90); 
3) in a matter of an approval of a law on amending the 
Constitution, as far as its provisions interfere with 
the content of Chapter I – ‘Commonwealth’, II – 
‘Liberties, rights and obligations of the man and 
citizen’ and XII – ‘Amendments to the Constitution’ 
(art. 235). 
In none of the above cases, however, there is an 
obligation to conduct a referendum, it is always optional and 
held if an authorised entity files a motion and a proper 
decision is taken by authorised organs. In light of the current 
referendum practice, it should be noted that in Poland there 
is a type of referendum that was classified by Gordon Smith 
as the so-called controlled referendum. It has the following 
three characteristics: those in power decide whether or not 
to hold a vote at all, when it is going to take place and they 
also decide on the questions being asked. 
The objective of this paper is to discuss the the role of 
‘controlled’ referendum in matters of particular importance 
T h e  r o l e  o f  ‘ c o n t r o l l e d ’  r e f e r e n d u m …  | 111 
for the state (art. 125) in Polish democracy. Such a 
referendum can be called by the Sejm by an absolute 
majority of the votes in the presence of at least half of the 
statutory number of members of the Sejm or by the President 
of the Republic of Poland with the consent of the Senate 
expressed by an absolute majority of the votes in the 
presence of at least half of the statutory number of senators. 
In the first, the Sejm can make a resolution on holding a 
referendum by an absolute majority of votes. A draft 
resolution on the order of a nationwide referendum may be 
submitted by the Presidium of the Sejm, a Sejm committees 
or a group of at least 69 deputies. Moreover, a request to 
order a referendum can be submitted to the Sejm by the 
Senate, the Council of Ministers, or a group of 500.000 
citizens. The popular initiative, however, may not concern 
such issues as expenditures, incomes, defence capability of 
the State and amnesty. It is the Sejm duty to examine the 
submitted request, however ordering a referendum is left to 
the recognition of the chamber. For the second, the decision 
to hold a referendum can be made by the President. Such a 
decision must be approved by the Senate by an absolute 
majority of votes. The Senate should take the appropriate 
resolution within 14-days of the date of submission of the 
draft provisions of head of state2. At the same time it should 
be noted that it is the President who determines the entire 
content of an ordinance to conduct a referendum, thus he 
decides which matters are of particular significance for the 
state, formulates the questions and indicates the date thereof, 
whereas the role of the Senate is limited to issuing a consent, 
i.e. passing a resolution that allows or rejects a referendum 
                                                          
2 Cf. K. Prokop, Polish constitutional law, Białystok 2011, p. 80-81. 
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in the date and form defined by the President3. ln this way, 
the Polish Constitution precludes the Head of State from 
holding a referendum without the consent of the Parliament. 
Such solution remains in accordance with the rationalised 
parliamentary system, which operates on the basis of the 
Constitution 1997.  
Moreover, a key element in the evaluation of the 
analysed referendum category is also an explanation of the 
meaning of the expression ‘matters of particular importance 
for the state’. M. Jabłoński is right to note that utilising the 
expression ‘does not constitute any model allowing for a 
suitable level of a priori identification of a matter to be 
resolved via a referendum vote. Such a solution may on the 
one hand prove the rational approach of the legislator in the 
sense that it is difficult to indicate a closed catalogue of such 
matters, thus such indefiniteness will allow for a universal 
reference to the existing competence, while on the other, 
considering the political character of the majority taking a 
decision on calling of a referendum, it is presumed that in 
many cases the assessment of the proposal to conduct the 
vote will be strictly political’4, which precludes any 
influence of civic character. Pursuant to art. 125 sec. 3 of the 
Constitution, if a national referendum is participated by 
more than a half of the citizens with the right of vote, the 
result is binding. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Cf. L. Garlicki, Komentarz do art. 125 Konstytucji [w:] Konstytucja 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, pod red. L. Garlickiego, Warszawa 
2001, p. 8. 
4 Cf. M. Jabłoński, Polskie referendum…,p.104. 
T h e  r o l e  o f  ‘ c o n t r o l l e d ’  r e f e r e n d u m …  | 113 
2. The role of ‘controlled’ referendum in Polish 
democracy 
Due to the introduction of the principle of nation 
sovereignty in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland it 
seemed that a nationwide referendum was bound to become 
an important instrument allowing the expression of opinions 
and formulation of decisions by the sovereign. In fact, as a 
form of participation of those governing in determining 
public matters it serves the immediate expression of the 
political will allocated to the citizen5. However, it needs to 
be remembered that according to the intentions of the 
founders of the Constitution the direct democracy 
institutions should not restrict the dominant position of the 
parliament, hence a national referendum was attributed in 
the Constitution a ‘supplementary character’ in relation to 
the activities of representative organs – the Sejm and the 
Senate6. The above view was also shared by the Polish 
Constitutional Court in point 11.5 of judgement K11/03 as 
of 27 May 20037. The Court recognised there that ‘the thesis 
on the supplementary character of direct democracy finds its 
justification... in the legal character of a referendum from 
the point of view of the entity entitled to refer to (initiate) 
the referendum procedure. In the Polish legal system we do 
not speak of a civil right to a referendum, as the citizen 
                                                          
5 See more Z. Witkowski, M. Serowaniec, The Views of the Polish Political 
Class on the Institution of a Nationwide Referendum, Kultura i Edukacja 2016, 
No. 4 (114), pp. 165–168 DOI: 10.15804/kie.2016.04.12. 
6 Cf. M. Pietrzak: Demokracja reprezentacyjna i bezpośrednia w Konstytucji RP 
[Representative and direct democracy in the Polish Constitution], [in:] 
Referendum konstytucyjne w Polsce [Constitutional referendum in Poland], ed. 
M. T. Staszewski, Warsaw 1997, pp. 31-32. 
7 An identical opinion on this issue is expressed by Prof. M. Jabłoński in: Polskie 
referendum akcesyjne [Polish accession referendum], Acta Universitatis 
Wratislaviensis No2965, Wrocław 2007, p.106, fn. 333. 
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(group of citizens) does not have a legally effective 
possibility to initiate actions whose immediate result 
consists in calling a referendum’8. Thus, an authorised 
motion is the one in whose light it explicitly follows from 
the current Polish constitutional regulations that the 
institution of a referendum only seemingly has a systemic 
meaning, while in fact it only to a small extent constitutes 
the guarantee for citizens of direct participation in decision-
making processes regarding matters of particular 
significance for the state9. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the current 
practice of the use of the institution of referendum in Poland 
are also less optimistic. From the very beginning of the 
implementation of this institution in the Polish legal order it 
was accompanied by political horse-trading. The members 
of the of the Constitutional Committee of the National 
Assembly challenged the importance of the institution of 
referendum by raising the argument that it created the 
premises for the establishment of ‘a permanent referendal 
republic’ thus providing ‘a very dangerous window for 
numerous initiatives that would create divisions in the 
society and burden the state's budget’, which was seconded 
by some of the representatives of legal science10. It was 
prophesied that instead strengthening the democratic 
legitimacy of a new state a referendum would act as a 
convenient form of exerting constitutional pressure on the 
Sejm and create cycles of tensions that would destabilise the 
state should the motions for a referendum be rejected by the 
                                                          
8 Ibid., p. 106. 
9 Cf. ibid., p. 103.  
10 Cf. ibid. and see Biuletyn KKZN XLIV, pp.151-152 
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Sejm. The final resolution concerning the institution of a 
referendum in the Constitution of 1997 clearly showed that 
within the members of the National Assembly passing the 
Constitution the dominant conviction was that the 
sovereign, and thus the totality of citizens, are not only ‘fully 
prepared for personal and direct governance’ but, moreover, 
that the faint political culture of the sovereign means that he 
should not be provided by the basic law the real possibility 
to influence the initiation of procedures that could result in 
the participation in shaping of the most important state 
decisions that concern him (the sovereign). It was 
recognised that such civic participation would lead to 
destabilisation and threaten the state of law rather than 
contribute to the development of civic democracy. And this 
was the principal reason why a nationwide referendum was 
turned into a merely decorative and secondary element. It 
should be straightforwardly admitted that the institution of 
referendum was marginalised in Poland by being assigned 
the features of a supplemental mechanism for indirect rule 
or responsible government11. Hence, although the adopted 
nationwide referendum mechanism in Poland fulfils the task 
of protection against its too frequent and not always justified 
use, at the same time it does not eliminate the risk of its 
entirely instrumental ad hoc use by currently ruling political 
majority12. However, the worst part is that this way the 
Polish political class expressed its real negative view on the 
need to ‘establish citizens’, the necessity to transform 
citizens into the actual public authority and not merely 
                                                          
11 Cf. on that topic M. Jabłoński, Polskie referendum... [Polish accession 
referendum], p. 105.  
12 Cf. ibid., p. 106. 
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addressees and subjects/objects of its imperative actions13. 
Moreover, according to the beliefs represented by the 
majority of politicians the institution of referendum may 
only be identified with the time-consuming and costly vote 
of no-confidence referring to actions undertaken by 
democratically elected representatives. Further, they also 
emphasised the lack of social recognition in voting, 
considering the fact that each vote may turn into a sort of a 
survey and not a substantive determination of a crucial 
national matter14. Simultaneously, attention was paid to the 
fact that a referendum is not a mechanism allowing for 
negotiations, thus it does not create the opportunities to 
foster consensus capable of satisfying the demands of all the 
stakeholders. On the contrary, it forces opting for a 
particular solution, which may lead to major societal 
conflicts. Unfortunately, constant references to the above 
arguments also prove that the political class do not treat 





                                                          
13 Cf. D. Dudek, Konstytucyjna aksjologia wyborów [Constitutional axiology of 
elections]. In: F. Rymarz, Iudices electionis custodes (Sędziowie kustoszami 
wyborów), Warszawa 2007, Wydawnictwo Krajowego Biura Wyborczego, s. 
47.  
14 Cf. M. Jabłoński, Referendum ogólnokrajowe w pracach Komisji 
Konstytucyjnej Zgromadzenia Narodowego (1993-1997) [National referendum 
in the works of the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly (1993-
1997)], Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis No 2341, ‘Przegląd Prawa i 
Administracji’ XLIX/2002, pp. 99 – 118. 
15 Cf. M. Jabłoński, Referendum ogólnokrajowe w polskim prawie 
konstytucyjnym [National referendum in the Polish constitutional law], Acta 
Universitatis Wratislaviensis No 2331 seria ‘Prawo’ Nr CCLXXIV, Wrocław 
2001, p. 135. 
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3. The referendum‘s practice in Poland 
The first referendum to be held after the year 1989 was 
the so-called enfranchisement referendum of 18 February 
1996 which was initiated by the decree of the President of 
the Republic of Poland on the common enfranchisement of 
the citizens16 and the resolution of the Sejm on holding a 
referendum on some of the directions of state property use17. 
The citizens had four questions to answer during the 
referendum:  
1) Are you in favour of the liabilities due to pensioners 
and public sector employees, arising from the 
decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal, to be 
satisfied from the privatised state assets?  
2) Are you in favour of the part of privatised state assets 
to supply the general pension funds?  
3) Are you in favour of increasing the value of 
participation certificates of National Investment 
Funds by extending the programme on other 
companies?  
4) Are you in favour of accounting for privatisation 
certificates in the common enfranchisement 
programme?  
From the legal point of view on 18 February 1996 two 
different referenda were called. However, the voter turnout 
was just above 32%. Therefore, they proved inconsequential 
on account of the statutory necessity of fulfilling the turnout 
                                                          
16 See the Decree of the President of the Republic of Poland of 29 November 
1995 on holding a referendum concerning the common enfranchisement 
(Journal of Laws No 138, item 685). 
17 See the Decree of the President of the Republic of Poland of 21 December 
1995 on holding a referendum concerning some of the directions of state 
property use (Journal of Laws No 154, item 795). 
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criterion for the validity of the referendum (over a half of 
those entitled to vote). The doctrine concludes that such a 
low turnout was caused mainly by the lack of a pre-
referendum debate and the complexity of the questions. 
Secondly, the lack of a long-standing tradition of taking part 
in a referendum and a belief that it may have a real impact 
on the affairs of the state might have been attributed to its 
failure18.  
The latest national referendum so far took place on 6 
September 2015 on the initiative of Bronisław Komorowski, 
the former President of the Republic of Poland19. In this 
referendum, the citizens were requested to provide answers 
to three questions concerning: single-mandate electoral 
districts, political party funding and the principles of settling 
ambiguous issues in favour of the taxpayer. In a common 
view, this initiative, on account of the questions posed was 
treated as an attempt to take over Paweł Kukiz' constituents 
and save the second ballot. However, less than three months 
before that time, before the referendum campaign 
commenced, the majority of Poles (58%) had no awareness 
of what it would be about. Only 39% of people declared to 
have knowledge on the issue, with only 17% being able to 
vouch for their knowledge20. As the commentators 
emphasised, presidential decision 'will not increase the 
citizens' trust of democracy, but conversely, the citizens will 
distance themselves from politics, from democracy, and will 
                                                          
18 Cf. M. Jabłoński, Referendum ogólnokrajowe w polskim prawie…, [National 
referendum in the Polish Law] pp. 44-47. 
19 See the Decision of the President of the republic of Poland of 17 June 2015 
on calling a national referendum 
20 Cf. CBOS survey message No 89/2015 Referendum – first reactions before 
the commencement of the campaign ,available on-line at: 
http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_089_15.PDF (12.07.2016). 
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not feel subjectified'21. Eventually, the turnout was only 
7.8% and has been the lowest of all recorded national 
elections held in Europe after 194522. The referendum 
became a symbolic defeat of entire Polish democracy, for 
which politicians hold the responsibility. 
Another attempt at an instrumental use of the institution 
of referendum could be the initiative of the President of the 
Republic of Poland, Andrzej Duda, by conducting a 
referendum with regard to changes in the Constitution. 
According to the President, the Poles should be able to 
comment on the constitution that has been in force for 20 
years and the political system defined in it. Moreover, the 
President wants the referendum on constitutional changes to 
be held next year on November 11 or to be extended onto 
two days: November 10 and 11. The said referendum is to 
be nationwide and intended as a consultative referendum. 
The constitutionalist stressed that, according to the rules in 
force, an outcome of a national referendum may be of a 
consultative or advisory character when the turnout is less 
than 50% of those entitled to participate, whereas a higher 
turnout means that the referendum is binding. Thus, one can 
ask the following question: what happens if the referendum 
– meant by the President as consultative, yet conducted in 
the area of the constitution – is binding? This would mean 
that the Sejm and the Senate are required to adopt the 
constitution in concord with the results of the referendum, 
however in order to adopt amendments to the constitution it 
                                                          
21 Cf, A. Szczęśniak: Referenda became a toy in the hands of politicians, 
available on-line at: http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/szczesniak-referenda-staly-sie-
zabawka-w-rekach-politykow/kvs33q (15.07.2016). 
22 Cf. G. Osiecki, M. Potocki, Referendum przeszło do historii [Referendum 
went down in history], ‘Dziennik Gazeta Prawna’, 8 September 2015. 
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is required to obtain two-thirds (votes) in the Sejm and an 
absolute majority in the Senate. At the moment it seems 
impossible to achieve such a majority. Thus, what would 
this commitment of the Sejm and the Senate mean? In 
political terms, such a referendum makes sense, for 
example, as a challenge to ensure such a majority with 
regard to constitutional changes in the present and incoming 
parliament. On the legal side, with regard to this particular 
parliament it seems that it would be difficult to enforce the 
results of the referendum if it were binding. This would 
mean a commitment that in practice would be difficult to 
keep. The discussion on the constitution and its possible 
changes is needed, although to many people these issues are 
very difficult. Another problem is concerned with a 
constitutional referendum which is to acknowledge the 
amendments to the constitution adopted by the parliament. 
According to the provisions of the constitution such a 
referendum may – but does not have to be ordered if the 
amendments pertain to the provisions stipulated in chapters 
I, II or XII of the constitution. These are chapters concerned 
with the principles defining the political system of the state, 
freedoms, rights and obligations of persons and citizens, and 
the procedures for amending the constitution. Indeed, it is 
clearly visible that the procedure of introducing changes in 
the constitution was intended for the purpose of correcting 
the constitution rather than changing it completely. In the 
situation where the entire constitution is subject to 
modification, i.e. also chapters I, II and XII, the matter of 
conducting a confirmatory referendum thus becomes more 
complicated. Therefore a question arises: what should be the 
object of such a referendum? Should it be chapters I, II and 
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XII or the entire constitution? It seems that the latter as what 
would it mean, for example, if the amendments to the three 
chapters were rejected (in the referendum)? In such a 
situation the entire constitution should be submitted to a 
referendum as a completely new normative act. A 
confirmatory referendum is not obligatory and if an 
agreement is reached on the political scene such as 
referendum is not conducted. However, with current 
extensive and sharp political disputes, it can be assumed that 
there will be a will to hold a referendum that is 
‘constitutional by character’ to end the procedure of 
changing the constitution. 
As practice shows, the issues that were the subject of 
voting were not sufficiently recognised by a larger part of 
the society. From the society's point of view, the referenda 
did not appear as procedures of direct participation in the 
process of exercising power but as a call for taking sides or 
even granting political support to a particular person or 
political group. A referendum, on account of the properties 
of human psyche, has a tendency to turn into a personal 
plebiscite which aims at building or denying support to a 
particular politician, or a group of politicians who authored 
the draft that has been put to vote. The draft and its 
properties, advantages and disadvantages are of secondary 
importance. As shown in practice, most frequently it 
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4. The Views of the Political Class on the institution of 
Referendum 
A referendum has been and still is commonly treated by 
the political classes as an element of political struggle 
between particular parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
groups that take advantage of it for their ongoing purposes. 
Different political hubs attach different expectations to 
referenda. Some politicians treat them solely as a test of 
popularity of their own group. Hence, a referendum is 
oftentimes considered as a test for political elites, which 
provides more of an indication of what the current 
distribution of powers on the political scene is, rather than 
binding solutions on issues that are essential to the state. 
Referenda have become toys in the hands of politicians who 
use them as tools in electoral competition and an element of 
the 'power game'. The institution of the referendum has thus 
become another means for running their political campaign 
on an extended scale, which enables the gathering of 
numerous constituents rather than a real procedure that 
ensures direct exercise of power for the public23. It is not 
uncommon for the political classes to use the institution of 
a referendum as a tool that ensures political success for the 
purpose of achieving a particular electoral goal. A further 
point concerns taking advantage of a referendum to build a 
position on a political scene by the actors of political life 
who wish to remind the voters about their existence. This 
certainly does not build the authority of the institution 
contributing to a low turnout and its gradual devaluation. 
                                                          
23 Cf. Z. Witkowski, Siedem grzechów głównych polskiej klasy politycznej 
wobec wyborców, wyborów i prawa wyborczego [Seven cardinal sins of the 
Polish political class in relation to their voters and the election law], Toruń 2015, 
p. 7. 
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 Political parties try to convert the issue posed at the 
referendum into a plebiscite around particular people or 
political orientations that support or contest a given solution. 
In the experience to date, vague questions, ambiguity, 
insufficient, substantive and organisational preparation of 
the voting contribute to a low turnover in a referendum. It 
thus may be a priori assumed that the answers to questions 
formulated in such a vague manner will not lead to any 
accurate conclusions. Worse still, the result of such a 
referendum will do very little in practice, but it will surely 
become a subject of political disputes between the 
governing party and the opposition. In such atmosphere the 
citizens may be dissuaded from taking part in law-making 
procedures in this form. If the decision-makers assume that 
social engineering of that kind will help them reach their 
intended goals, then the referendum will not bring the 
desired result. If a referendum is to fulfil what is expected 
of it, then the questions must be formulated with the highest 
possible degree of precision, as only then the correct 
interpretation of its results will be possible. Otherwise, it is 
possible to imagine a situation in which a referendum turns 
into a plebiscite of popularity and resentment, and not a way 
of making binding decisions24.  
 The political powers treat also referendum 
campaigns not as debates about pivotal issue for the state, 
but as a way of building electorate and mustering up the 
voters. The studies show that campaigns that propagate the 
referendum in mass media have been delivered to the public 
in a limited manner. It is far from being optimistic to realise 
                                                          
24 Cf. M. Jabłoński, Referendum ogólnokrajowe. Wybrane zagadnienia 
[National referendum. Selected issues], ‘Palestra’ No 5-6/2003, pp. 16-17. 
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that the campaigns prior to the referenda have been a display 
of demagogy rather than a substantial and factual debate 
with arguments25. A referendum has thus become 'a tasty 
morsel' for politicians in their fight to strengthen the position 
of their parties rather than educate the voters. However, 
what is even more surprising, the referendum-holding 
authority, as seen in previous cases, refrains from running 
an extensive referendum campaign and utilising the 
dedicated transmission time. In such a situation, the subject 
of the referendum becomes less important as the main goal 
of the participation in the referendum campaign is the 
emphasis of one's own political independence and 
distinctness. It should come as no surprise that the 
information campaigns held to date have been shallow in 
terms of substance, chaotic and focused on political 
competition. An obvious underlying political context, badly 
prepared questions and the lack of a real referendum 
campaign held in the media and the largest parties, translates 
into a very low turnout. Thus, the voters' indifference as 
regards the possibility to make decisions about the affairs of 
the state comes as no surprise. They have lost a sense of any 
real impact on the actions of the authorities as they have no 
guarantees that, regardless of the governing political elites, 
they will make decisions on the affairs that are essential to 
the state and, most importantly, for themselves26. 
 
                                                          
25 Cf. M. Rachwał, Demokracja bezpośrednia w procesie kształtowania 
społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Polsce [Direct democracy in the process of 
shaping the civil society in Poland], Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warsaw 2010, pp. 
89-90. 
26 Cf. M. Jabłoński, Referendum de lege lata i de lege ferenda, Acta 
Universitatis Wratislaviensis, ‘Przegląd Prawa i Administracji’ vol. 
XXXIX/1997, p. 84. 
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5. Conclusions 
A general reflection on the lost opportunities in 
terms of the functioning of political institutions due to 
insufficient professionalism both in the process of shaping 
appropriate legal measures as well as applying them in 
practice, remains. In order for a referendum to be able to 
fulfil its basic functions, certain requirements need to be 
met. Firstly, the issues that are to be regulated must be 
clearly and precisely formulated. It must also be preceded 
by a sufficiently long and thorough campaign, in which the 
society will have a chance to be confronted with different 
standpoints. This way it becomes subjectified and at the 
same time the possibility of any manipulations that political 
parties may be tempted to effect is diminished27. 
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Impact of UN Human Rights Monitor ing 
Mechanisms in Kenya  
 
 
1. Introduction  
International human rights scholarship has for years 
highlighted the adoption of binding norms and 
establishment of monitoring mechanisms as signs of 
progress in global human rights protection. This scholarship 
has however lacked a definitive answer on the causal 
effectiveness of the international human rights regime, 
specifically, the domestic impact of the international human 
rights regime. Studies on impact of the international human 
rights regime examine impact with reference to 
implementation of the judgements, decisions and 
recommendations of monitoring mechanisms. These studies 
have so far pointed to an ‘implementation crisis’.  
Writing on the implementation of the decisions of the 
Human Rights Committee, Alebeek and Nollkaemper put 
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the rate at 30% in 2002 and at 12% based on 2009 data.1 
Similarly, on recommendations of the UN special 
procedures, Piconne puts the rate of full implementation at 
18% based on the 2004 to 2008 data.2 In regard to 
concluding observations of UN monitoring bodies, 
Krommendijk finds similar trends of low levels of 
implementation in Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland.3  
Acknowledging this ‘implementation crisis’, a related 
question arises with regard to explanation of 
implementation: what accounts for implementation of the 
decisions, judgements and recommendations of monitoring 
mechanisms at the national level? While studies on the 
description of implementation are well developed, the same 
cannot be said of the concept of what accounts for 
implementation. Studies repeatedly demonstrate low levels 
of implementation without providing an explanation on 
what accounts for implementation or non-implementation.  
In view of this deficiency in scholarship, this paper 
addresses the following research question: what is the 
impact of the UN human rights monitoring mechanisms in 
Kenya and how do the findings on impact correlate with 
theoretical explanations of state compliance? The paper will 
advance the argument that the impact of human rights 
                                                          
1 R Aleebek, A Nollkaemper, ‘The Legal Status of Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
in National Law’ in H Keller & G Ulfstein (eds.), UN Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies: Law and Legitimacy, Cambridge University Press (2012) pp.356-357. 
2 T Piconne, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN’s 
Independent Expert on Human Rights, The Brookings Institution (2010), pp.22. 
3 J Krommendijk, The Domestic Impact and Effectiveness of the Process of State 
Reporting under UN Human Rights Treaties in the Netherlands, New Zealand 
and Finland: Paper Pushing or Policy Promoting?, Intersentia Publishing Ltd. 
(2014), pp.368-375. 
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monitoring mechanisms is shaped by the domestic processes 
that occur once implementation shifts to the domestic level 
and that impact can be enhanced by focusing on these 
domestic processes, institutions and actors.  
The paper makes two important contributions to existing 
literature. First, the research offers new insights into the 
study of impact of UN human rights monitoring 
mechanisms by drawing from international law compliance 
theories to explain impact. Second, by applying a theoretical 
approach, the study provides causal explanations of 
empirical facts as a basis for proposals to maximize national 
level impact.  
The paper is organized as follows. The second section 
defines and operationalises the concept of impact, then 
offers a brief narrative of Kenya and the UN human rights 
system and finally presents the transnational legal process 
theory. The third section discusses the methodology used to 
assess the impact of the UN human rights monitoring 
mechanisms in Kenya. The fourth section presents the 
empirical results, while the fifth section examines the 
empirical results under the optics of the transnational legal 
process theory. The sixth section draws on the study 
findings to make suggestions on the how the UN human 
rights monitoring system should evolve.  
 
2. Literature review and theoretical framework  
This section, firstly defines impact which is the main 
concept in this study. The section then presents the literature 
review and introduces the transnational legal process theory.  
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2.1. Impact 
Heyns and Viljoen in their study on the impact of UN human 
rights treaties on the domestic level define impact as ‘any 
influence that the treaties may have had in realization of the 
norms they espouse in individual countries’. The influence 
could occur as a result of the engagement with treaty 
monitoring mechanisms or internalisation of the norms at 
the national level. The study assessed impact through 
adoption or review of legislation or constitutions, policy 
formulation and implementation of concluding observations 
as well as infiltration of treaty norms to educational 
programmes and media coverage.4 A 2012 study on the 
impact of the African Charter and the Women Rights 
Protocol on select African countries defines impact as state 
compliance with the African Charter and Women’s Protocol 
and ‘more direct forms of influence’.5 Viljoen and Louw in 
their study on state compliance with the findings of the 
African Commission draw a distinction between direct and 
indirect impact of human rights treaties and law.6 The study 
defines direct impact as immediately demonstrable 
expressed, for instance by implementation of a finding of a 
treaty monitoring body. Indirect impact is on the other hand 
defined as incremental and occurring over time.7 Okafor in 
his study of the impact of the African human rights system 
                                                          
4 CH Heyns, F Viljoen, The impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties 
on the Domestic Level, Cambridge University Press (2002), pp.1-2. 
5 Centre for Human Rights, Impact of the African Charter and the Women’s 
Protocol in Selected African Countries, Pretoria University Law Press (2012), 
pp.7. 
6 F Viljoen & L Louw, ‘State Compliance with the Recommendations of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1994-2004’ 101 American 
Journal of International Law (2007): 1. 
7 Ibid.  
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in Nigeria, South Africa and other select African countries 
extends the measurement of impact beyond state 
compliance with decisions of monitoring regimes to 
influencing the thinking processes of key domestic actors. 
Okafor thus examines ‘the influence of the African system’ 
in relation to its influence on national courts, executive 
action and policy making, legislative processes and as 
deployed by civil society activists.8 Krommendijk in his 
study on the domestic impact of the concluding observations 
of UN treaty bodies defines impact as the use and 
discussions of the reporting processes and concluding 
observations at the domestic level by parliament, courts, 
national human rights institutions, ombudsman institutions, 
non-governmental organisations and media.9 
Drawing from this literature, this paper defines impact as the 
influence of the decisions, recommendations and 
concluding observations of UN human rights monitoring 
mechanisms on actions of key domestic actors. Impact is 
assessed through the influence of the decisions, 
recommendations and concluding observations on: national 
courts, executive action and policy making, law making, 
activities of non-state actors and the 1997-2010 
constitution-making process in Kenya. Influence is thus 
observed through national courts decisions and judgements, 
government policies including policy statements, legislative 
action including hansard proceedings, reports of civil 
society organisations and archival documents of the 
constitution-making process.  
                                                          
8 OC Okafor African Human Rights System, Activist Forces and International 
Institutions, Cambridge University Press (2007), pp.3-5; See also pp.91-93. 
9 Krommendijk, supra, note 3, at p25. 
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2.2. Kenya and UN Human Rights Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Kenya has ratified seven of the nine core international 
human rights treaties,10 while it has not ratified any 
protocols or accepted any of the individual complaints 
procedures.11 It has however accepted the inquiry procedure 
under the Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.12 In terms of actual 
engagement with the UN human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies, Kenya’s engagement traces back to the 1979 
submission of the first state report to the Human Rights 
Committee and issuance of the resulting concluding 
                                                          
10 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465, U.N.T.S 85 (Kenya 
ratified 21 Feb. 1987); International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted Dec. 19 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (Kenya ratified 01 May 1972); 
International Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S 13 (Kenya ratified 9 March 1984); 
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S 195 (Kenya ratified 13 September 2001); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 
19, 1966, 1993, U.N.T.S 3, (Kenya ratified 01 May 1972); Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M 1448 (Kenya ratified 31 
July 1990); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities G.A Res. 
6/106, adopted Dec. 13, 2006, (Kenya ratified 19 May 2008). Kenya has signed 
but not ratified the Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, G.A Res. 61/177 adopted Jan. 12, 2007. Kenya has neither 
signed not ratified the International Convention on Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, G.A Res. 45/158, adopted 
Dec. 18, 1990.  
11 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kenya Home Page, 
Ratification Status, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Tr
eaty.aspx?CountryID=90&Lang=EN (accessed 31 March 2017). 
12 Ibid.  
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observation in 1981.13 As of March 2017, Kenya had 
submitted a set of 19 state reports and received 17 
concluding observations.14  
Turning to the charter based mechanisms, while Kenya has 
not issued standing invitation to the special procedures, as 
of March 2017, Kenya had received nine special rapporteur 
visits.15 In regard to the Universal Peer Review, Kenya has 
undergone two cycles in 2010 and 2015 resulting in 128 and 
192 recommendations respectively.16 
While Kenya’s engagement with UN monitoring 
mechanisms is well documented, no systematic 
investigation has been undertaken to determine the level of 
implementation of the concluding observations and 
recommendations. Consequently, the impact of the 
monitoring mechanisms at the national level remains 
unknown. This paper addresses this gap by first conducting 
a systematic study on the level of implementation of the 
concluding observations and recommendations in order to 
assess the impact of monitoring mechanisms. Further, in 
view of Kenya’s constitutional review process spanning 
                                                          
13 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kenya Home Page, 
Reporting Status for Kenya, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyEx
ternal/countries.aspx?CountryCode=KEN&Lang=EN (accessed 31 March 
2017). 
14Ibid. 
15 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kenya Home Page, 
Country and Other Visits by Special Procedures Mandate Holders, http://www.
ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/CountryvisitsF-M.aspx (accessed 31 March 
2017). 
16 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kenya Home Page, 
Kenya and Charter Based Bodies, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDO
C/GEN/G15/064/59/PDF/G1506459.pdf?OpenElement (31 March 2017). Of 
the 128 recommendations issued in 2010, Kenya rejected 7, while in 2015, of 
the 192 recommendations, it rejected 61.  
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1997 to 2010, the study assesses the impact of the 
concluding observations and recommendations on the 
process and on the drafting of the Constitution, 2010. The 
study considers concluding observations and 
recommendations issued between 1981 and 2014.  
 
2.3. Theoretical framework – Transnational Legal 
Process Theory 
The theoretical starting point of this paper is the observation 
that UN human rights monitoring is essentially a vertical 
process entailing engagement of state and non-state actors 
at both the national and international arena. Further, that 
implementation of the recommendations of monitoring 
mechanisms is a domestic affair involving state and non-
state actors, domestic institutions and politics. Accordingly, 
theoretical explanations that are state centric cannot account 
for impact of monitoring mechanisms at national level.  
Koh defines transnational legal process as the theory and 
practice of repeated interaction of both public and private 
actors in domestic and international as well as public and 
private fora to make, interpret, enforce and ultimately 
internalise rules of international law.17 The features of the 
transnational legal process are: (i) non-traditional in that it 
saddles domestic, international, public and private law 
divisions; (ii) non-state centric as it considers both state and 
non-state actors; (iii) dynamic as transnational actors engage 
in repeated interaction; and (iv) normative in that from the 
process new rules emerge which are interpreted, internalised 
and enforced.18 The transnational legal process theory is 
                                                          
17 H Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’, 75 Neb. L. Rev. (1997): 183-184. 
18 Koh, supra, note 17 at 184. 
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thus a vertical process in which state and non-state actors 
interact in domestic and international fora to persuade non-
complying states to accept certain norms in their domestic 
value set, so that the norms are obeyed as part of national 
law.19 The primary elements of the theory are the 
chronological phases of interaction, interpretation, 
internalisation and obedience.20 Internalisation at the 
domestic level occurs as a result of incorporation of 
international legal norms in the legal and political systems 
through executive action, legislation and judicial 
interpretation.21 The theory argues that the repeated 
participation of states in law creating and interpretation fora 
results in vertical internalisation or domestication of norms 
which is a powerful way of international law compliance. 
Koh identifies three forms of norm internalisation: social, 
political and legal internalisation.22 Social internalisation 
occurs when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that 
there is general adherence to it; while political 
internalisation occurs when the political elites accept a norm 
and champion for its adoption as government policy.23 
Legal internalisation occurs ‘when an international norm is 
incorporated in the domestic legal system and becomes 
domestic law through executive action, legislative action, 
judicial interpretation or some combination of the three’.24 
Legislative internalisation occurs when international norms 
                                                          
19 H Koh ‘Transnational Legal Process After September 11’, 22 Berkeley J. 
Inter’l. L(2004): 339. 
20 H Koh ‘Bringing International Law Home’, 35 Hous L. Rev (1998): 644. 
21 Koh, supra, note 17 at 204. 
22 Koh, ‘Bringing International Law Home’, supra, note 20 at 642.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
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are made into national legislation or incorporated into 
national constitutions hence binding on states. Judicial 
internalisation occurs through domestic litigation leading to 
incorporation of international norms in national law and as 
constitutional norms.25 The forms of internalisation are not 
sequential and may vary.26  
The theory identifies the agents of internalisation as: 
transnational norm entrepreneurs, government norm 
sponsors, transnational issue networks, interpretive 
communities and law declaring fora, bureaucratic 
compliance procedures and issue linkages.27 Transnational 
norm entrepreneurs are non-governmental organizations 
and individuals who mobilize political and public support 
for norm creation and internalisation.28 Government norm 
sponsors are government actors who support and promote 
the specific norms, while transnational issue networks are 
‘epistemic communities’ that debate and generate political 
solutions at global and regional levels.29 Interpretive 
communities and law declaring fora include treaty regimes, 
courts at the domestic, regional and international levels, 
domestic and regional legislatures, ad hoc tribunals and 
non-governmental organizations.30  
Transposing the transnational legal process theory to 
international human rights law, Koh argues that compliance 
                                                          
25 Koh, ‘Bringing International Law Home’, supra, note 20 at 643. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Koh, ‘Bringing International Law Home’, supra, note 20 at 647. 
28 Ibid.  
29Koh, ‘Bringing International Law Home’, supra, note 20 at 647. Political 
scientists define epistemic communities as ‘network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that issue area’. 
30 Koh, ‘Bringing International Law Home’, supra, note 20 at 649-650. 
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is achieved through repeated interaction and interpretation 
leading to international human rights norms acquiring a 
‘stickiness’ and are obeyed out of perceived self interest 
which transforms to institutional habit.31 Norm 
internalisation is set in motion by transnational norm 
entrepreneurs who lobby and mobilize public support for the 
creation of a universal human rights norm.32 The 
transnational norm entrepreneurs also enlist the support of 
epistemic communities that debate the issue and generate 
political solutions at the domestic, regional and global 
levels.33 Additionally, the transnational norm entrepreneurs 
seek government actors who champion the norm while law 
declaring fora akin treaty monitoring mechanisms form 
interpretive communities which define, clarify the particular 
norms and their violation.34 The norm interpretations issued 
by the law declaring fora are internalised into domestic 
political structures reshaping state identities and interests, 
hence compliance.35  
This paper hypothesised that the concluding observations 
and recommendations of monitoring mechanisms are 
implemented through repeated interactions of the state and 
non-state actors in multiple fora in which the state is 
persuaded to accept the recommendations and ultimately 
internalise them in its political, legal and social order.  
                                                          
31 H Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’, 74 Indiana Law 
Journal (1999): 1411.  
32 Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’, supra, note 31 at 
1409-1410. 
33 Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’, supra, note 31 at 
1410. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
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3. Research design: methodology used to assess impact  
This section outlines the methodology that was used to 
assess the impact of the UN human rights monitoring 
mechanisms in Kenya and thus answer the research 
question. The study adopted an empirical and theoretical 
analysis. As stated earlier, no systematic investigation had 
been undertaken on the implementation of the concluding 
observations and recommendations of UN monitoring 
mechanisms in Kenya. To undertake the study on impact, 
data and information was first collected to assess the level 
of implementation.36 The analysis traced the 
implementation pathways of the recommendations and 
concluding observations to determine the extent of influence 
on government actors, non-state actors and the 
constitutional review process. The study took into account 
                                                          
36 Data and information on implementation was collected between October 2013 
and July 2015 through desk review, participant observation and semi-structured 
qualitative interviews involving key government officials, civil society 
organizations, human rights experts and experts in the constitution review 
process. In relation to desk review, a variety of sources including government 
policies and statements, national court decisions, hansard proceedings, annual 
reports of non-state actors and newspaper reports were analyzed for information 
on implementation. Participant observation was used in instances in which 
implementation could be deduced from observed phenomena such as reduction 
of water prices in informal settlements. Semi-structured in-depth qualitative 
interviews were conducted using a standard interview guide. The interviewees 
were identified using purposive sampling to ensure that only persons with first 
hand information and from whom relevant data and information could be 
obtained were interviewed. The mode of interviewing was face to face with each 
interviewee met individually. Telephone interviews were used to follow up or 
to obtain more information. Email correspondence was sparingly used in 
instances in which an interviewee was not available for a face to face interview.  
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the concluding observations and recommendations issued 
between 1981 and 2014.37  
The study defined implementation as taking action that is 
responsive to the concluding observations and 
recommendations of monitoring mechanisms to improve the 
enjoyment of rights.38 The study did not view 
implementation as binary, that is full or non-
implementation, but rather located it along a continuum, 
hence the broad categories of implementation adopted were: 
full, partial and non-implementation.39  
• ‘Full implementation’ connoting that the action 
taken in largely responsive to the concluding 
observations or recommendations. 
                                                          
37 The study excludes concluding observations and recommendations that are 
vague, too broad and do not point to any specific measure that the government 
was to undertake to be deemed to have implemented the concluding observation 
or recommendation. For instance, a recommendation to ‘address poverty’ was 
deemed to be too broad and incapable of assessment as to a specific measure the 
state ought to take. Similarly, a recommendation to the state to ‘address 
impunity’ was considered vague and too broad. In instances in which impunity 
was localized such as ‘address impunity in relation to the 2007/08 post-election 
violence’ or ‘address impunity in extrajudicial killings’, the recommendations 
were assessed for implementation. In addition, recommendations that were not 
reflective on Kenya’s circumstances such as a recommendation requiring Kenya 
to ensure children are not subjected to the death penalty, yet national legislation 
outlaws imposition of the death penalty on children.  
38See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights 
Documents, ‘Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ E/2009/90, 8 June 
2009, para 3, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/362/90/PD
F/N0936290.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 2 April 2017). 
39See Viljoen & Louw, supra, note 6 at 3-5. The authors describe five categories 
of compliance with the recommendations of the African Commission which 
include full compliance, noncompliance, partial compliance, situational 
compliance and unclear cases.  
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• ‘Partial implementation’ connoting that action taken 
is to some extent responsive to the concluding 
observation or recommendations or it does not 
implement certain aspects. 
Example: Legislative framework put in place but 
does not encompass all the provisions contemplated 
in the concluding observations or 
recommendations.  
• ‘Non-implementation’ connoting that no action has 
been undertaken in regard to the particular 
concluding observations or recommendations or 
where action taken by the state is contrary to the 
concluding observations or recommendations. 
Example: Prohibition of the death penalty which 
instead the Constitution, 2010 provides for the 
death penalty by enshrining the death penalty 
saving clause. 
Partial implementation is classified both as a stable end in 
response to the concluding observations and 
recommendations and also as a pathway towards full 
implementation. Accordingly, the following sub-categories 
of partial implementation are drawn:40  
                                                          
40 D Hawkins, W Jacoby, ‘Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European 
and Inter-American Courts on Human Rights’, 6 Journal of International Law 
and International Relations (2010): 77-83. Hawkins and Jacoby in their study 
of partial compliance with the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights describe four types of partial 
compliance. These are: split decisions, state substitution, slow motion 
compliance and ambiguity compliance amid complexity. Split decisions signify 
compliance with part of the overall decision but not the other, while state 
substitution implies that the state circumvents the specific court order and 
implements and offers a different response. Split implementation is implied 
when the state takes remedial action based on the court’s decision but does not 
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• Split implementation: concluding observations or 
recommendations have been implemented in part 
but not other parts of it. Split implementation 
represents an end point in the state’s actions in that 
the state does not intend to take further measures in 
regard to particular concluding observations or 
recommendations. 
• State substitution: the state implements an 
alternative response rather than what was 
recommended by the monitoring mechanism. In this 
instance, the action taken is responsive to the spirit 
of the concluding observations or recommendations 
but is not the specific terms recommended by the 
monitoring mechanism. 
• Slow motion: responsive action has been initiated or 
the state has indicated that it will implement the 
concluding observations or recommendations.  
These sub-categories of partial implementation are not 
mutually exclusive. Additionally, under full and partial 
implementation a further sub-category of situational 
implementation is drawn which denotes implementation 
occurring as a result of change in circumstances within the 
state, for instance the constitution review process.41 
                                                          
fulfil the requirement completely and in some instances indicates that it will 
fulfil the requirement. Finally ambiguity compliance signifies instances which 
state compliance is challenging as it is difficult to determine compliance due to 
the complexity of the requirement or when compliance is beyond the state’s 
capabilities.  
41 See Viljoen & Louw, supra, note 6 at 6-7. The authors describe situational 
compliance as compliance that occurs as a result of change in circumstances in 
a given country, for instance transition from a repressive or undemocratic 
government to a democratic system. Accordingly, they posit that since the 
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For ease of analysis, the concluding observations and 
recommendations were categorised in five thematic groups: 
personal liberty and physical integrity and political rights; 
economic, social and cultural rights, women’s rights, 
children’s rights and rights of collective groups such as 
indigenous persons, refugees and persons with disabilities. 
In each of the thematic groups data and information was 
collected, examined and analyzed to determine the extent of 
implementation of particular concluding observations and 
recommendations and the influence on domestic processes 
and actions of key actors. For full and partial 
implementation the assessment year was 2014. The study 
used the term ‘recommendations’ generally to include the 
concluding observations of treaty monitoring committees 
and recommendations of the UPR and of the special 
rapporteurs and independent experts.  
 
4. Empirical results  
The study considered 144 recommendations issued between 
1981 and 2014 by the treaty monitoring committees, the 
Universal Peer Review and special rapporteurs. On the 
overall, the study found low level of implementation of the 
concluding observations and recommendations of 
monitoring mechanisms and minimal impact at national 
level. Of the 144 recommendations assessed only 43 were 
fully implemented in the 34 year period. Non-
implementation was the most prevalent outcome followed 
by partial implementation (See table below). Notably, full 
and partial implementation was characterised by state 
                                                          
changes occurred as a result of change in circumstances as opposed to 
government action, then it does not count as compliance.  
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obstructionism. In addition, most of the fully and partially 
implemented recommendations were implemented through 
constitutional review process, hence situational 
implementation.  
 
Table 1. Quantitative overview of the status of implementation of 
concluding observations and recommendations of monitoring mechanisms 
 







1. Personal integrity and 
liberty and political rights 
11 12 26 49 
2. Economic, social and 
cultural rights 
3 7 8 18 
3. Women’s rights 11 10 6 27 
4. Children’s rights  14 9 8 31 
5. Rights of collective groups 4 8 7 19 
Total  43 46 55 144 
 
Thematically, recommendations on personal liberty and 
physical integrity and political rights, exhibited the highest 
levels of non-implementation. Full implementation under 
this thematic group was as a result of the expressly 
mandated constitutional reforms and mainly related to 
institutional reforms such as independence of the Judiciary, 
police reform, vetting of judges and police officers and 
independence of the office of the public prosecutor. In 
partial implementation, the most common sub-category was 
slow motion implementation in which the government 
indicated that action would be taken, although this was 
characterised by delays and state obstructionism. This was 
in relation to enactment of laws: the anti-torture legislation 
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and freedom of information legislation and also in relation 
to payment of compensation to victims past post-electoral 
violence and human rights violations under the Truth Justice 
and Reconciliation Commission Report.42 The non-
implemented recommendations related to individual 
accountability for human rights violations and ratification of 
human rights treaties mainly, the individual complaint 
procedures. Similarly, in relation to recommendations on 
abolition of the death penalty, decriminalization of 
consensual same sex relations, accountability for the 
2007/08 post-election violence, the government took 
contrary action indicating unwillingness to implement.43 On 
impact, the study found that the recommendations had 
minimal impact and only influenced the actions of non-state 
actors in two instances. Firstly, relying on the 
recommendations non-state actors initiated draft legislation 
on anti-torture and freedom of information. Secondly, non-
state actors engaged in strategic litigation before national 
courts, the East Africa Court of Justice and filing of a 
communication at the African Commission on Human and 
                                                          
42 For instance, in regard to the anti-torture legislation, which was initiated and 
drafted by non-state actors, the government had on two occasions before the 
Committee Against Torture in 2013 and in March 2015 during the Universal 
Peer Review indicated that it would table the bill in Parliament. However, as of 
November 2015 the bill had not been tabled for debate. Similarly, in relation to 
the Access to Information Bill, the Bill which was initiated by non-state actors, 
the government had failed to table the Bill for Parliamentary debate since 2007.  
43 The Constitution, 2010 contains a death penalty saving clause thus making 
the death penalty legal. On decriminalization of homosexuality, the 
Constitution, 2010 enshrines provisions on marriage that impliedly outlaw 
homosexuality. In relation to accountability for the 2007/08 post-election 
violence, the President in the 2015 State of the Nation address indicated that the 
county would pursue restorative justice measures, thus foreclosing any 
possibility of prosecution.  
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Peoples’ Rights to pressure the state to investigate and 
prosecute perpetrators of human rights violations.44  
On economic, social and cultural rights, implementation 
was as a result of actions of non-state actors, the 
constitutional review and notably through the Executive. All 
the partially implemented recommendations fell in the sub-
category of slow motion implementation, in which measures 
had been initiated towards implementation. The explanation 
for notable Executive action in the implementation of the 
recommendations under this thematic group was that 
between 2005 and 2009, concluding observations were 
routinely submitted to cabinet for discussion, approval and 
authorization to implement.45 This in particular relates to the 
2008 concluding observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The 
concluding observations on regularising and controlling 
water pricing by private vendors and low price housing for 
slum-upgrading were proritised as they also coincided with 
the government development agenda. In regard to impact, 
the recommendations influenced the actions of the 
Executive, the Judiciary, non-state actors and also 
legislative action. On the Executive, as pointed out the 2008 
concluding observations of the CESRC influenced the 
National Water Policy provisions on water pricing by 
private vendors and the slum-upgrading programme. On 
                                                          
44 Interview with A Kamau, Programme Officer, Independent Medico-Legal 
Unit, Kenya, Nairobi, 17 January 2015. See also Independent Medical Legal 
Unit v Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya and 4 others, reference no. 3 
of 2010 East African Court of Justice; African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Communication 385 of 2010. 
45 Interview with M Njau-Kimani, Legal Secretary Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs, Department of Justice, Kenya, Nairobi, 4 March 2015. 
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influencing judicial decisions, the 2005 Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) concluding observations on evictions 
and 2004 recommendations of the independent expert on 
housing were repeatedly pleaded in domestic litigation on 
evictions thus influencing court decisions.46 In regard to 
influencing legislative action, mainly content and direction, 
the 2005 HRC concluding observations and the 2004 
recommendations of independent expert on housing 
influenced the initiation and the content of the Evictions and 
Resettlement Bill, 2014. On influencing the actions of non-
state actors, relying on the recommendations, non-state 
actors initiated litigation on evictions in domestic courts and 
also drafted of the Evictions and Resettlement Bill, 2014.  
On women’s rights, implementation was as a result of the 
constitutional review process and actions of non-state 
actors. In partial implementation, the category of state 
substituted implementation was most observable, in which 
the state implemented measures that mirrored the spirit of 
the recommendations but were not in the precise or specific 
terms required by the monitoring mechanisms. The state 
substituted implementation related to recommendations on 
prohibition of polygamy, prohibition of bride price and 
criminalization of marital rape.47 One would note that these 
recommendations relate to issue areas that attract 
                                                          
46 See Ibrahim Sangor Osman versus the Minister of State for Internal Security 
and Provincial Administration & 3 others [2011] eKLR; Satrose Ayuma & 11 
others versus Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff Benefits 
Retirement Scheme & 2 others [2011] eKLR.  
47 On prohibition of polygamy and payment of bride price, the state in the 
Marriage Act, 2013 introduced provisions to regulate them, rather than prohibit. 
Similarly, on criminalization of marital rape, the state in the Protection against 
Domestic Violence Act, 2015 recognized marital rape as a form of domestic 
violence without attaching any criminal sanctions.  
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contestation between women’s rights and culture. The non-
implemented recommendations in which the government 
took contrary action related to female quotas for political 
representation and access to medical abortion in cases of 
rape and incest.48 Notably, the study observed a number of 
instances of state obstructionism in implementation of 
recommendations in women’s rights even in instances in 
which recommendations were classified as fully 
implemented.49 Turning to impact, the study found 
influence on legislative action, the actions of non-state 
actors and on the constitutional review process. On 
influencing legislative direction, the Prohibition of Female 
Genital Mutilation Act was enacted as an initiative of non-
state actors in response to the concluding observations of 
HRC, 2005, the Committee on Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee) in 
2003, 2007 and the Universal Peer Review (UPR) in 2010. 
Similarly, the enactment of the anti-trafficking in persons 
                                                          
48 The state in October 2010 when ratifying the Protocol on the Rights of Women 
in Africa placed a reservation on the provisions requiring states to guarantee 
access to medical abortion in cases of rape or incest.  
49 The anti-trafficking in persons legislation was drafted as an initiative of non-
state actors and submitted to the government for publication and tabling in 
Parliament in 2006. The government failed to table for Parliamentary debate 
leading to its tabling as a private member bill in 2009. The legislation was passed 
in July 2010 but the government delayed assent to it until October 2010 
following pressure from civil society organizations. Further, the government 
only operationalised the legislation in October 2012 following a court petition 
by civil society organizations. By 2015, the government was yet to fully 
operationalise the legislation by setting up a critical fund to assist victims of 
trafficking in persons. Similarly, even though the Prohibition of Female Genital 
Mutilation Act was enacted in 2011 as an initiative of non-state actors, the 
government delayed implementation by failing to set up the implementing body 
until January 2014.  
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legislation was an initiative of non-state actors in response 
to the concluding observations of the CEDAW Committee, 
the HRC, the Committee Against Torture (CAT) and the 
recommendations of the UPR. On the influence of the 
recommendations on the actions of non-state actors, as 
alluded to above, non-state actors relying on the 
recommendations initiated legislation. On influencing the 
constitutional review process, non-state actors in their 
submissions on the constitutional provisions relating to 
marriage and divorce deployed the 1993 CEDAW 
Committee concluding observations.  
In regard to children’s rights, the recommendations were 
mainly implemented through the constitutional review 
process and executive action. Notably, children’s rights had 
the highest number of fully implemented recommendations, 
including ratification of treaties which was absent in all 
other thematic groups. In partial implementation, the most 
observable sub-category was slow motion implementation, 
in which the government had indicated willingness to 
implement the recommendations or initiated measures 
towards implementation. Pointedly, the study did not find 
any instances of state obstructionism to non-state actors’ 
initiatives to implement the recommendations. On the non-
implemented recommendations there was no finding of state 
unwillingness to implement any of the recommendations, 
demonstrated by the fact that no contrary action was taken 
in regard to any recommendation. On impact, the 
concluding observations and recommendations influenced 
Executive action, legislative action and non-state actors’ 
activities. In relation to Executive action, the government 
undertaking to set up the children’s ombudsman was in 
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response to the 2007 concluding observations of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). On the 
influence on legislative action and non-state actors’ actions, 
the Child Justice Bill was initiated by non-state actors and 
the national human rights institution in response to the 2002 
concluding observations of the CRC.  
Lastly, on the rights of collective groups, recommendations 
were mainly implemented through the constitutional review 
process. In partial implementation, the most observable sub-
category of implementation was split implementation, in 
which the government initiated measures that were only 
partly responsive to the recommendations. These 
recommendations related to issuance of identity cards to 
indigenous people, consultations with indigenous people 
prior to exploitation of resources in their ancestral land, 
payment of compensation to internally displaced persons 
and provision of legal aid to indigenous peoples. The non-
implemented recommendations in which no action was 
taken related to refugees and internally displaced persons, 
including the ratification of the AU Kampala Convention on 
Internally Displaced Persons and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Persons and the ILO Convention 169. 
The government took contrary action in regard to the 
concluding observation on relaxing the refugee 
encampment policy. Assessing impact, the 
recommendations influenced the actions of non-state actors, 
legislative action and the constitutional review process. The 
drafting of the Internally Displaced Persons Act was 
initiated by non-state actors with technical support from the 
special rapporteur on internally displaced persons. On 
influencing the constitutional review process, the 
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recommendations of the Special Rapporteur on indigenous 
peoples influenced the discussions on the constitutional 
provisions on recognition of indigenous peoples. 
 
5. Examining the theoretical framework  
This section examines the empirical results in light of the 
transnational legal process theory. The discussion is 
structured around four key questions emanating from the 
empirical results: (i) what accounts for implementation?; (ii) 
what accounts for the variation in the degree of 
implementation across different thematic rights?; (iii) why 
the state has taken deliberate steps to implement certain 
recommendations while yet obstructing implementation of 
others; and (iv) why the recommendations influenced the 
actions of some domestic actors and yet failed to influence 
the desired kind of action from others, particularly the 
executive? 
The transnational legal process theory argues that 
international human rights law is enforced through the three 
phases of institutional interactional whereby global 
international human rights norms are debated and 
interpreted and the norms are ultimately internalised in the 
domestic legal systems.50 The theory further argues that the 
main determinant on whether an international rule will be 
obeyed is the degree of internalisation in the domestic legal 
system.51 The empirical results demonstrate that 
implementation was characterised by vertical strategies in 
which government and non-state actors interacted in either 
                                                          
50 Koh ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced’, supra, note 31 at 
1399. 
51 Koh ‘Bringing International Law Home’, supra, note 20 at 674-676. 
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public or private or domestic or international fora to debate 
and interpret the norms expressed in the recommendations 
to persuade the government to accept and adopt the norms 
as part of domestic norms. Answering the question of what 
accounts for implementation, the picture that emerges is that 
of domestic processes involving a variety of actors including 
state and non-state actors, domestic and international 
institutions. These actors continually engage in multiple 
fora in which the government is persuaded of certain 
violations and to accept the recommendations and adopt the 
norms expressed in them as part of its domestic norms. 
Implementation therefore can be attributed to the domestic 
processes triggered by non-state and transnational actors 
with a view to persuading the state to adopt certain norms as 
domestic norms.  
Flowing from the above, the question that presents is what 
accounts for the varying degrees of implementation across 
thematic rights. The recommendations on women’s rights 
and children’s rights exhibited high levels of full and partial 
implementation. Dissected further, one finds considerable 
differences in implementation between the two thematic 
rights. On the recommendations on women’s rights, 
implementation is mainly through the constitutional review 
process, hence situational implementation, and through non-
state actors. Further, implementation is characterised by 
state obstructionism, while in partial implementation, state 
substitution is prevalent. Conversely, in regard to the 
recommendations on children’s rights, implementation was 
mainly through the constitutional review process and 
executive action. In addition, recommendations on 
children’s rights did not reveal any instance of state 
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obstructionism. How then do we account for the 
differences? First, the transnational legal process theory 
propounds that whether the process of norm-internalisation 
will occur depends on the particular norm for which 
internalisation is sought. In this context, the high level of 
implementation of children’s rights through executive 
action and without any instance of state obstructionism 
demonstrates acceptance of norms on children’s rights in the 
domestic value set. This assertion was confirmed by 
interviewees working on children’s rights, that the 
government was more receptive to children’s rights 
compared to other thematic rights.52 The opposite 
proposition holds true for women’s rights. The study results 
indicate that implementation was characterised by state 
obstructionism, delays even in instances in which 
implementation had occurred as a result of the constitutional 
review process and state substituted implementation. The 
transnational legal process theory would attribute this to 
lack of internalisation of the norms enunciated in the 
recommendations on women’s rights in the domestic 
system. The only possible explanation for the high level of 
implementation despite state obstructionism is the 
initiatives of non-state actors. Turning to low levels of 
implementation, personal liberty, physical integrity and 
political rights and rights of collective groups exhibited low 
levels of implementation. Similarly, for the 
recommendations under these two thematic rights, the 
explanation for low levels of implementation lies firstly in 
lack of internalisation of particular norms in issue. For 
                                                          
52 Interview with P Mutiso, Programme Officer, CRADLE, Nairobi, 23 March 
2015. 
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instance, on rights of collective groups, the concept of 
indigenity remains contested at the national level. 
Illustratively, one interviewee, the Kenyan Ombudsman, 
stated, ‘the fact the one community arrived in Kenya fifty 
years earlier or later should not be a basis for special 
recognition’.53  
Revisiting the issue of state obstructionism, the question 
posed is why the state would take deliberate steps to 
implement some recommendations while obstructing the 
implementation of others? The paper has so far 
demonstrated that implementation occurs as a result of 
norm-internalisation. Looking at the empirical findings, it is 
plausible to deduce that the widespread non-implementation 
and partial implementation is as a result of lack of or 
ineffective norm-internalisation in the domestic system. 
Even then, legal internalisation of the norms enunciated in 
the recommendations has largely occurred through 
constitutional review process which incorporated these 
international human rights norms as domestic constitutional 
norms. Additionally, legal internalisation has also occurred 
as a result of judicial incorporation as demonstrated through 
domestic litigation, for instance in the case of the 
recommendations on evictions. If legal internalisation has 
largely occurred, how then do we explain state 
obstructionism which characterised both full and partial 
implementation? As observed from the empirical findings, 
legal internalisation matters little if the Executive is 
determined to obstruct implementation. The transnational 
legal process theory offers two answers to state 
                                                          
53 Interview with O Amollo, Ombudsman and Member of the Committee of 
Experts in Nairobi, 1 April 2015.  
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obstructionism. First, that it signifies lack of political 
internalisation, as political internalisation occurs when 
political elites accept a norm and promote its adoption as 
part of government policy. Evidently then, state obstruction 
of implementation signifies lack of political internalisation 
of the recommendations among government bureaucracies. 
Second, obstructionism can be explained as ‘grudging 
compliance’. According to the transnational legal process 
theory, once an international norm has been incorporated in 
the internal value set of a state, internalised compliance 
occurs, which is obedience. Grudging compliance means 
that the norm has not been incorporated in the domestic 
political and social structures of the state. This in the study 
was observed in instances in which the government 
obstructed implementation, for instance by failing to table 
bills in Parliament or where full implementation had 
occurred, by failing to operationalise legislation or 
regressing on constitutional standards.  
The final issue relates to impact, which was central to the 
study. The question posed is why the recommendations 
influenced the actions of some domestic actors such as the 
Judiciary and yet failed to influence the desired kind of 
action from others, particularly the Executive? Linking 
impact to the theoretical framework, for impact to occur, 
there must be internalised compliance, hence obedience. 
This implies full norm-internalisation, that is incorporation 
of norms in the domestic legal, political and social structures 
and bureaucratic structures, hence deliberate 
implementation as the recommendations are part of the 
state’s internal value set. Drawing from the above, the 
recommendations should influence key government actors 
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towards implementation. The concluding observations and 
recommendations indicate that the empirical findings have 
had little impact in Kenya and only influenced the actions of 
the Executive in limited instances. Further, as already 
pointed out, full norm-internalisation has not occurred in 
many issue areas. While legal internalisation occurred in 
relation to norms expressed in the recommendations, 
political and social internalisation remained elusive, which 
explained non-implementation, partial implementation and 
state obstructionism. Conclusively, the failure of 
recommendations to influence the actions of the Executive 
is due to lack of political and social internalisation. This 
point finds support by examining some of the 
recommendations in which the Executive deliberately took 
contrary action such as abolition of the death penalty, 
decriminalisation of consensual same sex relations and 
access to medical abortion. These recommendations point to 




This paper has demonstrated that the UN human rights 
monitoring mechanisms have had limited impact in Kenya. 
Additionally, the paper revealed that recommendations of 
monitoring mechanisms were mainly not implemented, and 
in the few instances of implementation, it was mainly 
partial. The paper also demonstrated how the theoretical 
explanations of state compliance with international law 
correlate with the findings of impact. The empirical findings 
on limited impact and non-implementation and partial 
implementation correspond to existing studies alluded to in 
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Section 1 of this paper which similarly find limited impact 
and point to an ‘implementation crisis’. 
Relying on the transnational legal process theory, the 
limited impact can primarily be explained by lack of full 
norm-internalisation of the norms expressed in the 
recommendations of monitoring mechanisms in Kenya’s 
internal value set. Specifically, while legal internalisation 
has largely, occurred political and social internalisation has 
not occurred. For full norm-internalisation to occur, 
particularly political and social internalisation, the 
transnational legal process theory suggests triggering 
repeated institutional interaction, interpretation and further 
attempted internalisation. First, on the issue of repeated 
institutional interaction, this would imply empowering more 
actors to trigger institutional interaction with a view to 
expanding the set of domestic, international and 
transnational actors that provoke the transnational legal 
process. In view of the limited political and social 
internalisation, it turns to empowering more actors, 
particularly epistemic communities to debate and generate 
political solutions in contested issue areas among 
individuals, government agencies, international 
organizations and domestic non-governmental 
organizations. Contextualising to the UN human rights 
monitoring mechanisms, the question that presents is what 
roles can treaty monitoring committees and special 
rapporteurs play in provoking the transnational legal process 
once implementation shifts to the domestic arena? This 
study demonstrated one instance in which the special 
rapporteur on internally displaced persons offered technical 
support on implementation of recommendations on 
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enactment of legislation. Additionally, on epistemic 
communities, how can their participation be amplified in the 
implementation process for political internalization. 
Second, in relation to interpretation, the theory advocates for 
creation of new fora for debate, articulation and elaboration 
of norms. In this context this would point to exploring the 
extent to which other domestic and international institutions 
can be enhanced to play a role in implementation of the 
recommendations. Third, on further attempted 
internalisation, the theory suggests combining strategies of 
legal internalisation with strategies of political and social 
internalisation to make human rights norms ‘feel familiar’ 
to political actors and to the public. In the context of human 
rights monitoring mechanisms, what strategies can be 
employed for political and social internalization and how 
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There are pieces of the individual's life that anyone can 
freely learn, but there are also parts that contain facts, data, 
and information that are specifically personal. The flow of 
information between the public and the internal sphere is 
one-sided. Once information flows out of the internal 
sphere, they will never be hidden again. Everyone is 
responsible for deciding what information they are releasing 
from the internal sphere to the public. In this respect these 
are subjective areas, since not all of us are sensitive to the 
same circumstances, some give more, others give less 
information to the public, plus there is a difference between 
the individuals on which types of data they allow to flow. 
However, there is a general measure of privacy (protecting 
family life, home, and so on) that requires a strong 
protection of the law. This, as a general guideline also helps 
to seek the definition of the ‘thresholds of sensitivity’. 
Present essay analyses how such ‘thresholds of sensitivity’ 
can be defined at the case of secret information gathering. It 
is a current issue in Hungary as the European Court of 
Human Rights established the violation of the Convention 
and the national Parliament is about to introduce a new law 
in the topic. In the following we evaluate the ECHR’s 
decision and the new draft and we also intend to give a 
general outlook on the Hungarian legislation on secret 
information gathering. 
 
1. Privacy protection in the frame of basic human rights 
It is essential to differentiate if the flow of information is 
upon the free will of the person concerned or is it caused by 
a public authority. In legal terms, the latter case is the 
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restriction of privacy that should be under constitutional 
protection in democratic societies. 
The notion of privacy is not new, as Warren and Brandeis 
already wrote its basics in the 1890s.2 However, privacy has 
changed a lot since, therefore it’s protection must be 
reconsidered. Privacy is affected by historical development 
and, even today, privacy faces many challenges. Part of such 
challenges are modern technology: on the internet, with 
smartphones and drones, much less information can be 
excluded from the public than before. The other part of the 
challenge is society itself and, of course, people living in it. 
People raised in virtual reality shows and social networks 
find it natural that their work, relationships, diet, all their life 
are of public data. Obviously, people are free to determine 
the parts of their life they share and they take all the 
consequences of their decision. In this context, the state has 
a passive role: on the one hand, it enables individuals to 
protect what they want to protect – within limits that they do 
not violate the rights of others – without interfering their 
privacy (protection of basic rights). On the other hand, the 
continuous development of technology clearly requires an 
active privacy protection from the state: it shall help to 
protect private information, so that it does not become 
public in spite of the individual's will (for example 
protection against online hacking attacks, or protection of 
the individual's home). 
The question therefore arises whether the concept of privacy 
needs any reconsideration at any level, and whether the 
                                                          
2 Warren, Samuel D. – Brandeis, Louis D. 'The Right to Privacy’ Harvard Law 
Review (1890/4): 193–220. 
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scope of protection itself shall be widened or is it necessary 
to encircle its meaning? 
 
2. The objective and subjective protection of privacy  
 
2.1. The ‘Threshold of sensitivity’ 
There is a strange controversy in the 21st century’s privacy 
protection: the technological developement of the modern 
era seems to necessitate a greater protection of privacy, it is 
essential to widen the ’protection net’. On the other hand, 
due to technological advances society is increasingly 
expanding its privacy to the outside world. Every time it 
depends on the individual, what interference reaches his or 
her 'threshold of sensitivity’. 
The human rights dilemma appears as follows: it is the 
question of the individual's freedom of self-determination 
how much of his or her privacy they share with the public. 
The limit between the information kept private and the 
information shared with the outside world is called a 
‘threshold of sensitivity’; this is the threshold beyond which 
the individual does not want to share information. The right 
to privacy therefore protects the confidentiality of 
information above the threshold of sensitivity. 
It differs from person to person that how much and what 
kind of information are shared with the public. Therefore, 
for each individual, the threshold of sensitivity is different. 
This results in a subjective level of privacy protection: the 
protection, for each individual, concerns to information and 
data above their own threshold of sensitivity. 
Is there an objective protection of privacy? At first glance, 
objective protection seems to be a paternalistic idea: if 
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everyone is free to decide what they concern to keep private 
and what to share, then the state cannot require people not 
to publish information from their privacy. 
However, in our view, an objective level of privacy 
protection can also be defined, which is human dignity. If 
the impact on privacy violates human dignity – regardless 
of the individual’s (subjective) threshold of sensitivity – this 
impact will be unconstitutional. 
As a consequence, there is a parallel subjective and 
objective protection level of privacy, where the subjective 
level of protection cannot be lower than the objective one. 
Based on this theory, in addition to subjective protection, 
privacy has an objective boundary, which – regardless of the 
will of the individual concerned – shall be protected. 
 
2.2. Secret information gathering and privacy 
The spread of communication and privacy are inversely 
proportional; the extension of communication results in a 
decline in private life. One reason for that is our own 
behaviour. The other one is that, in response to different 
national security challenges, the law imposes mandatory 
data handling on a wider scale. The clear distinction 
between the two cases is that in the former case the 
information becomes accessable for others by the 
individual’s own free will, but in the latter case it is 
regardless of his or her will. There is an even more severe 
restriction – and therefore it is a particularly sensitive area 
of the restriction of privacy – when the person concerned 
does not even know about the interference, because not only 
does it happen regardless his or her will but without his or 
her knowledge. Secret information gathering is therefore 
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such a severe restriction of privacy; the person who collects 
the information receives a fully presenting and thus 
identifiable picture of the individual concerned, about his or 
her characteristics, habits and secrets, and by storing and 
transmitting such data, others may also become information 
holders. Due to the earlier mentioned effects of technical 
developments, secret information gathering expands to 
more and more data. These data can be utilesed in a more 
and more professional way and at the same time, there is less 
and less chance for detection (i.e. there is less chance that 
the person concerned could be aware of the fact of the secret 
information gathering). 
As a consequence the data the individual intends to treat as 
an internal secret in his or her private sphere will flow to the 
public side irrespective to the person’s will. Such a 
procedure can only be carried out under appropriate 
constitutional and procedural guarantees. 
 
2.3. Basic features of secret information gathering 
The concept of secret service tools has so far been defined 
in literature in a wider and narrower sense. In a wider sense, 
it is the method of collecting data by authorities without the 
knowledge of the person concerned and with the necessary 
harm caused in basic human rights (privacy protection of 
residence, mailing, personal data and the right to respect 
private and family life). In the narrow sense, it means 
technical equipment, technical and IT solutions for data 
collection by authorities.3 It is noteworthy that both 
                                                          
3 István Solti 'Changes in National Security Interest Secret Information 
Gathering’ (Hungarian title: 'A titkos információgyűjtés és a titkos adatszerzés’) 
Szakmai Szemle (2013/1): 119.  
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legislation and legal literature make distinction between 
secret information gathering for criminal and for national 
security purposes.4 Without questioning the distinction 
between national security and criminal law enforcement 
purpose of data gathering, in a constitutional sense the main 
importance in both cases are on that the proceeding itself is 
about (1) the collection of private data (2) without the 
knowledge of the person concerned, (3) for some 
governmental/state purpose. In this regard the concept of 
secret information gathering is understood for both issues. 
Also the regulation of information gathering for criminal 
and for national security purposes are similar,5 with respect 
to the constitutional aspects of the two procedures, both 
must be consistent with the same constitutional guarantees, 
ensuring that the interference with privacy is constitutional. 
 
3.The regulation of secret information gathering 
in Hungary 
 
3.1. The legislative background of regulation 
According to Article 46 of the Basic Law of Hungary, 
detailed rules relating to the organisation and operation of 
the national security services, the rules for the use of special 
investigative means and techniques, as well as the rules 
                                                          
4 The two categories are similar in a way, that the new Criminal Procedure Act 
of Hungary (entry into force 1st July 2018) will use the determination secret 
information gathering. 
5 László Kis: 'Secret Data Gathering in Criminal Law Procedures, Especially in 
Cooperation with the European Union’ (Hungarian title: 'A titkos adatgyűjtés 
szerepe a büntetőeljárásban, különös tekintettel az Európai Unió keretében 
folytatott együttműködésre’ PhD study): 56. 
http://www.uni-miskolc.hu/~wwwdeak/drkisl_ertmh.pdf (accessed 30 
September 2017) 
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concerning national security activities shall be laid down in 
a cardinal Act (i.e. in an Act that is adopted by the 
supermajority of MPs). 
The specific regulations are stipulated by the Act on 
National Security Services (hereinafter referred to as: NSS 
Act). Accordingly, in the course of the secret information 
gathering process, legal guarantees are available at both 
during and after the procedure. 
The most general test for evaluating the constitutionality of 
the restriction of a human right is the necessity-
proportionality test. This test should also be applicable for 
national security issues if they concern human rights. The 
NSS Act defines the ’necessity-proportionality’ test shall be 
applied throughout the whole proceedings and must be 
considered when ordering the procedure and under its 
implementation. 
In certain cases, when there is a higher intervention to 
human rights, the procedure is subject to external 
permission (judicial or by the Minister of Justice). The 
decision of the judge or the Minister of Justice is based on 
the submission of the Directors-General of the services, and 
the terms of its content are regulated in the NSS Act. 
Accordingly, the submission must include the location of 
information gathering, the names or the scope of the parties 
concerned – which, from a constitutional point of view, 
require a high level of protection, as a very wide group of 
people can be observed this way. In such a case, compliance 
with the principle of necessity-proportionality is essential, 
as well as of the data applicable for identification, the 
description of the data collection, the justification of 
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necessity6, the beginning and the end of the procedure 
(defined in days) and its justifications in case if it is based 
on an exceptional permit. The third guarantee, which is after 
the completion of the procedure, is a post-external control 
over the procedure. Such control might be the Parliament’s 
Commission, by the Hungarian National Authority for Data 
Protection and Freedom of Information (hereinafter reffered 
to as: DPA) and the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. 
The Hungarian National Security Service (hereinafter 
referred to as: NSS) also proceeds secret information 
gathering. In this case, the NSS is responsible for the 
accuracy of data they provide as a data supplier, and for the 
use of it or for taking or failing to take measures based on it, 
the requesting body is responsible. According to the NSS 
Act, if the data collection was performed by the NSS as a 
service provider, they transmit the data obtained solely to 
the ordering body and then delete the data from its own 
register. The NSS keeps records of the activities conducted 
as a service provider, and it does not store any personal data 
beyond that specified. 
The NSS Act also provides that national security services 
may only use data in their possession for the purpose of the 
legal basis of collecting the data, unless the data refer to the 
implementation of a criminal offense and the law provides 
for its handover, or it requires obligatory information 
                                                          
6 The Court of Justice of the European Union stated in case Digital Rights 
Ireland v Minister for Communications & Others: 'So far as concerns the right 
to respect for private life, the protection of that fundamental right requires, 
according to the Court’s settled case-law, in any event, that derogations and 
limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so 
far as is strictly necessary.’ 
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handover to other national security services, and the data 
receiver itself is entitled to receive the data. 
For the reason that it effects basic rights, the constitutional 
requirement of the principle of necessity and proportionality 
must prevail at all stages of the proceedings. It is a 
constitutional guarantee that secret information gathering 
can only be obtained to the extent and for the time necessary 
to achieve the purpose set out in the task described by the 
law, unless it can be achieved otherwise. The NSS Act 
emphasises that secret information gathering should be a 
measure of ultima ratio; it is essential to use the least 
restrictive measure to the person's privacy. 
However, there is a further guarantee that the NSS Act 
defines the cases where the procedure shall be terminated 
immediately and obligates to delete the obviously 
unnecessarily collected data.7 
 
3.2. The control of secret information gathering 
The secret information gathering is first controlled when the 
procedure is ordered. Directors General who are in charge 
of the service submit a proposal for the order, the contents 
of which are set forth in the NSS Act. The Directors General 
in charge for the service decide on the content of the 
proposal, which decision must be justified. Subsequently, in 
the course of the procedure, the role of the permitting judge 
                                                          
7 Section 60 (1) NSS Act: Collective secret gathering of data subject to external 
authorization shall be terminated immediately if: 
(a) it has reached its purpose defined in the permit; 
(b) no further result is expected; 
(c) the deadline has expired; 
(d) collecting secret information for any reason is illegal. 
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or in the cases specified in the NSS Act, the Minister of 
Justice is the next step in the procedure. 
The ministers responsible for the control of services shall 
control the legitimate and proper functioning of the services, 
the implementation of their tasks, approve internal rules of 
procedure and permission of secret information gathering 
and investigate complaints concerned to the functioning of 
the service. 
 
3.2.1. Parliamentary scrutiny 
Parliamentary scrutiny is mostly carried out, by the National 
Security Committee of the Parliament. The Committee may 
request information on the operation of the national security 
services and may also recieve information on the activities 
and operation of the services on the basis of a complainant's 
submission or notification of the personell of the services. 
The Committee may also request information from the 
Minister and from the Directors General concerning secret 
information gathering that requiers external permission and 
about authorization procedures based on exceptional 
authorizations. Moreover, the Committee investigates 
complaints suspecting illegal activities of the services. The 
Committee may ask the Minister to conduct a supervision, 
and in some cases, it may itself conduct a fact-finding 
investigation, where it has access to the records of the 
services, and has the right to interrogate the personell of the 
service. In case of detecting illegal or improper operation, 
the Committee calls the Minister to conduct an 
investigation, to take action, and the Committee may also 
initiate an investigation of liability. In addition, the 
Committee takes resolution on the Commissioner for 
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Fundamental Rights’s report on the review of the procedure 
of the National Security Service. 
It shall be highlighted, that the Minister’s and the service’s 
obligation to inform the Committee does not expand to 
information that in a particular case, would endanger the 
high priority national security interests related to the method 
or the protection of the source. However, if the Committee 
investigates the legal functioning of the national security 
services, in agreement with the two-thirds of its members, 
may oblige the Minister and the Director General to provide 
such information on the methodology used in domestic 
secret information gathering, that the knowledge of which is 
necessary for the judgement of legality. The information 
accessed this way can only be used in the Committee’s 
procedure. In addition, the ministers in charge shall report 
on the activities of the services on a regular basis, but at least 
twice a year. 
It shall also be noted that, besides the National Security 
Committee, the Defense Committee is also involved in 
parliamentary control by continuously monitoring the 
implementation of the tasks of the Military National 
Security Service. 
 
3.2.2. Legal control: The role of the DPA and the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights in monitoring 
the procedures 
The DPA has the power of control over the protection of 
personal data, privacy violations and the publicity of public 
interest data, which power also expands to the control of the 
legality of secret information gathering. During the 
investigation procedure of the DPA, similar to the 
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ombudsman's procedure and based on the regulations of the 
Act on the Right to informational self-determination and 
freedom of information (hereinafter referred to as 
Information Act. It has a wide range of access, such as copy 
requests, data recognition and information requests and 
inquiries to initiate investigations and provision of 
information. This provides a broad scope for external 
control for the authority; anyone can submit a complaint on 
the suspect of illegal secret information gathering by the 
national security service, or on the possible direct danger of 
it. The DPA has the right to use the data collected during the 
investigation procedure – even classified data – for its data 
protection procedure. In case the Information Act is 
infringed, the DPA also has administrative powers, such as 
ordering the destruction of illegaly stored personal data, 
informing the data owner if information request has been 
denied unlawfully, and it also has the authority to impose 
fines. 
The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights may investigate 
national security services in a human rights aspect. 
Nonetheless, the Commissioner's right of access is limited. 
It can not, for example, view the document containing the 
technical data of the devices and methods used and the 
identification of the persons using it, and to any documents 
that can identify the source of information. 
 
3.2.3. Time of procedure 
The NSS Act defines the longest possible period of secret 
information gathering. It ensures that privacy cannot be 
infringed continuously: secret information gathering 
procedures, if they require external permissions, can only be 
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conducted for up to 90 days. The time limit might be 
extended for a further 90 days if justified.  
There is also a time limit for one special case, the so-called 
exceptional authorisation, under which the Director General 
of the services may authorise the procedure prior to the 
decision of the judge or the Minister of Justice if the external 
authorisation would result in a delay that would obviously 
undermine the effective functioning of the national security 
service. When ordering an exceptional authorization, the 
Director General of the services must also initiate 
authorisation from the judge or the Minister of Justice. The 
authorisation shall be decided within 72 hours from the 
submission. The duration of the exceptional authorization, 
therefore, can only be maintained within this deadline, if it 
meets the statutory conditions. 
However, there are no statutory time frames for secret 
information gathering procedures by national security 
services that are not bound by an external permit. However, 
the principle of necessity-proportionality must be 
considered; long-lasting information gathering may result in 
a disproportionate restriction of privacy. 
The termination of the data handling and the obligation of 
immediate delete of data are prescribed by the NSS Act for 
the deadline foreseen by the law, if the court has ordered the 
cancellation, if data handling is illegal, if the exceptional 
secret information gathering was later not authorised and if 
data handling is unnecessary. 
Article 50 of the NSS Act provides regulations for the time 
of data handling if the national security services received 
data from the register of other organs; they may handle data 
for 70 years from the date of data gathering. There is a 
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shorter time limit for handling data received from security 
management and in the surveillance and management of 
cryptographic activities (10 years) and for data generated 
during the performance of national security control (20 
years). 
The Information Act also stipulates indirect regulations on 
the time for handling data. Personal data can be handled if 
such activity is indispensable for achieving the purpose of 
data handling procedure and is suitable for the purpose. 
Furthermore, personal data can be handled only to the extent 
and time required to achieve the purpose of the data 
handling. It must also be ensured that the data holder cannot 
be identified after the time of data handling purpose lapsed. 
 
4. The constitutional aspects of secret information 
gathering 
 
4.1. Secret information gathering based on the practice 
of the Constitutional Court 
The Basic Law of Hungary ensures the respect for private 
and family life, home, communications and that everyone 
has the right to protect their personal data.8 This also 
pertains to secret information gathering and any limitation 
must meet the above-mentioned necessity-proportionality 
basic right test. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court 
pointed out that protection of national security interests is a 
constitutional purpose and an obligation of the state.9 The 
constitutional purpose legitimises the secrecy of 
information gathering; the observed person will not be 
                                                          
8 Article VI 
9 Decision 13/2001. (IV. 14.) CC.  
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informed of the observation itself and national security tools 
and methods are especially hidden.10 These are 
constitutional restrictions on information rights. In addition 
it must also be considered that the restriction should not be 
abusative and discretionary decision-making should be 
limited to the greatest possible protection of fundamental 
rights (esp. fair trial). 
The Constitutional Court also pointed out that national 
security services have an essential role to safeguard the 
country’s sovereignty and its political, economic and 
defense interests.11 National secret and special security 
activities require adequate legal regulation and guarantees 
to ensure that national security services under no 
circumstances constitute a threat to democracy. Therefore, 
states may only limit basic rights if, and to the extent that it 
is necessary and justified to safeguard the national security 
of the country and enforce its sovereignty. 
The secret information gathering was the object of Decision 
2/2007. (I 24) CC. In this case, the Constitutional Court 
reckoned that ‘state interference shall be a matter of severe 
public interest and must be proportionate to the threat to be 
avoided and the disadvantage caused.’ The Court also 
highlighted that, in the constitutional judgement of the 
secret information gathering, ‘a stricter standard applies to 
the requirements in this procedure than in other procedures 
as they are not open to public. The use of national security 
                                                          
10 Géza Finszter points out the importance of the legitimate purpose of collecting 
information, saying that ‘it is forbidden to put positions of the observation into 
political or unfair economic interests and it is forbidden to subordinate the 
observations to organizational interests’. Finszter, Géza ‘Criminalistics of Secret 
Observations’ (Hungarian title: ‘A titkos felderítés kriminalisztikája’ In: BÓCZ, 
Endre Criminalistics II. BM Publisher, Budapest, 2004): 971–972. 
11 Decision 16/2001. (V.25.) CC 
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tools provides extraordinary power to the users and makes 
the individuals concerned higly vulnerable.’ 
The main idea of the decision was to strengthen the 
requirement of legality: ‘For the protection of public order 
and public security, which is recognized as a constitutional 
purpose of the use of secret means, it is not possible to give 
a general mandate to law enforcement that restricts basic 
rights without the respect of necessity and the 
proportionality princples and without certain conditions of 
the authorisation could be verified both in general and in the 
particular cases. This, in certain cases, also eliminates 
procedural guarantees on the legality of the evidences, all in 
all the fair trial’. The decision was not primarily 
emphasising the posterior control of the procedure’s 
content, but the importance of the existance of a real (and 
obviously preliminary) legislative mandate. 
Decision 32/2013. (XI. 22.) CC further analysed the 
requirements under which the use of national security 
measures are permissible. The Court analyzed whether it 
was constitutionally acceptable that the Minister of Justice 
allows secret information gathering and, with regard to the 
legal environment, concluded that the guarantee system was 
sufficient. The decision considered the Parliament’s 
National Security Committee to be appropriate for 
functioning as the external control but pointed out that ‘the 
National Security Committee and the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights (i.e. the ombudsman), can only provide 
effective external control over the authorising power of the 
Minister of Justice, if the Minister's decision to permit secret 
information gathering activities contains sufficient and 
detailed justification. The reasoning must be deep and 
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detailed enough for the external control to review the 
deliberation of national security interest and the basic rights 
concerned’. Therefore, the decision stated as a constitutional 
requirement that the Minister has to give reasoning for the 
decision.12 
 
4.2. The Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary case 
The collision of the authorisation of secret information 
gathering and privacy and the revision of Hungarian 
legislation were also examined by the ECHR. In the Szabó 
and Vissy v. Hungary case,13 two workers of an NGO turned 
to the ECHR for the reason, that the Counter Terrorism 
Centre (that is part of the Police) was authorised to conduct 
secret information gathering to investigate suspect of 
specific crimes and national security interests to help the 
fight agianst terrorism and help Hungarian citizens who 
were in trouble outside Hungary by using the methods and 
tools enlisted earlier. 
The complainants have not stated that they have been 
observed for the purposes of national security. Yet they have 
stressed that the mere existence of the law itself is a suitable 
reason for people to be victims of this procedure.14 
                                                          
12 Justice Péter Paczolay and justice András Bragyova pointed out in their 
concurring that the Minister of Justice cannot be considered as external control, 
therefore the model is not a sufficient guarantee of privacy protection. ‘The 
collision of the state’s national security interests and privacy rights should not 
be decided by political organs (like the parliamentary committee) but by a court 
that evaluates the necessity and proportionality of the restriction of rights.' 
13 No. 37138/14. 12 January 2016 
14 In case Roman Zakharov v. Russia (2015) the Court stated, thath firstly it 'will 
take into account the scope of the legislation permitting secret surveillance 
measures by examining whether the applicant can possibly be affected by it, 
either because he or she belongs to a group of persons targeted by the contested 
legislation or because the legislation directly affect all users of communication 
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However, they have emphasised that they were more likely 
to become observed by secret means than ordinary civilians 
would be, as they are employees of an NGO, which creates 
a critical opinions towards the government. 15 
The complainants have pointed out that, without the absence 
of effective control over the secret information gathering 
conducted by external authorisation, there is nothing to 
prevent the executive power from discretionary authorising 
the national security services to exercise the special powers 
specified in the NSS Act. 
The ECHR declared, that the existence of the law itself 
entails the risk of observation and the danger that the state 
intervenes in the freedom of communication of users of 
postal and telecommunications services, thus to exercising 
their right to respect for private and family life and their free 
communications, as the scope of persons who may be 
subject to observation is not precisely regulated. 
It was also concerned that the order of the measures was 
entirely in the hands of the executive power. Thus, it can 
interfere in the privacy of the citizens without control, 
providing the possibility of an unrestricted observation and 
a massive, systematic data gathering, especially because it 
did not have any obligation for reasoning. The government 
this way would have the possibility to create a detailed 
profile of intimate aspects of the lives of citizens, too. 
                                                          
services by instituting a system where any person can have his or her 
communications intercepted'. 
15 Related to suitable reasons for being victims of secret information gathering 
see for example case Esbester v. the United Kingdom (1993), Matthews v. the 
United Kingdom (1996), Redgrave v. the United Kingdom (1997) where it is 
declared that 'the Commission required applicants to demonstrate that there was 
a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the measures had been applied to them.' 
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The ECHR has warned that such a threat to privacy must be 
strictly controlled, but under the law, effective external 
control is not ensured. The ECHR found that the Hungarian 
legislation does not meet this criteria, as secret information 
gathering is permitted by the Minister of Justice instead of 
the courts. The Minister makes decision upon the initiative 
of police organs, without the knowledge of the details, the 
documents and facts and this way the consideration of the 
proposed measure and the possibility of informed decision 
making is not ensured. Moreover, it is also problematic that 
the extension of the authorisation is not clarified. Thus, the 
ECHR concluded that the member of the executive power 
gaining political responsibility, in this case the Minister of 
Justice, does not constitute an effective assurance of respect 
for basic rights concerned. 
On this basis, the ECHR found an infringement of Article 8 
of the Convention. The decision said: ‘A central issue 
common to both the stage of authorisation of surveillance 
measures and the one of their application is the absence of 
judicial supervision.16 (75) The ECHR added that ‘the 
authority competent to authorise the surveillance, 
authorising of telephone tapping by a non-judicial authority 
may be compatible with the Convention provided that that 
authority is sufficiently independent from the executive. 
However, the political nature of the authorisation and 
supervision increases the risk of abusive measures. The 
Court recalls that the rule of law implies, inter alia, that an 
interference by the executive authorities with an 
                                                          
16 See also Klass and Others v. Germany 1978, Weber and Saravia v. Germany 
2006, Kennedy v. the United Kingdom 2010 
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individual’s rights should be subject to an effective control 
which should normally be assured by the judiciary, at least 
in the last resort, judicial control offering the best guarantees 
of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure. In a 
field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases 
and could have such harmful consequences for democratic 
society as a whole, it is in principle desirable to entrust 
supervisory control to a judge. […] Either the body issuing 
authorisations for interception should be independent or 
there should be control by a judge or an independent body 
over the issuing body’s activity. Accordingly, in this field, 
control by an independent body, normally a judge with 
special expertise, should be the rule and substitute solutions 
the exception, warranting close scrutiny.’ (77) 
According to the decision of the ECHR, the reviewer of the 
authorization should either be a judicial body or an 
independent institution. To fulfil the requirements stated in 
this decision, the legislator therefore can decide whether the 
authorization (or its revision) shall be delegated to a judge 
appointed in accordance with the rules set out in the Act on 
Criminal Procedure, or shall create an independent body 
specifically for this purpose or to entrust an independent 
institution currently operating with the review of the 
authorization. 
 
4.3. Response to the ECHR’s decision 
The legislator, according to present knowledge, chooses the 
latest solution; it intends to make amendments to the NSS 
Act and the Information Act (hereinafter referred to as: 
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Draft).17 The Draft does not intend to implement the control 
mechanism through an independent body of judiciary or 
judicial status, but wishes to ensure that the Hungarian 
legislation is consistent with the Convention by delegating 
the external control to the DPA. From the point of view of 
compliance with the Convention, it is therefore necessary to 
consider whether the DPA is an independent external body 
that fulfils the requirements of the ECHR's decision. 
According to the Information Act, the task of DPA is to 
control and promote the right to the protection of personal 
data and the right to access data of public interest. In this 
regard the DPA fulfils quasi-ombudsman functions; it 
contributes to the prevail of basic rights declaired in Article 
VI. of the Basic Law. On the other hand, the Information 
Act also stipulates authoritative powers; in this regard the 
DPA exercises executive power in connection with 
information rights. As a consequence, the DPA has dual 
status: on the one hand, it acts as a quasi ombudsman, 
contributing to the protection of information rights and acts 
as an authority on the other. 
Performing its activity the DPA is independent from the 
Government; it is an autonomous authority that the 
Government cannot direct or supervise individual cases. It 
is also independent in its structure that is regulated by law 
(meaning that it is defined by the Parliament), but it can 
freely establish its own internal structure. However, its 
personal independence cannot be compared to the courts, as 
its president is appointed by the President of the Republic 
                                                          
17 Draft Law BM/8652/2017. https://goo.gl/BZBUjT 
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upon the Prime Minister's proposal. Besides its autonomy 
the DPA, as an authority, is not out of the executive branch; 
on the contrary, it is part of it. 
Article 36/A of the Draft on the Information Act states that 
the observation complaint is conducted by DPA as a quasi-
ombudsman body. It conducts a wide-ranging investigation 
in order to prevail basic rights, which results in indirect 
action. It does not give remedy to the violation of the basic 
right, but through giving information and initiative it 
contributes in the effective remedy. The ECHR considered 
it necessary to lay down rules which ‘provide effective 
safeguards and guarantees to avoid misuse’ (59). We 
conclude that the solution to the Draft can only be 
considered effective if it contains further rules on what 
procedure is to be followed in case DPA considers that the 
observation complaint is well-founded. 
At the same time, the regulatory solution of the Draft 
appears to indicate that under the supervision of the Minister 
of Justrice’s order for sercret information gathering, DPA 
makes a decision as an authority. If the DPA brings an 
administrative decision on this subject, then its judicial 
review must also be ensured. The DPA makes a decision on 
the legality of the ordering decision during the review, so it 
does not have the power to examine whether it is justified to 
order secret information gathering. In order to comply with 
the Convention, it is in any case necessary to clarify the 
extent to which DPA controls the authorization of secret 
information gathering. Overall, it can be stated that the DPA 
is the appropriate forum for reviewing the authorisation of 
secret information gathering, but only in case a law 
determines in which competence the DPA prevails, the 
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consequence of its decision and whether the decision has a 
further supervision. 
Another issue is whether it fulfils the criteria the ECHR set 
that the approval of the DPA only takes place after the 
Minister’s authorization only, i.e. after the secret 
information gathering had already begun. 
The Draft itself is disputed. According to the NGO initiated 
the ECHR's decision, the proposed regulation does not meet 
the requirements of the ECHR because it does not entrust 
the review for the authorization of a court, and the review, 
with a few exceptions, is only ex post.18 Kinga Zakariás has 
just the opposite view; she states that the collection of 
information is only possible in case of an ‘individual 
suspicion’, authorization is being investigated by an 
independent authority and this examination seems to be an 
effective control in individual cases.19 
The interpretation of ‘prior judicial authorization’ in item 73 
of the ECHR's decision is an interesting issue. If the prior 
authorization is interpreted in a way that only after the 
authorisation can the secret information gathering be 
started, then the Draft’s solution is not a preliminary one. 
On the other hand, if prior authorization means that the 
approval concerns the initiation of secret information 
gathering and not the (ex post) utilization of the data 
collected, then the criteria is fulfilled. 
 
                                                          
18 The Eötvös Károly Institute's position the draft law on the independent 
revision of the secret information gathering for national security purposes. 
https://goo.gl/8SVqp5 (accessed: 15 October 2017) 
19 Kinga Zakariás: The Collision of the Right to a Private Sphere and National 
Security Interests through Secret Intelligence Gathering – From a Constitutional 
Point of View (forthcoming). 
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5. Summary 
Secret information gathering is probably the most slippery 
issue in the collision of privacy and national security 
interest. This is one of the most powerful restriction of the 
right to privacy, since it is not just done without the will of 
the person concerned, but without his or her knowledge. 
Consequently, there is no way for him or her to protect basic 
rights or enforce the law. At the same time, the objective of 
national security (or criminal law enforcement) may make 
such a restriction of this basic right constitutional; but only 
if it has adequate safeguards. 
The constitutional prerequisite of secret information 
gathering is the predictable legal environment. It is 
particularly important to define the scope of organs, 
competences, time frames and the content of information 
gathering. The case law of the Constitutional Court, and in 
particular the decision of the ECHR in Szabó and Vissy v. 
Hungary coclude that legal regulation is not sufficient in 
itself and the effective and independent control of the 
enforcement of secret information gathering is also 
necessary. As for now it is an open question if the Draft 
fulfils the criteria derived from the Basic Law and from the 
Convention. The main question how it will prevail in 
practice, if it will be appropriate to protect the privacy of the 
persons concerned.  
We conclude that the DPA is a sufficient forum of 
supervising secret information gathering only if the law 
stipulates the aspects of supervision, the consequence of the 
DPA’s decision and clarifies if DPA is an ombudsman-like 
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The Legality of National Security1 
 
 
National security is a seemingly transparent, one 
dimensional concept, focusing on maintaining the 
functionality of the state – including mainly intelligence and 
counter-intelligence. However, if we dare to take a closer 
look, we can identify, among other matters, the political goal 
of good governance.2 On one hand, the concept of national 
security [policy] has the cultural-institutional context of 
policy, and on the other, the constructed identity of states, 
governments, and other political actors.3 National security, 
in addition, cannot be separated from governmental policy, 
as it is a component of it. National security services are part 
of the state administration and they represent the state’s 
point of view on the concept of protego ergo obligo and its 
interpretation in the political and legal sense. However, 
                                                          
* István Sabjanics - Junior assistant researcher, Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University, Budapest, Hungary, sabjanics.istvan@jak.ppke.hu.  
1 This work was created in commission of the National University of Public 
Service under the priority project KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15-2016-00001 titled 
‘Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance’ and the Ereky 
Public Law Research Center Pázmány Péter Catholic University Faculty of Law 
and Political Sciences 
2 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan022332.pdf 
3 P.J. Katzenstein: 1. Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National 
Security. In: The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics. (ed. P.J. Katzenstein), Columbia University Press, New York, 1996. 
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submission of some sort, more than in the case of an average 
public servant, is expected from the staff of national 
security.4  
Dicey defines the rule of law as the absolute supremacy or 
predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of 
arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness 
of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on 
the part of the government.5 All institutions and members of 
the public administration, particularly those with public 
authority, are required to follow the instructions of the 
constitution and the laws. The elements of legality are found 
in constitutional provisions6 and regional international 
human rights documents, like the ECHR. There are some 
requirements of government that must prevail at all times, 
e.g. normativity, transparency, and oversight. The authority 
they practice separates national security from the rest of 
public administration and clarifies the necessity of a relevant 
act of parliament. 
 
 
                                                          
4 See Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces 
Personnel: Chapter 9 Military Unions and Associations p. 65-73. http://www.d
caf.ch/content/download/35589/526395/file/HandbookHumanRightsArmedFor
ces-080409.pdf; J. Slater: Homeland Security vs Workers’ Rights? What the 
Federal Government Should Learn from History and Experience, and Why. In: 
U. Pa. Journal of Labour and Employment Law. Vol. 6. No. 2. pp. 
295-356. www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jbl/articles/volume6/issue2/Slater6U.Pa
J.Lab.%26Emp.L.295(2004).pdf; This appears to be the case for the staff of 
Hungarian national security, according to the report of the ombudsman AJB-
2047/2016.  
5 A.V. Dicey: The Law of the Constitution, p. 120. 
6 In the case of Hungary Articles B (1) and C (1) and (3) of the Fundamental 
Law of Hungary, in France Article 1 of the Constitution of France, in Germany 
Article 20 (3) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, in Poland 
Article 2 and 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland are the key elements 
of establishing the democratic rule of law, just to mention some. 
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1. Features of the law on national security 
The rule of law expects that individuals have knowledge if 
their rights are limited, as acts of parliament are made 
public, but directives of the government are not necessarily 
made public. In fact, the existence of a declassified law 
makes it possible to have proper oversight by independent 
forums such as the national audit office, the judiciary, the 
ombudsman, and, in some cases, specialized tribunals. Law 
on national security can cover four aspects of national 
security 1) organisation, 2) authority, 3) staff, and 4) 
oversight. Budget and finances are mentioned as well, but 
unlike the previous four categories, they are usually 
considered as parts of those and certainly not as their 
independent peers. These aspects can enter legality in one 
legislative step or several, it does not affect the outcome, 
that is national security under the rule of law. Defining the 
authority of national security shapes the public field as well 
as the relationship between individuals and the state. If the 
legislation passes an overall act on national security, 
including oversight, powers, procedures and organisational 
structure of national security services, in light of the law, the 
administrative features of national security will share the 
same legal and political protection as the status of oversight 
bodies for example. Stability of the state administration is a 
democratic value, but at the same time, providing a 
conditional legal protection for human rights and the names 
and headquarters of a government agency is more than 
futile. Governments should have the freedom of shaping 
their administration the way it suits their security politics, 
international relations etc. the best, without the necessary 
give-and-take of national politics, which is likely to happen 
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in order to the gain the same level of political support of the 
opposition as if the government had proposed to get rid of 
all privacy rights. The national security services in the UK 
have their own acts,7 but at the same time their role and 
corresponding authority have been shaped by terrorism, 
which appears separately in independent legislation, 
covering the law enforcement spectrum as well.8 In Estonia 
the law on national security services9 identifies two 
organisations, although it provides no relevant information 
on their tools and methods, which appear to be a key element 
in the Hungarian legislation.10 Not every country shares the 
same legislative approaches when dealing with national 
military intelligence. Perhaps, the authority of military 
intelligence and security services usually11 does not cover 
the civilian population, and thus the political necessity for a 
unified national security legislation can be challenged. It 
could well be reminiscent of the past, when all the 
intelligence and security activities of the state were kept in 
the shadows. All in all, there is a tendency between countries 
participating in joint operations, like NATO member states, 
which makes it easier to share experiences and give the 
opportunity to copy or transplant12 legal solutions. Be that 
                                                          
7 Security Service Act 1989, that covers MI5,) Intelligence Services Act 1994, 
that covers MI6 and GCHQ. 
8 The Terrorism Act 2000, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003, The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, The 
Terrorism Act 2006, The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, The Justice and Security 
Act 2013, The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. 
9 Julgeolekuasutuste seadus (2000. 12. 20.) JAS 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/514112013020/consolide.  
10 Article 53-56 § of the Hungarian law on national security services. 
11 On the other hand, see Centro National de Inteligencia of Spain. 
12 For the original concept of legal transplantation see L. K. Donohue: 
Transplantation. Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, V. V. Ramraj. – M. 
Hor – K. Roach – G. Williams, George (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 
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as it may, some aspects13 of international cooperation 
between national security services can raise questions 
regarding the protection of human rights and dignity.  
Most European countries adopted declassified legalisation 
on military national security after the end of the cold war: 
Germany14 in 1990, Slovakia15 and the Czech Republic16 in 
1994, the Netherlands17 in 2002, and Poland18 with the 
division of the previously unified military intelligence in 
2006.19 Military intelligence in Switzerland has a 
                                                          
Cambridge, 2012 or in Hungarian a different interpretation see I. Sabjanics: A 
félelem mint jogi következményekkel járó veszélyforrás. In: (ed.) G. Finszter – 
I. Sabjanics: Biztonsági kihívások a 21. században. 838 p. Budapest: Dialóg 
Campus Kiadó, 2017. pp. 745-753. 
13 Basically, if a piece of intelligence material crosses the borders of a country, 
the same rules apply as if it was acquired there in the first place. This concept 
was forgotten when governments accepted information shared by countries that 
had torture and other inhumane methods in practice for questioning.  
14 Militärische Abschirmdiens (MAD), Gesetz über den militärischen 
Abschirmdienst (1990. 12. 20.) MADG http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/madg/, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Gesetz über den 
Bundesnachrichtendienst (1990. 12. 20.) BNDG http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bndg/BNDG.pdf, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), 
Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz (1990. 12. 20.) BVerfSchG 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bverfschg/BJNR029700990.html.  
15 Vojenské Spravodajtsvo, Národnej Rady Slovenskej Republiky (1994. 06. 30) 
https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/1994/198/20160101.html.  
16 Vojenské Zpravodajtsví, Zákon č. 153/1994 Sb. o zpravodajských službých 
České republiky (1994.07.07.) http://vzcr.cz/shared/clanky/18/153_1994.pdf. 
17 Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), and Militaire 
Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD), both appear in Wet op de 
inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (2002. 02. 07.) Wiv 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0013409/2017-03-01.  
18 In Poland, civilian and military national security each had a unified service 
established between 1990-2002. A functional division of the services was 
sanctioned by ustawa z dnia 24 maja 2002 r. o Agencji Bezpieczeństwa 
Wewnętrznego oraz Agencji Wywiadu http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download;jsessi
onid=68B6FFFEC2B30A2A822D3B1C7AAED67E?id=WDU20020740676&t
ype=2, while the previous act was passed in 1990 
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU19900300180&type=2. 
19 Służbę Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego (SKW) Polish military counter-
intelligence, Służbę Wywiadu Wojskowego (SWW) Polish military 
intelligence, Dz.U. 2006 Nr 104 poz. 709 ustawa o Służbie Kontrwywiadu 
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government regulation from 200920 which was adapted with 
the authority provided by Article 99 of the law on the 
army. 21 In Italy, (military) intelligence was established in 
1925 after World War I, which, with the change in the form 
of government in 1946 and the intention of leaving their 
involvement in the war behind, was replaced by a newly 
established, still military, organisation. 22 Similarly, to the 
frequent political crises and government changes in Italy – 
and contrary to Western Europe – the intelligence services 
were also subject to several reforms, most notably in 197723 
with a failed coup, which involved the head of the 
intelligence service.24 The latest reform25 of Italian national 
security of 2007 focused on following European trends26 
regarding national security legislations. 
                                                          
Wojskowego oraz Służbie Wywiadu Wojskowego (2006. 06. 09.) 
http://isip.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20061040709&type=3.  
20 Verordnung über den Nachrichtendienst der Armee, 2009 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20092339/index.html#a5.  
21 Bundesgesetz über die Armee und die Militärwaltung, Militärgesetz (MG) 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19950010/index.html.  
22 A Servizio informazioni militari (SIM) existed between 1925-1945, 
established by royal decree no. 1809/25. (1925. 10. 15.) 
http://siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it/cgi-bin/pagina.pl?TipoPag=prodente&Chiav
e=53534.  
23 Istituzione e ordinamento dei servizi per le informazioni e la sicurezza e 




25 Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e nuova disciplina 
del segreto, Legge 3 agosto 2007, n. 124 http://www.normattiva.it/uri-
res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2007;124.  
26 Declassified report of the Italian government on national security threats 2007, 
p.199 https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2015/
12/relazione-2007.pdf.  
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In the aftermath of the Cold War, declassified regulation of 
national security became a possibility27 and most countries 
passed their legislation, or at least passed an interim law,28 
so the government and the parliament could win time for 
reaching the necessary political consensus.29 The lack of 
declassified regulation in the former socialist regime did not 
mean that state security – organisation, authority and staff at 
least – was something of an uncharted terra incognita, for 
all administrative structured bodies are created by a 
normative decision, shaped with normativity and all 
instructions and directives are written on a normative 
language.30  In the Netherlands national security was 
established by a secret royal decree, which was declassified 
in 1972, and later replaced by an act in 1987.31 
At least three factors can be listed as the basis of a newly 
established national security legislation. First, the 
previously mentioned and most obvious is the end of the 
cold war, which allowed declassified regulation to appear 
and was triggered by a new democratic demand of the 
                                                          
27 Poland was a peculiar socialist state, not just for its method of nationalising 
private property (see: Broniowski v. Poland, ECHR), but also for having an act 
on state security (for the 1985 act on state security see: 
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU19850380181&type=2). 
28 As did Hungary with Act X of 1990 on interim legislation on authorisation of 
special measures and methods of secret services. 
29 This consensus was blocked, in some cases, like Hungary, for years, because 
the political parties in parliament could not agree on how to deal with the 
previous network of state security. 
30 E.g. from Hungary: http://abparancsok.hu/sites/default/files/parancsok/10-22-
22_1976.pdf; from the GDR see G. Förster: Die Juristische Hochschule des 
Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit. Die Sozialstruktur ihrer Promovenden, 
Münster LIT 2001. 
31 A Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (counter-intelligence) and Buitenlandse 
Inlichtingendienst (intelligence) existed until 2002. 05. 29., from which period 
between 1949-1972 they were authorised by a classified royal decree, that was 
declassified in 1972, but the relevant law was only passed in 1987 - 
http://www.stichtingargus.nl/bvd/par/wiv1987.pdf.  
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people that all government activity – operated with public 
funds – should be transparent and accounted for, and 
second, a copied model legislation between countries that 
was transferred by international relations. This could have 
been established between allies, countries with a shared 
cultural background or for pure political benefit in national 
politics.32 Thirdly, case-law of the ECHR regarding national 
security and, particularly with, privacy, arbitrary in secret 
investigations and proper oversight had great effect on 
shaping national legislation regarding national security.33 
 
2. Situating national security 
National security has a place in a state governed by the rule 
of law. Gathering intelligence at home and abroad 
strengthens a democratic government in the same way as 
security clearances do, regarding integrity and the fight 
against corruption. The open measures initiated by law 
enforcement and the military cannot deal with all types of 
threat against democracy. In order to maintain the rule of 
law effectively government has to allow national security 
some sort of independence within state administration.34 
                                                          
32 For detailed characterisation of the three above-mentioned methods, see in 
Hungarian I. Sabjanics: A félelem mint jogi következményekkel járó 
veszélyforrás (Fear, as a source of threat with legal consequences) in: Biztonsági 
kihívások a 21. században (ed. G. Finszter, I. Sabjanics) Dialóg Campus Kiadó 
Budapest 2017, pp.745-753. http://www.bm-tt.hu/assets/letolt/BM-
konyv_1.pdf. 
33 E.g. see: Malone v. UK [8691/79 (1984)] or Herman & Hewitt v. UK 
[12175/86 (1989)]. 
34 D. Vitkauskas: The Role of a Security Intelligence Service in a Democracy. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Democratic Institutions Fellowships 
Programme 1997-1999, June 1999, p. 53. www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-
99/vitkauskas.pdf; in a previous context see M.G. Raskin: Democracy versus 
the National Security State. In: Law and Contemporary Problems. Vol. 40. No. 
3. 1976. pp. 189-220.  
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Article 2 of the Slovene ZSOVA35 and Article 3 of the 
Lithuanian law on national security36 invoke the authority 
provided by the constitution of the state. However, the 
Estonian JAS37 which regulates the national security 
service, KaPo38 or the Slovakian SIS Act39 refer back only 
to the abstract concept of constitutional order without 
mentioning any specifics. Obviously, the abstract concept of 
constitutional order can be deduced from the relevant 
constitutions.40 Their authority and the service provided by 
national security prohibits placing them under any other 
branch of power, other than the executive. Their role in 
aiding government decision-making puts them in a central 
position within the state administration, even when the 
organisation itself lacks independence, as being part of 
another central body. Functionality prevails over structural 
framework when dealing with national security. The 
German MAD41 is part of the Bundeswehr and looks like a 
non-essential government body. Though, as the military 
national security service of Germany, it is vital to the 
sovereign governmental decision-making and is considered 
                                                          
http://www.scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3491&conte
xt=lcp 
35 Zakon o Slovenski obveščevalno varnostni službi Ministrstva za obrambo 
(1999. 07. 29.) http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/slovenia-
study-data-surveillance-si.pdf 
36 Law no. VIII-49 on the basis of the national security of Lithuania (1996. 12. 
19.) http://e-seimas.lrs.lt/rs/legalact/TAD/TAIS.120108/format/ISO_PDF/ 
37 Law on national security authorities (2000. 12. 20.) 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/514112013020/consolide.  
38 Kaitsepolitseiamet http://www.kapo.ee.  
39 Act no. 46/1993. On Slovakian Intelligence Service www.sis.gov.sk/about-
us/zakon-o-sis.html. 
40 Constitution of Estonia http://www.president.ee/en/republic-of-estonia/the-
constitution/; Constitution of Slovakia http://www.prezident.sk/upload-
files/46422.pdf. 
41 Militärischen Abschirmdienst.  
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to be part of the German national security community 
among the rest of the national security services, that, on the 
other hand, are independent.  
Aspects of national security as a sensitive matter have an 
impact on national politics and international relations. 
Keeping it a secret helps the effectiveness of national 
security and provides a stable environment for diplomatic 
actions. The existence of counter-intelligence activity in the 
UK was first mentioned in a speech in Parliament in 1952, 
while intelligence, despite the several James Bond books 
and movies, was acknowledged by the British Government 
officially only in 1986.42 Before passing national security 
legislation the cooperation between national security 
services and other governmental bodies or NGOs was 
considered a patriotic and civic duty, but talking about it was 
frowned upon. Basically, governmental approval gave 
legitimacy to the authority of national security services, for 
all related norms were classified. The division of national 
security and law enforcement was always elemental. 
National security never had investigative powers and was 
kept outside the criminal procedure, but it was expected to 
contribute to its success.43 If a criminal procedure is initiated 
the role of national security ends44 in that specific case, or 
at least there must be a shift in its focus, in order to continue 
gathering information. There is some overlap45 in the 
                                                          
42 http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29938135. 
43 H. Born, I. Leigh: Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best 
Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies, Publishing House of the 
Parliament of Norway, Oslo, 2005.  
44 ET Crime Analysis: Organised Crime – Best Practice Survey No. 4, 
(Strasbourg: CoE, 2002), p. 6. 
45 Security Services Act 1989 1(2) identified the function of MI5 as protection 
of national security, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, 
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authority of national security and law enforcement, which 
establishes a competitive relationship between the two sides 
of public interests, one regarding national security, and one 
regarding criminality. However, proper evaluation of 
information which concentrates on the benefits that can be 
achieved in each field of interest, especially referring to the 
source or the date of expiry of the information, can establish 
a functioning cooperation between the two interpretations of 
public interest. 
 
3. Internationalism in national security46 
With the end of the cold war and the rise of international 
terrorism, governments gave a green light to international 
cooperation of national security services outside their 
traditional alliances. This is based on focusing on the 
pragmatic benefits of information sharing, rather than the 
similarities in their respective national politics or 
democratic institutions. Every piece of information has its 
own value, correlating with the measures taken and other 
legal circumstances. The harder it is to obtain the 
information, the more valuable it will be. In theory, it is 
hardest, if not impossible, if the information cannot be 
obtained legally by the authorities, because their chances 
would be reduced to pure luck. Nevertheless, information 
that would be illegal to acquire within the legal system of a 
                                                          
terrorism, and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from 
actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by 
political, industrial or violent means. However, it was completed in 1996 with a 
new section 1(5) and the obligatory support of police and investigative 
authorities. 
46 For a more detailed work on the subject see H. Born, I. Leigh, A. Wills (eds.): 
International intelligence cooperation and accountability, Routledge, 2011, p. 
336. 
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state, could become the subject of trade via international 
cooperation between national security services. A practical 
interpretation of CAT47 and human rights regarding 
criminal procedure, or just the individuals Miranda rights 
alone, if we do not want to go too far, could mean a great 
difference between the legal circumstances in which the 
information was acquired. This arrangement suggests a gap 
in legislation, since national security committees of 
parliaments usually lack the authority to practice oversight 
regarding the international cooperation of national security 
services. This means that joint operations, secret 
investigations within partnerships abroad, and information-
sharing stay hidden in the shadows, out of the sight of 
politicians.48 Somehow, only the scandalous cases come up 
to the surface like the infamous CIA black sites49 across the 
world, the Abu Omar-case50 or now the alleged deception of 
ABW by Russian intelligence.51 There were compelling 
suggestions on how to make intelligence more accountable, 
yet none of the sides is satisfied with the political 
                                                          
47 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1984). 
48 F. Fabbrini: The European Court of Human Rights, Extraordinary Renditions 
and the Right to the Truth: Ensuring Accountability for Gross Human Rights 
Violations Committed in the Fight Against Terrorism. In: Human Rights Law 




50 Report by the Secretary-General on the use of his Powers under Article 52 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, in the Light of Reports suggesting 
that Individuals, notably Persons suspected of Involvement in Acts of Terrorism, 
may have been Arrested and Detained, or Transported while Deprived of their 
Liberty, by or at the Instigation of Foreign Agencies, SG/Inf (2006) 5, 28 
February 2006, para. 4. 
51 http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/336562,Polish-security-service-
targeted-by-Russian-spies-under-previous-gov’t-report. 
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consensus.52 With the limits of our legal system in mind, we 
see noteworthy concepts behind glass doors that would 
never take root in different constitutional circumstances.53 
International cooperation of national security services 
appears solely in statistics,54 and in a few cases, 
governmental approval of establishing the framework for 
cooperation is mentioned in legislation.55 If we look at the 
successive and correlative system56 of oversight bodies 
regarding the activity of national security, an apparent gap 
                                                          
52Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on 
Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Genf, 2009, p. 90. 
53 E.g. the UK’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal (www.ipt-uk.com). 
54 E.g. the Danish PET’s Annual Report of 2006-2007 pp.24-27. 
https://www.pet.dk/English/~/media/Engelsk/PETannualreport_2006-
2007.ashx, although the Estonian KAPO just mentions topics for international 
cooperation, such as terrorism, protection against the increasing influence of 
Russia and migration https://www.kapo.ee/sites/default/files/public/content_pa
ge/Annual_Review_2016.pdf. 
55 The legislation of Switzerland is a peculiar example, as federal act no. 510.10 
on military and military administration states that the government can sign 
treaties on international cooperation of military national security regarding data 
protection and participating in international military informational systems 
https://www.admin.ch/ops/de/classified-compilation/19950010/index.html. 
Art. 36(1) d of the Dutch Wiv states that acquiring information through 
international cooperation and establishing partnerships with foreign national 
security services need to be sanctioned by the relevant member of government. 
56 Oversight is carried out as followed: 1) internal control (or self-control, 
focusing on expertise and legal framework), 2) government control (which is no 
longer internal control in the original sense, similarities in their related interest, 
however, is hard to contest, 3) oversight of parliament, 4) oversight of the 
judiciary, 5) other external (independent) oversight (national audit office, 
ombudsman etc.) – which does not contain media, since the media lack the 
authority for direct involvement in staff policy, reorganising institutions etc.; 
from a different view oversight can be 1) a priori (typically internal, 
governmental and judicial), 2) continuous (exclusively internal and sometimes 
governmental), 3) ex post facto (basically all types) 
See H. Born – I. Leigh: Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and 
Best Practice for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies. Publishing House of the 
Parliament of Norway, Oslo, 2005 or in Hungarian I. Sabjanics: Gondolatok a 
polgári titkosszolgálatok közjogi helyzetéről. In: (ed.) B. Páll. A Közjogi 
Államtudományi Kutatócsoport publikációi III. SZIT, Budapest 2007. pp.169-
219. 
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occurs, that is fit for international cooperation. Even though, 
the threats challenging national security seem to be 
continuously shifting in tone and changing surface, legal 
stability is vital to the rule of law. This means, the only 
option is to establish a competent framework either in the 
constitution or, at least, in relevant (declassified) laws.57  
 
4. Providing national security in the 21st century 
The existing national security legislation, if appropriate, 
supports the rule of law and establishes the trust of the 
people in the government, by providing the necessary 
amount of exposure. Considering, national security needs to 
operate discreetly, even success stays hidden from the 
public. Beside the relevant legislation, which establishes 
and defines national security, the authority exercised by the 
services, and what can be regarded as none other than a clear 
message from the government to the public and other 
governments, national security services have some potential 
too. National security services must go further, when 
providing democratic service to the public, than merely 
being accountable, transparent, and cooperating with 
oversight bodies. They also can appeal to the public. 
Reaching out to the public is more than just an opportunity 
to acquire relevant operational information. It is a gesture of 
inviting the public to a conversation on threats, measures, 
and insight as a partner, and obviously not as a peer. But 
then again, no governmental body, when exercising public 
authority, considers the people as a peer. Official 
                                                          
57 See P. Gill: Intelligence, Threat, Risk and the Challenge of Oversight, In: 
Intelligence and National Security 27:2, 2012, pp. 202-222; also, the Report of 
the Venice Committee on the democratic oversight of national security services 
(2007 June). 
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publications of national security58 give first hand analyses 
of policies and prevent political and ignorant interpretations 
of their work. This way a defensive reaction to a bad press 
can be avoided before it occurs. It is also a measurement of 
their involvement in supporting democracy: after all, an 
independent voice of national security, that focuses on 
expertise, rather than being just an echo of the government’s 
perspective, is so much more compelling. Public 
representation of national security requires an online 
presence, which in the 21st century is essential for the 
accountability and transparency of the government. In the 
early days of the Internet, however, it was peculiar for 
national security services to establish an online interface.59 
National security is as complicated as it is limited in being 
transparent to the public. Nonetheless, there are great many 
opportunities for national security services to reach out to 
the people and even speak the language of the Millennials 
                                                          
58 See the site of the Danish PET https://www.pet.dk/Publikationer.aspx; the 
Estonian KAPO https://www.kapo.ee/et/content/aastaraamatu-väljaandmise-
traditsiooni-ajalugu-ja-eesmärk-o.html; the Dutch AIVD 
https://www.aivd.nl/publicaties; the German Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publik
ationen; the Czech BIS https://www.bis.cz/vyrocni-zpravy.html; the Slovakian 
SIS https://www.sis.gov.sk/pre-vas/sprava-o-cinnosti.html; the Polish SKW 
https://www.bip.skw.gov.pl/skw/zamowienia-publiczne; while in the UK it is 
traditionally printed by the Parliamentary Committee: http://www.gov.uk/gove
rnment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211553/31176_HC_547_
ISC.PDF. 
59 According to Wayback Machine the site of the German Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution was launched on 1996. 12. 28. 
www.verfassungsschutz.de, while the others followed as listed: www.nbh.hu 
(1997. 11. 01.); www.mi5.gov.uk és www.gchq.gov.uk (1998. 12. 05.); 
www.sis.gov.sk (1998. 12.12.); www.bis.cz (1999. 04. 18.); www.uzsi.cz (2002. 
06. 06.); www.abw.gov.pl (2002. 08. 06.); www.aw.gov.pl (2002. 10. 19.); 
www.pet.dk (2003. 12. 11.); www.mkih.hu (2004. 02. 14.); www.fe-ddis.dk 
(2004. 12. 23.); www.vzcr.cz (2005. 02. 04.); www.bnd.bund.de (2005. 03. 22.); 
www.sis.gov.uk (2005. 11. 01.); www.skw.gov.pl (2007. 05. 17.); 
www.sww.gov.pl (2009. 01. 31.); www.vs.mosr.sk (2016. 05. 28.). 
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or the Alpha generation. Threats to national security, 
developments in technology, and a shift in the social 
structure will be continuously besieging national security 
services. The traditional lines between politics and policies 
are becoming dynamic, allowing politicians to dictate how 
experts should operate, and to install political accountability 
on officers, that were appointed and not elected. The process 
did not start yesterday, and will not be over tomorrow, but 
the more vigilant we stay, the better opportunity we will 
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1. Introductory remarks 
The EU migration agenda is rapidly growing and it brings 
a high degree of tensions and instability in the European 
Union. These concerns are reflected in the political 
processes with a prominent example of the referendum on 
Brexit. The migration agenda was also a central topic in 
recent elections in EU countries with a rise of anti-migration 
and anti-integration parties.1 Similarly, these issues are 
central to EU neighbours, a clear example being recent 
developments in Switzerland. The Swiss government had a 
difficult task how to implement the results of referendum 
that required a limitation of migration from the EU.2 
                                                          
* Václav Stehlík - Associate professor of EU law, Jean Monnet Chair in EU law, 
Department of International and European Law, Faculty of Law, Palacký 
University in Olomouc, Czech Republic, vaclav.stehlik@upol.cz. This chapter 
was prepared under the research project of the Czech Grant Agency, ‘Postavení 
osob ze třetích zemí v právu Evropské unie’, No.17-24822S.  
1 Including f.e. France, Germany, Hungary or the Czech Republic. 
2 A termination of migration agreement with the EU would also cease Swiss 
participation in the EU internal market due to the Guillotine clause inserted in 
EU-Swiss contractual set-up as a termination of one of the basic agreements 
would automatically cause termination of others. For details see f.e.: 
https://euobserver.com/justice/136398 (28.11.2017). 
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One of the reasons for high sensitivity of migration 
agenda is that it gets in clash with traditional values of 
societies of Member States. It can threaten social well-being 
of the host society (dependence and even an abuse of 
national social benefits) and cause changes in national 
labour markets (taking jobs from locals or reducing price of 
work). Importantly migration is perceived also as a threat to 
safety of population and security of states. The aim of this 
chapter is to focus on legal developments of the EU 
regulation in relation to public security restrictions. The 
main emphasis will be put on the status of free moving EU 
citizens and correspondingly their family members 
including third country nationals. 
Public security exception was incorporated in the 
founding treaties at the outset of EU integration. It was 
inserted into several provisions of the EU law. These 
exceptions are primarily applicable both in the internal 
market freedoms as well as in measures adopted in the area 
of freedom, security and justice (Schengen acquis). They 
likewise proliferate in EU external agreements. Still, in 
Johnson3 the EU Court of Justice (further referred as CJEU) 
clarified that there is no inherent general exception from the 
full application of EU law based on public security and the 
use of this exception is possible only in cases expressly 
allowed by the founding treaties.4 
Neither the EU primary nor secondary law gives any 
definition what is understood by public security in the EU 
                                                          
3 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, point 26. 
4 For a commentary see M. Trybus, The EC Treaty as an Instrument of European 
Defence Integration: Judicial Scrutiny of Defence and Security Exceptions, 
Common Market Law Review 39, 2002, p. 1349. 
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law. Thus, the concept and conditions for its application are 
shaped mostly in the case-law of the CJEU. One common 
characteristics reappearing in many cases is that these 
decisions often combine both public policy and public 
security arguments while differences of these two 
exceptions are not always delineated. Statistics on common 
or separate application of these exceptions show that the use 
of public policy exception in the free movement cases is 
much more common than rather an exceptional recourse to 
only public security grounds.5 Still, even if these exceptions 
are often used together, they still involve a principal 
conceptual difference as will become apparent from the 
examination of EU migration rules (especially Directive 
20014/38). 
The following analysis will focus on the most notable 
cases where CJEU interpreted public security exception and 
defined limits of the competence of Member States. The 
case-law will be chosen across the four internal market 
freedoms as it will help to give a more complex picture of 
the CJEU approach. It will focus on the free movement of 
goods, capital and establishment (subchapter 2), on free 
movement of workers (including workers from associated 
countries, subchapter 3) and, finally, on most recent 
developments in the context of EU citizenship (subchapter 
4). It will be shown that the principles adopted in other 
market freedoms are cross-referred in the migration case-
law. 
  
                                                          
5 See for statistics see D. Kostakopoulou-Dochery, N. Ferreira, Testing Liberal 
Norms: Public Policy and Public Security Derogations and the Cracks in 
European Union Citizenship, 20 Colum. J.Eur. L., 192, 2014, p. 182. 
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2. The public security exception and the free movement 
of goods, capital and establishment  
This subchapter will focus on the most noteworthy cases 
in the free movement of goods (Campus Oil, Commission v 
Greece, Richardt), including its use in external relations 
(Werner, Leifer) and one case concerning also free 
movement of capital and establishment (Albore). The aim is 
not to make an exhaustive survey, nor a full case-note on 
individual decisions.6 Rather, the text intends to show the 
basic principles formulated by the CJEU in these cases 
which reappear in subsequent case-law, including migration 
law. 
 
2.1. Free movement of goods 
The public security exception in relation to the free 
movement of goods is articulated in present art. 36 TFEU. 
The CJEU interpreted it in several decisions, for the first 
time in Campus Oil.7 This case concerned Irish rules on the 
import of the petroleum products to the country. Ireland 
required importers to take part of their imported petroleum 
from the state-owned refineries. The justification for this 
requirement lay in the necessity for Ireland to keep own 
production in refineries run by state. The CJEU was ready 
to accept this argument as petroleum products are of 
exceptional importance as an energy source in economy. 
They have ‘fundamental importance for a country's 
existence since not only its economy but above all its 
                                                          
6 The full analysis of individual cases referred further were done systematically 
f.e. in Common Market Law Review, usually directly after the adoption of the 
case. We will refer to some of these comments. 
7 72/83 Campus Oil Limited and others v Minister for Industry and Energy and 
others, ECLI:EU:C:1984:256. 
M e t a m o r p h o s i s  o f  P u b l i c  S e c u r i t y . . . | 205 
institutions, its essential public services and even the 
survival of its inhabitants depend upon them’.8 These 
conclusions on the content of public security exception 
regularly reappear later in case-law. 
Consequently, an interruption of supplies of petroleum 
products would endanger country's existence and could, 
therefore, seriously affect its public security. The CJEU 
added that the restriction cannot be used for economic ends 
and country cannot plead economic difficulties caused by 
the elimination of barriers to intra-Community trade.9 The 
CJEU articulated additional conditions for the legitimacy of 
public security exception by national authorities the 
fulfilment of which should have been confirmed by national 
courts in individual cases.10 Thereby, the Campus Oil set up 
basic principles for the use of public security exception and 
Member States are not fully free to have recourse to it and 
common EU based conditions will be applicable. 
The conclusions in Campus Oil were under scrutiny 
much later in a similar case Commission v Greece.11 Even 
though at the end of the day arguments of the Greek 
Government were purely economic and could not serve as a 
justification for the quantitative restriction concerned,12 the 
CJEU confirmed conclusions in Campus Oil; namely that 
                                                          
8 See ibid, point 34. 
9 Comp. ibid, point 35. 
10 The CJEU was criticized for judicial activism as the detailed conditions set up 
in its judgement should be reserved to the EU legislator; see K. Mortelmans, 
Case 72/83, Campus Oil Limited, and others v. The Minister for Industry and 
Energy, and others, Judgment of 10 July 1984, (1984) 3 C.M.L.R. 544, Common 
Market Law Review 21: 687- 713, p. 713. 
11 C-398/98 Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:565. 
12 Comp. ibid, points 30-31. 
206 | V á c l a v  S t e h l í k  
maintenance of minimum stocks of petroleum products may 
be crucial for public security.13  
A successful recourse to public security exception can be 
found in Richardt,14 a case on possible limits to the transit 
of goods which originated in a Member State. The case 
concerned criminal proceedings brought against Mr. 
Richardt and four other persons by Luxembourg authorities 
who were accused of the breach of Luxembourg law 
requiring an authorisation for transport of security sensitive 
goods. Namely, it involved a unit for the production of 
bubble memory circuits which originated in the USA, was 
imported to France (thus, got into free circulation in the EU) 
and should have been exported – via Luxembourg territory 
– to the then Soviet Union. As the goods were already in free 
circulation, any limit, including a requirement of 
authorisation, was a clear restriction to the free movement 
of goods.15  
To justify the national law, Luxembourg authorities had 
recourse to the public security exception. The CJEU decided 
that public security covers both a Member State's internal 
security and its external security.16 An importation, 
exportation and transit of goods capable of being used for 
strategic purposes may affect the public security of a 
Member State; therefore, it must be allowed to impose a 
                                                          
13 Comp. ibid, point 29. In relation to regulation of petroleum product in Greece 
see also a preceding case C-347/88 Commission of the European Communities 
v Hellenic Republic, ECLI:EU:C:1990:470. 
14 C-367/89 Criminal proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoires 
Scientifiques SNC, ECLI:EU:C:1991:376, points 47-49. 
15 Also in breach of secondary law, namely article 10 of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 222/77 of 13 December 1976 on Community transit, OJ L 38, 
9.2.1977, p. 1-19. 
16 See Richardt, point 22. 
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requirement of a special authorisation to verify whether the 
goods are of strategic character or not.17 
 
2.2. External dimension of public security 
Whereas the first two cases concerned the internal 
dimension of public security, Richardt indicated that public 
security definition will cover also external dimension. In 
this regard there are two interesting examples on the 
interpretation of public security in the context of EU 
common commercial policy, namely Werner18 and Leifer.19  
In Werner the question was whether the common 
commercial policy concerns exclusively commercial 
objectives, or whether it covers also measures having 
foreign policy and security objectives.20 Common rules for 
export of goods were at that time regulated on the EU level 
by Regulation 2603/09.21 In its art. 11 the Regulation 
allowed Member States to set limits on the same grounds as 
are articulated in relation to the free movement of goods (art. 
36 TFEU), including also grounds based on public security. 
In fact the case dealt with a refusal to issue licences for 
export of furnaces and coiling machines from Germany to 
Libya. The introduction of that licensing requirement was 
intended to prevent furnaces and coiling machines from 
being used for military purposes in Libya's missile 
                                                          
17 See ibid, point 23.  
18 C-70/94 Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH v Federal Republic of 
Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1995:328. 
19 C-83/94 Criminal proceedings against Peter Leifer, Reinhold Otto Krauskopf 
and Otto Holzer, ECLI:EU:C:1995:329. 
20 Comp. Werner, point 7. 
21 Regulation (EEC) No 2603/69 of the Council of 20 December 1969 
establishing common rules for exports OJ L 324, 27.12.1969, p. 25–33. 
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development programme. Issuing such licenses feared to 
disrupt foreign relations.  
The CJEU confirmed the outcomes of Richardt, namely 
that the concept of public security under art. 36 TFEU 
covers both a Member State’s internal security and its 
external security. Then the CJEU attributed the same 
meaning to the concept also in external economic relations 
and refused the interpretation that Member States would be 
allowed to restrict movement of goods to thirds countries 
more than they are allowed to do in the context of the 
internal market. Put differently, the CJEU chose a parallel 
interpretation of public security exception both in internal 
and external movements of goods.22 Furthermore, the CJEU 
linked state security to the security of international 
community as a whole and accepted that the risk of a serious 
disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of 
nations may affect the security of a Member State. Thus, the 
use of the public security exception was admissible.23  
Similarly, the public security exception in the context of 
common commercial policy and the regulation concerned 
was the main point in Leifer. This case concerned the 
requirement of licenses for export of dual-use goods (plant, 
plant parts and chemical products) from Germany to Iraq. 
The applicant for a licence was bound to prove that the 
products will be used exclusively for civil purposes. 
According to the CJEU a public security concern might 
justify national licensing procedure and Member States can 
                                                          
22 See Werner, point 25. 
23 See ibid, point 26-27. 
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refuse to issue a licence if the goods can objectively be used 
for military purposes.24 
 
2.3. Public security in the context of freedom of 
establishment and capital movement 
Public security exception argumentation appeared also in 
relation to freedom of establishment and capital movement; 
an exceptional case being Albore.25 This case concerned 
Italian rules setting up an authorisation procedure for the 
purchase of immovable property in a military important area 
on the Isle of Ischia. There was no limitation to acquire the 
property for Italian nationals; however, non-nationals 
intending to purchase such a property were bound to get a 
prior authorisation by Italian authorities. An open 
discriminatory nature of these rules clearly indicated that 
these rules were in breach of internal market rules on the 
freedom of establishment and capital movements, 
potentially justified by public security reasons.  
The Italian government tried to justify the discrimination 
with reference to the specificity of relationship between a 
state and its own nationals. This relationship is based on a 
common set of values, solidarity as well as obligations. In 
the area of public security the interests of a state are 
protected by national criminal law which makes it an 
offence for any citizen to accept monetary reward or other 
advantage from a foreign source for behaving in a manner 
contrary to national interests. On contrary, according to the 
Italian government persons not having Italian nationality 
were not in the same position as Italian nationals. They did 
                                                          
24 Comp. Leifer, point 36. 
25 C-423/98 Alfredo Albore, ECLI:EU:C:2000:401. 
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not share Italian national interests and were not subject to 
the special obligations imposed by Italian law to conform to 
those interests.26 
It would be useful to shortly refer to an interesting 
opinion of Advocate General Cosmas. In his arguments he 
connects the mere internal market perspective and the 
developing concept of EU citizenship. Italian rules go 
against the idea of continuous convergence of the peoples of 
the Member States and of advancement of European 
integration. However, these arguments are primarily 
political, not legal. From the legal point of view Member 
State still retained the right to make a distinction between its 
own nationals and those of other Member States. In certain 
situations a conduct of one’s own national is less of a 
potential risk to national military security than that of 
citizens of other Member States.27 In that regard AG 
Cosmas accepted a difference in treatment based on 
nationality; however, he lacked a satisfactory explanation 
regarding the criteria for designation of an area as being of 
military importance and necessity to control some areas for 
the purpose of safeguarding national military interests.28  
In comparably laconic decision the CJEU refused any 
national rules that would constitute an arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction. According to the 
CJEU a mere reference to the requirements of defence of the 
national territory cannot suffice to justify discrimination 
against nationals of other Member States. The restriction 
must be well substantiated and it must be shown that the 
                                                          
26 Comp. Opinion of Advocat General in Albore, ECLI:EU:C:2000:158, points 
63-64. 
27 Comp. AG Cosmas in Albore, point 66. 
28 Comp. ibid, points 76 and 78. 
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‘non-discriminatory treatment of the nationals of all the 
Member States would expose the military interests of the 
Member State concerned to real, specific and serious risks 
which could not be countered by less restrictive 
procedures’.29 This was not true for Italian rules.  
In Albore the CJEU would accept the use of public 
security exception in relation to military interests of 
Member States, nevertheless, it did not retreat from the 
emphasis put on the liberal internal market. The CJEU did 
not give a bianco cheque to Member States and fairly in 
depth scrutinized national practice and interpreted the 
internal market exceptions narrowly. It seems that Italian 
motivation really did not rest primarily on any economic 
ends and the argument based on the specificity of the liaison 
of a home Member State and its own nationals was 
admittedly meant frankly. Still, if the area would be that 
crucial for military purposes, one would expect a similar 
safety requirements both to home and host member 
nationals. In that light the argument of insufficient 
justification seems to be relevant and acceptable. 
Indeed one should have in mind that the progressive and 
liberalising case-law on the EU citizenship was delivered 
several years later. Directly after the insertion of EU 
citizenship in TEU in 1993, the CJEU conceived the EU 
citizenship more as complementary to national citizenship. 
The early cases dealing with the EU citizenship closely 
connect it to other treaty provisions and market freedoms 
and the extensive reading of rights connected to EU 
                                                          
29 See Albore, point 22. 
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citizenship were initiated in 2001 by case Grzelczyk.30 Thus, 
Albore decision is still rested on the old reading of EU 
citizenship, as was openly reflected in the Opinion of 
Advocate General.31 
 
2.4. A summary on the free movements of goods, 
establishment and capital 
Cases in relation to the free movement of goods both in 
the EU and under common commercial policy rules brought 
in complex fundaments for the construction of public 
security exception. The CJEU made it clear that this 
exception includes safeguarding of state’s institutions, 
essential public services and survival of its inhabitants 
(Campus Oil, Commission v Greece), and it covers both 
internal security and external security of Members States 
(Richardt). The CJEU called for a parallel interpretation of 
public security exception both in internal and external 
movements of goods (Werner) and made it clear that 
security may be affected also by a risk of serious 
disturbances to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence 
of nations (Leifer). Any discrimination based on nationality 
must be well justified (Albore). 
The case-law in this area showed that the concept of 
public security is comprehensive. Still, the CJEU made it 
obvious that exceptions in art. 36 TFEU do not form a 
reserved domain of sovereignty of Member States that 
would remain in their exclusive jurisdiction. They are 
                                                          
30 C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-
la-Neuve, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458. 
31 For a further detailed analysis of the case see V. Hatzopoulos, Case C-423/98, 
Alfredo Albore, Judgment of the Sixth Chamber of 13 July 2000, nyr, Common 
Market Law Review 38: 455–469, 2001. 
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allowed by the EU law to derogate from the principles in 
well substantiated cases in order to achieve the objectives 
set out in Treaty articles concerned.32 From the few 
mentioned cases (and there were not many others) it was 
apparent that the CJEU will analyse individual cases in quite 
a detail and examine whether the recourse to the exceptions 
is properly justified. 
 
3. Public security grounds in the context of the free 
movement of workers 
The public security exception is regulated in relation to 
workers directly in the founding treaties33 with further 
details regulated in the former Directive 64/221.34 
According to this Directive measures taken on grounds of 
public policy and public security could be based exclusively 
on the personal conduct of the individual concerned and 
previous criminal convictions in themselves could not 
constitute grounds for such measures.35 These conditions 
were applicable for expulsions founded on both public 
policy and public security grounds. Clear contours for the 
use of exceptions were left for national implementing rules. 
These were applied by national courts and scrutinised for its 
conformity with EU law via the preliminary ruling 
procedure. Again the case-law of the CJEU was crucial for 
the interpretation of these conditions. 
                                                          
32 Comp. Campus Oil, point 32 or Richardt, point 19. 
33 Nowadays art. 45 para 3 TFEU. 
34 Council Directive 64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of 
special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals 
which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, 
Official Journal 056, 04/04/1964, p. 850-857. It was replaced with Directive 
2004/38, see details in the next subchapter. 
35 Comp. art. 3 of Directive 64/221. 
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The following analysis will refer to decisions where 
public security exception was directly applied (Bonsignore), 
or to decisions that concern public policy exception but are 
conceptually applicable also to public security. This 
concerns especially the condition of personal conduct which 
was defined in cases concerning primarily public policy 
(Van Duyn, Adoui and Cornuaille). Finally, the subchapter 
will shortly touch on the transferability of these principles 
to external relations (Jany). The conceptual conclusions 
from this case-law were later incorporated in the text of 
current legislation (Directive 2004/38) which will be 
covered in the next chapter. 
 
3.1. Personal conduct in the early case-law 
One of the well-known decisions in this regard is Van 
Duyn.36 It actually concerned a public policy exception and 
the condition articulated in Directive 64/221 that any 
measures based on public policy (and also public security) 
must be based on the personal conduct of an individual 
concerned. The case concerned a Dutch woman who wanted 
to work as a secretary for the Church of Scientology in the 
United Kingdom. She was refused a leave to enter the UK 
as the activities of the Church of Scientology were deemed 
socially harmful, but no administrative measures against 
this Church were taken. The key issue37 was the 
interpretation of the term ‘personal conduct’; in other words, 
whether the membership in an organisation may be counted 
as a personal conduct. The CJEU differentiated between 
                                                          
36 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133. 
37 Except that the CJEU for the first time set up that directives can be 
vertically directly effective. 
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past and present membership to an association. Whereas the 
former cannot justify restrictions to the free movement, the 
actual membership can become such a ground. It may be 
connected with the participation in the activities of the 
organisation and identification with its aims.38 
Furthermore, the CJEU confirmed that the concept of 
public policy must be interpreted strictly and cannot be 
determined unilaterally by Member States without any 
control by the EU institutions. On the other hand, the CJEU 
confirmed that circumstances for the application of public 
policy exception differ territorially (that is in various 
Member States) and in time; this necessitates a discretion 
for authorities of each Member State.39 Importantly, the 
CJEU accepted that Member States can limit the free 
movement of workers, in this case the right to take up an 
offered employment in another Member State even though 
this is not prohibited to one’s own nationals.40  
In Van Duyn the CJEU showed a strong understanding 
for Member State’s discretion. It accepted that the present 
(but not past) membership to an organisation may be 
assessed as a personal conduct and also accepted the use of 
this exception even though Member States did not take the 
same restrictions to its own nationals. This clear breach of 
the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality 
requires a proper justification by Member States. For sure it 
would be in breach of international law to require that a 
Member State would expulse one’s own nationals.41 Still, 
the Member State’s concern about the socially harmful 
                                                          
38 Comp. Van Duyn, point 17. 
39 Comp. ibid, point 18. 
40 Comp. ibid, point 23. 
41 Comp. ibid, point 22. 
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character of activities of the Church cannot seem serious 
enough if it does not impose any corresponding restriction 
to the activities of the Church and its own national in this 
respect. As a result the CJEU left quite a wide discretion to 
Member States for the use of the exception; especially it did 
not strictly require restrictive measures required to both the 
UK and other Member States’ nationals.  
Not a sufficient apprehension of the lack of possible and 
maybe desirable steps against own nationals was definitely 
a shortcoming of the CJEU approach and the Van Duyn 
principles were later revised as will be shown below. 
Actually in the same year when Van Duyn was decided the 
CJEU accepted also a stricter reading of the condition of 
personal conduct presumed by the Directive, even though in 
a different context. 
The decision in Bonsignore42 concerned an Italian 
worker in Germany who was criminally convicted for an 
offence against the firearms law and for causing death by 
negligence. According to the national court the deportation 
was not justified by special preventive measures based on 
the facts or present and foreseeable conduct of the plaintiff, 
but it was conceived as a general preventive measure. His 
expulsion was perceived as a prevention against increasing 
violence among immigrants in larger cities.43 This primary 
motivation for expulsion was refused by the CJEU. The 
CJEU reiterated the condition in Directive that deportation 
must be based on the personal conduct of the individual and 
only on breaches of peace and security which might be 
                                                          
42 67/74 Carmelo Angelo Bonsignore v Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt Köln, 
ECLI:EU:C:1975:34. 
43 Comp. ibid, point 4 
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committed by the individual concerned.44 The prohibition of 
an expulsion as a preventive measure was later inserted in 
the current Directive.45  
 The requirement that only a present threat to public 
policy may justify an expulsion was further elaborated on in 
case Bouchereau.46 This case concerned a French national 
who was found guilty for unlawful possession of drugs, for 
which he was conditionally discharged for 12 months. He 
should have been expelled from the UK. The question was 
whether previous criminal convictions may be interpreted as 
a personal conduct required as a condition for expulsion 
under Directive 64/221. According to the CJEU previous 
criminal convictions can be relevant only if they are an 
evidence of a present threat to public policy.47 Furthermore, 
the use of public policy exception requires existence of a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to fundamental 
interests of society.48 This apprehension of public security 
was regularly restated in subsequent case-law. 
 
3.2. Reconsideration of Van Duyn principles in later 
case-law 
It took nearly a decade before the principles formulated 
in Van Duyn were clearly reconsidered. It happened in joint 
cases Adoui and Cornuaille49 which concerned two French 
women who were refused to be granted a residence permit. 
The decision was based on public policy grounds as they 
                                                          
44 Comp. ibid, point 6. 
45 See art. 27/2 of Directive 2004/38. 
46 30/77 Regina v Pierre Bouchereau, ECLI:EU:C:1977:172. 
47 Comp. ibid, point 28. 
48 Comp. ibid, point 35. 
49 Joined cases 115 and 116/81 Rezguia Adoui v Belgian State and City of Liège; 
Dominique Cornuaille v Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:1982:183. 
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worked as waitresses in a bar suspect of conducting 
prostitution. The Belgian law did not prohibit prostitution as 
such,50 but allowed local authorities to pass regulations of 
these activities to uphold public morality or to ensure the 
keeping of the public peace. The city of Liège adopted such 
local rules. The CJEU reiterated the premise that Member 
States are free to designate their own set of values 
concerning public policy exception; the application of these 
rules cannot lead to arbitrary (non-justified) distinction to 
the detriment of nationals of other Member States.51 A 
conduct may not be considered as being of a sufficiently 
serious nature where the Member State does not adopt, with 
respect to the same conduct on the part of its own nationals, 
repressive measures or other genuine and effective measures 
intended to combat such conduct.52 
In summary in this decision the CJEU rejected an 
arbitrary use of the public policy exception and required a 
proper justification of any discriminatory rule. Moreover, it 
required that Member States must take adequate steps also 
against own nationals; otherwise they cannot take steps 
against free moving nationals of other Member States. By 
this the CJEU revises outcomes of Van Duyn case. The 
approach of the CJEU seems to be stricter and pushes higher 
threshold for the use of Member States discretion.53 
                                                          
50 The law prohibited only some activities such as soliciting, incitement to 
debauchery, exploitation of prostitution, the keeping of a disorderly house or 
brothel and living on immoral earnings. 
51 Comp. Adoui and Cornuaille, point 7. 
52 See ibid, point 8. 
53 Comp also T. C. Hartley: Joined Cases 1 15 and 1 16/81, Adoui v. Belgian 
State and City of Liège and Cornuaille v. Belgian State. Preliminary Rulings of 
18 May 1982 requested by the President of the Tribunal de Première Instance, 
Liège, not yet published Common Market Law Review 20: 131 – 145, p. 142-
143. 
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These decisions may be read also in the context of 
development of free moving case-law. Notably in the period 
between Van Duyn and Adoui and Cornuaille the CJEU 
delivered liberalising decisions in the EU internal market 
which caused a massive revision of national regulations 
restricting the four freedoms, starting with the free 
movement of goods. The CJEU formulated a prohibition of 
restrictions both of discriminatory and indistinctly 
applicable (non-discriminatory) character which would 
impede the free movement of goods. These conclusions later 
overflew to other freedoms. Even though fully liberalising 
decisions in relation to free movement of workers were 
delivered later,54 the emphasis on the limited use of 
discriminatory restrictions could be seen strongly already in 
80s.55 Adoui and Cornuaille decisions seem to be part of this 
liberal market discourse.  
The conclusions in Adoui and Cornuaille cases were later 
confirmed especially in Calfa.56 The case concerned an 
Italian national who was criminally convicted for drug 
possession on her holiday in Crete. She was sentenced for 
three months and automatically expulsed from Greek 
territory for life. In its decision the CJEU reiterated that her 
personal conduct must create a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society. Consequently, an automatic expulsion for life does 
                                                          
54 C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others 
v Bosman and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1995:463. 
55 See f.e. C-53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1982:105, 
C-139/85 Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1986:223 or C-
357/89 Raulin v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:87. 
56 C-348/96 Criminal proceedings against Donatella Calfa, ECLI:EU:C:1999:6. 
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not allow to consider her personal conduct or the danger 
which she represents for the requirements of public policy.57 
The strict reading of public policy exception in Adoui and 
Cornuaille was likewise referred to in the context of 
external relations. It was namely the decision in Jany58 on 
the association agreements (Europe Agreements) between 
EU and Poland and the Czech Republic. The pre-accession 
disputes concerned several Polish and Czech nationals who 
wanted to work as self-employed prostitutes in the 
Netherlands and were refused the right of residence. They 
based their rights on the prohibition of discrimination at 
work and right of residence.59 The Dutch authorities based 
their decision on the exceptions inserted in the agreement, 
namely public policy.60 In this regard the CJEU explicitly 
referred to Adoui and Cornuaille and confirmed both 
principles, namely that the conduct must constitute a 
genuine threat to public order and that the same effective 
measures to monitor and repress activities of that kind must 
be taken also to its own nationals.61 
 The same concept and condition for the use of 
exceptions based on public policy was reiterated in the 
context of Turkey Association Agreement and Decision No 
                                                          
57 Comp. ibid, point 25-27. Actually there was a possibility to ask for revision 
of the decision after three years or family ties to Greece could be taken into 
consideration. For a full comment on Calfa see C. Costello, Case C348/ 
96, Donatella Calfa, Judgment of the Full Court of 19 January 1999, nyr, 
Common Market Law Review 37: 817–827, 2000. 
58 C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:616. 
59 Comp. art. 37, para 1 and art. 44 para 3 and 4 of Polish Association 
Agreement. The same rule was also in the Czech Association Agreement. 
60 Article 53(1) of the Association Agreement between the Communities and 
Poland. The same regulations is also in the Czech Association Agreement. 
61 Comp. Jany, point 61. 
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1/80 of the Association Council62 in Nazli.63 The aim of the 
Decision was to constitute a next stage to secure free 
movement of workers as it is regulated in EU law. The 
CJEU required that principles in the corresponding treaty 
provision should be extended, as far as possible, to Turkish 
nationals who enjoy the rights conferred by Decision No 
1/80.  
It actually does not have to mean that the interpretation 
must be totally the same. What seems to be important, is the 
objective of the external agreement; the importance of the 
objective in mirror provisions was assessed in case 
Polydor.64 A proper interpretation of mirror provisions must 
be based on the context-related interpretation.65 Much will 
depend on whether the objective of EU provision and the 
corresponding provisions of an external agreement will be 
the same, in the context of the whole external agreement.66 
Simply said, if the objective is comparable, the 
interpretation should be the same, and vice versa. In Nazli 
the CJEU had recourse to Adoui and Cornouaille approach 
and repeated that the public-policy derogation presupposes 
that there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat 
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.67 It 
further reiterated the principle that Member States should 
                                                          
62 Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the 
development of the Association. 
63 C-340/97 Nazli and Others ECLI:EU:C:2000:77. 
64 270/80 Polydor Limited and RSO Records Inc. v Harlequin Records Shops 
Limited and Simons Records Limited, ECLI:EU:C:1982:43. 
65 Comp. D. Thym, M. Zoetewej-Turhan (eds), Rights of Third-country 
Nationals under EU Association Agreements. Leiden/Boston: Brill/Nijhoff, 
2015, p. 205. 
66 Comp. Polydor, point 15. 
67 Comp. Nazli, point 59. 
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take repressive measures also in relation to its own nationals 
to justify their use to a third country national. 
 
3.3. A summary on the free movements of workers 
When applying public policy as well as public security 
exception, Member States are obliged to take into 
consideration personal conduct of the person concerned.  
This obligation based on the wording of the Directive 
was interpreted by the CJEU in a varying manner. In the 
early case law the CJEU seemed to allow more discretion to 
Member States (Van Duyn); in later cases this early 
approach was revised. The CJEU refused general preventive 
measures (Bonsignore) and required that the measures must 
be justified by a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to 
fundamental interests of society (Bouchereau). The CJEU 
further curtailed MS’s discretion by the principle that 
personal conduct will be sufficiently serious only if the 
Member State concerned adopts the same restricting 
measures against own nationals (Adoui and Cornuaille). 
The shift in the comprehension of Van Duyn principles was 
confirmed also in relation to external relations, namely 
European Agreements (Jany) and EU-Turkey Association 
Agreement (Nazli). The same interpretation will be 
applicable only after a due consideration of objectives of 
external agreements that actually might differ, in that case 
the discretion of Member States in public policy or security 
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4. Freedom movement of EU citizens under Directive 
2004/38 
The personal conduct condition as it developed 
especially in the context of free movement of workers is 
applicable also in the context of currently valid Directive 
2004/38 and this condition of ‘individualisation’ of the 
decision reappears importantly in the most recent cases on 
public security. This subchapter will present the structure of 
the current Directive 2004/38 and then focus on current 
case-law on the application of public security exception 
(Tsakouridis, P.I.). 
 
4.1. Survey of the current rules in Directive 2004/38 
The conditions under which EU citizens may benefit 
from the right of free movement and residence in other 
Member States are at present regulated by Directive 
2004/38. It sets up conditions for stay and permanent stay of 
an EU citizen and his/her family members in another 
Member State. It is a consolidating Directive in relation to 
various previous legislative acts concerning free movement 
of persons in the EU. Among others this Directive also 
replaced the former Directive 64/221 and also incorporated 
in its text CJEU’s case-law, including that which was 
considered above. Details on the interpretation and use of 
restrictions can be found in Chapter VI of the Directive, 
especially in art. 27-33. 
The art. 27 establishes general principles, namely that 
Member States may restrict the freedom of movement and 
residence while these grounds may not be invoked to serve 
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economic ends (comp. Campus Oil and art. 36 TFEU68). 
Any measures must be proportionate and they must be based 
exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual 
concerned (comp. Van Duyn and especially Adoui and 
Cornuaille). Furthermore, previous criminal convictions in 
themselves cannot constitute grounds for taking such 
measures (comp. former Directive 64/221 and Bonsignore 
line of case-law). Personal conduct of the individual 
concerned must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently 
serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society and justifications based on general prevention are 
not acceptable (Bonsignore line of case-law). Furthermore, 
the article 27 sets up a cooperation between Member States 
that intend to use this exception (f.e. information on criminal 
records of the person concerned). 
The art. 28 is another crucial provision that regulates 
protection against expulsion. Primarily, the host Member 
State deciding on expulsion must take into account how long 
the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her 
age, state of health, family and economic situation, social 
and cultural integration into the host Member State and the 
extent of his/her links with the country of origin. Second 
paragraph of art. 28 introduces an enhanced protection in 
relation to persons with the right of permanent residence. 
They may be expelled only on serious grounds of public 
policy or public security. Third paragraph attributes even a 
stronger protection to EU citizens who have resided in the 
host Member State for the previous ten years or who are 
                                                          
68 Art. 36 TFEU prohibits that the exceptions would constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States. 
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minors, except if the expulsion is necessary for the best 
interests of the child.69 They can be expelled only on 
imperative grounds of public security. The enhanced level 
of protection is attributed only to EU citizens, not their 
family members. 
The art. 29 gives details on the public health restrictions; 
art. 30 to 33 then establish procedural guarantees in 
expulsion proceedings (notification of decisions, procedural 
safeguards, duration of exclusion orders and expulsion as a 
penalty or legal consequence).  
Whereas the Directive consolidated principles which 
were mostly elaborated in previous analysis, controversial 
developments appeared in recent case-law. This concerns 
especially the rights of residence and protection against 
expulsion based on public security in relation to long-term 
residents. As was indicated above, in that regard the 
Directive 2004/38 in its art. 28 introduces an enhanced 
protection and distinguishes two situations. While according 
to the second paragraph long-term residents can be expelled 
on serious grounds of public policy or public security (art. 
28, para 2), according to the third paragraph, EU citizens 
with more than 10 years residence can be expelled only on 
imperative grounds of public security (art. 28 para 3). The 
distinction between second and third paragraph may be 
summarised in the following way: 
• personal scope: second paragraph concerns all 
residents, both an EU citizens and their family 
members; enhanced protection in the third paragraph 
                                                          
69 Here the Directive refers to United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child of 20 November 1989. 
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can be benefited only by an EU citizen (not his/her 
family members) 
• grounds for expulsion: under second paragraph 
decisions of Member States must be based on both 
public policy or public security; third paragraph 
refers only to public security 
• gravity of breach: the second paragraph requires that 
Member States will show serious grounds; third 
paragraph refers to imperative grounds. 
Thus, it is obvious that the protection against expulsion 
under the third paragraph is much stronger in comparison to 
the second paragraph, both as far concerns the personal 
scope, limitation of number of grounds for expulsion and 
gravity of grounds for expulsion. Some of these issues were 
subject to interpretation in recent case-law that brings a 
degree of confusion as far as the rationale of previous case-
law is concerned. This is true especially in two recent cases 
Tsakouridis and P.I. that compromised the concept of public 
security as well as the distinction between serious and 
imperative grounds in the second and third paragraph of art. 
28 of the Directive. 
 
4.2. Tsakouridis: a broad reading of public security 
exception 
Case Tsakouridis70 concerned a Greek national who was 
born in Germany (1978), obtained there a secondary school 
leaving certificate (1996) and finally got an unlimited 
residence permit in Germany (since 2001). Mr. Tsakouridis 
partially worked in Greece, partially in Germany. He had a 
                                                          
70 C-145/09 Land Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:708. 
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criminal record (among others for compulsion and 
intentional assault). In 2007 he was arrested for criminal 
offences in connection with dealing in narcotics as part of 
an organised group, namely illegal dealing in substantial 
quantities of narcotics as part of an organised group. He was 
sentenced to more than six years’ imprisonment and should 
be expelled from Germany. As he was a resident for period 
exceeding 10 years, the condition of imperative grounds of 
public security became operative. Under the German rules 
if an imprisonment crossed the threshold of 5 years, 
measures were justified by imperative grounds of public 
security.71  
The CJEU analysed whether the activities could be 
covered by the concept of imperative grounds of public 
security. It emphasized that the concept of imperative 
grounds of public security is considerably stricter than that 
of serious grounds. Imperative grounds condition requires 
that the threat must be of a particularly high degree of 
seriousness.72 
The CJEU confirmed the concept of public security as it 
developed in the case-law. Namely it covers both internal 
and its external security (with reference f.e. to Albore) and 
it can include threat to the functioning of the institutions and 
essential public services and the survival of the population, 
as well as the risk of a serious disturbance to foreign 
relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations, or a risk to 
military interests, may affect public security (with reference 
f.e. Campus Oil, Werner, Albore).73 In relation to dealing 
                                                          
71 Comp. ibid, point 11-13. 
72 Comp. ibid, point 41. 
73 See ibid, points 43-44. 
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with narcotics as part of an organised group the CJEU 
emphasized the devastating effects of these crimes and 
concluded that it could reach a level of intensity that might 
directly threaten the calm and physical security of the 
population as a whole or a large part of it.74 
The CJEU then made it clear that it is necessary to take 
into consideration a personal conduct of the person 
concerned as it is required in art. 27 para 2 of Directive 
2004/38. Namely it stated that previous criminal convictions 
cannot in themselves constitute grounds for taking public 
policy or public security measures; CJEU refused the 
general preventive measures. It also required to respect 
principle of proportionality with a regard to the length of 
residence of the EU citizen in the host Member State and in 
particular to the serious negative consequences that such a 
measure may have for Union citizens who have become 
genuinely integrated into the host Member State.75  
According to the CJEU it is necessary to find a balance 
between exceptional nature of public security and actual 
personal conduct of the person concerned. The assessment 
should be done at the time when the expulsion is ordered. It 
should take into account possible penalties and the sentences 
imposed, the degree of involvement in the criminal activity, 
the risk of reoffending (with reference to Bouchereau), the 
risk of compromising the social rehabilitation of the Union 
citizen in the State in which he has become genuinely 
integrated.76 The national court must take into account also 
                                                          
74 See ibid, point 47. 
75 See ibid, point 48-49. 
76 See ibid, point 50. 
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fundamental rights such as right to family life.77 
Proportionality of the measure must be assessed based on 
‘the nature and seriousness of the offence committed, the 
duration of residence of the person concerned in the host 
Member State, the period which has passed since the offence 
was committed and the conduct of the person concerned 
during that period, and the solidity of the social, cultural 
and family ties with the host Member State’. A very good 
justification is required especially in relation to a person 
who have spent all his childhood and youth in the host 
Member State.78 It was left up to the national court to apply 
these principles in relation to Mr. Tsakouridis. 
In Tsakouridis the CJEU confirmed that organised drug 
related crimes can endanger public security and the long 
term residents may be expulsed on imperative grounds of 
public security even after more than 10 years of their 
residence in the host Member State. There were 
considerable critical responses to these conclusions. Very 
briefly at this moment one problem is how to delineate the 
concept of public policy and public security and the 
requirement of ‘seriousness’ and ‘imperativeness’ of the 
activities if the person concerned. The critical argument is 
that these distinctions were blurred by Tsakouridis. The 
CJEU adopted a broad reading of imperative grounds of 
public security and allowed Member States to cover in this 
concept also domestic criminal law offences which 
otherwise might be conceived as part of only public policy 
grounds and, thus, not applicable to a person covered in para 
                                                          
77 Art. 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and art. 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. 
78 See Tsakouridis, point 53. 
230 | V á c l a v  S t e h l í k  
3 of art. 28.79 Consequently, when establishing imperative 
grounds of public security the main attention should be paid 
to the degree of seriousness more than to the existence of a 
special security threat.80 The CJEU, thus, left much space 
for the discretion of Member States in formulation of their 
concepts of public policy and public security and made the 
expulsion of long-term residents easier. 
The arguments on confusing the distinction between 
public policy and security are well substantiated. Still, one 
should not overlook that the definition of public security 
formulated in previous case-law is broad and includes both 
internal and external security. Prima facie one cannot 
exclude that activities of organised drug cartels might in 
some cases become a danger even for internal security of a 
state. Whether it will be true in individual case must be 
decided by national courts. The CJEU stressed the necessity 
of a well-done proportionality test which requires to weigh 
out between public security grounds and the actual personal 
conduct of the individual. It also gave more detailed 
instructions to national courts what to take into 
consideration when deciding on the expulsion. In that regard 
in principle the decision in Tsakouridis might be acceptable. 
However, public security issues were under a further 
scrutiny in P.I. which brought more uncertainty in the 





                                                          
79 Comp. D, Kostakopoulou-Dochery, N. Ferreira, op.cit. p. 173. 
80 Comp. ibid, p. 174. 
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4.3. Case P.I.: confirmation of Tsakouridis principles 
The question in P.I.81 – a case decided two years after 
Tsakouridis – was whether the conclusions in Tsakouridis 
would be confirmed and, thereby, also the new trend in the 
case-law.  
The case P.I. concerned an Italian national who had long 
lived in Germany (since 1987). He was sentenced to 
imprisonment for more than seven years for sexual assault, 
sexual coercion and rape of a minor. The victim was his 
former partner’s daughter who was 8 years old when the 
offences commenced. According to the national court it 
could not be excluded that he would commit the crimes 
again; consequently, the court decided about his expulsion. 
The key question was whether this expulsion based on his 
extremely serious criminal offences could be covered by 
imperative grounds of public security.82  
When interpreting the imperative character of public 
security, the CJEU took into consideration several factors. 
It referred to art. 83 para 1 TFEU according to which sexual 
exploitation of children is considered to be a particularly 
serious crime with cross-border dimension. This article 
gives EU power to legislate in these areas. Correspondingly 
the CJEU referred to EU legislation, namely Directive 
2011/93.83 According to this Directive sexual abuse and 
sexual exploitation of children is considered to be a serious 
                                                          
81 C-348/09 P. I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:300. 
82 Comp. ibid, points 15-17. 
83 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2004/68/JHA, OJ L 335, 17.12.2011, p. 1-14. 
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violation of fundamental rights.84 The Directive then sets up 
minimum terms of imprisonment in case of sexual crimes 
against children; an aggravating circumstance is if the crime 
is committed by a member of the family.  
The CJEU finally concluded that Member States may 
regard criminal offences enumerated in art. 83 para 1 ‘as 
constituting a particularly serious threat to one of the 
fundamental interests of society, which might pose a direct 
threat to the calm and physical security of the population 
and thus be covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds 
of public security’’.85 The condition is that as the ‘manner 
in which such offences were committed discloses 
particularly serious characteristics’.86 The final decision 
was again up to the referring court. 
First of all, it is clear that P.I. elaborates on the CJEU’s 
approach in Tsakouridis and pushes it much further. In 
Tsakouridis the CJEU made it clear that imperative grounds 
of public security in general include also the calm and 
physical security of the population as a whole or a large part 
of it. Imperative grounds of public security may also include 
dealing with narcotics as part of an organised group.87 In 
P.I. it made it clear that not only drug related organised 
crime but also sexual abuse of children may be included into 
this category.  
Importantly P.I. made a further clarification what crimes 
may be perceived as an imperative ground to public security. 
                                                          
84 It also makes a referral to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child of 20 November 1989 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. Comp. P.I., points 26-27. 
85 P.I., point 28. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Comp. Tsakouridis, point 47. 
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Crimes enumerated in art. 83 para 2 comprise terrorism, 
trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of 
women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms 
trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of 
means of payment, computer crime and organised crime. 
This list might be extended by a unanimous decision of the 
Council, with a consent of the European parliament. 
First, no doubt that nature and effects on individual of 
this kind of crime is abhorrent and unjustifiable, but the 
question remains whether these crimes affect public 
security, that is a disruption calm and physical security of a 
part or whole population. This is important when delimiting 
public policy and public security. Whereas public policy 
may include various illegal activities including criminal or 
administrative offences,88 public security grounds should 
include a particularly serious criminal conduct going 
beyond individual harm caused to victims.89 In seems that 
the activities of Mr. P.I. were with limited effect with no 
other persons involved. The question is whether the 
punishment for these criminal acts is not properly and 
sufficiently covered by criminal law sanctions including a 
long-term imprisonment and foreseeably a medical 
treatment in case of deviation and whether additional 
exclusion of the long-term resident from the society of the 
host Member State is justifiable. In other words whether it 
would not be adequate and – with regard to the integration 
of the long-term resident – sufficient to impose the same 
                                                          
88 See in this regard case-law quoted at M. Besters, M. Macenaite, Securing the 
EU Public Order: Between an Economic and Political Europe, 14 German L.J. 
2075, 2090 (2013), p. 2078. 
89 Comp. Opinion of Advocate general Bot in P.I., ECLI:EU:C:2012:123, point 
38. 
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sanctions which would be taken against one’s own 
nationals.  
Second, the problem is also the referral to art. 83 TFEU. 
The article actually says that the enumerated crimes are 
particularly serious and have a cross-bordered dimension. It 
is no way evident that by this article Member States intended 
to define crimes the commitment of which would equal to 
breach of imperative grounds of public security. One could 
discuss about the serious or imperative character of these 
crimes as well as whether they affect (only) public policy or 
public security. This is not clear at all from the article itself. 
It seems more that this article ‘just’ gives to the EU a 
competence for a common action with helps to fight more 
effectively against these crimes with cross-border 
dimension in a synchronised/harmonised way.  
The extent of public security exception is definitely 
rather general and vague and according to the CJEU it will 
depend on Member States what in their territory and in their 
security law will be regarded as a threat to public security. 
However, it seems that the reading, if not in Tsakouridis 
then for sure in P.I., is very broad and seemingly going out 
of what was meant by its inclusion in the Directive. Some 
commentators even suggest a particularly narrow reading of 
paragraph 3 of art. 28 of the Directive with a referral to its 
historic context. The Directive was negotiated just after the 
terrorist attacks in September 2001 in the USA. 
Consequently, a better reading would be to permit only 
terrorism as a ground under art. 28 para 3. Definitely this 
very strict reading of the Directive is imaginable and 
strongly in favour of the free movement and common 
citizenship principles; still, it would be two narrow and not 
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reflecting the wording of the Directive. If Member States 
would like to limit it just to this ground, they could simply 
put it in the Directive. By not doing it they presumed that 
other issues might be also covered by imperative grounds. 
One could envisage various other situations when Member 
States might want to use it except terrorism;90 however, the 
requirement that the activities are harmful to part or whole 
society should be met in individual cases. 
A strong criticism of both Tsakouridis and P.I. judgments 
is also based on the idea that it goes against the long-term 
developments in the area of free movement and EU 
citizenship. Even before the introduction of EU citizenship 
the tendency was to interpret the market freedoms broadly 
and exceptions therefrom narrowly. After some time of 
hesitation following the introduction of EU citizenship by 
Maastricht Treaty the CJEU put great emphasis on the 
concept of EU citizenship as a universal/fundamental status 
of migrant EU citizens.91 The case-law favoured very 
strongly the principle of non-discrimination also in domains 
that were quite sensitive for Member States. This appeared 
in various cases concerning financial and social benefits, the 
right of residence, including family members caring of an 
EU citizen, even in situations without cross-border 
element,92 and surprisingly also the acquisition or loss of 
                                                          
90 The opposite might then lead to broad definitions of terrorism in national legal 
orders. 
91 C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-
la-Neuve, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, reflected also in indent 3 of the Preamble of 
Directive 2004/38. 
92 See f.e. N. Reich, S. Harbacevica, Citizenship and Family on Trial: A Fairly 
Optimistic Overview of Recent Court Practice With Regard to Free Movement 
of Persons, Common Market Law Review 40, 2003, p. 615–638. In case on the 
status of family members caring for an EU (non-moving) citizen see especially 
much discussed case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de 
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Member States citizenship.93 The rationale behind a 
restrictive reading of exceptions could be described as an 
effort to increasingly equalise a free moving EU citizen to 
nationals of the host Member State. This was even more 
evident especially in relation to long-term residents. This 
pro-integrationist approach is actually supported by the 
construction of the Directive 2004/38 which is based on the 
gradually increasing rights of EU citizens based on the 
length of stay; the strongest protection being afforded to EU 
citizens residing in a host Member States over 10 years with 
the expulsion allowed only on very exceptional grounds of 
public security.  
The decisions in Tsakouridis and even more evidently in 
P.I. then seem to go against both previous trends in case-law 
as well as the ‘spirit’ of secondary legislation. As was noted 
above in P.I., the effect of criminal acts concerned on part 
or whole of the society could be hardly perceived. Thus, no 
surprise that this approach was criticised and evaluated as a 
blind line of case-law which is doomed to be abandoned. 
Similar as what happened to Van Duyn or others cases.94 
According to some scholars it supports the notion of 
otherness,95 namely that EU nationals who are long-term 
residents still differ from own nationals and may be 
                                                          
l’emploi (ONEm), ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, confirmed in C-434/09 Shirley 
McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ECLI:EU:C:2011:277. 
For a very fine analysis of all ground-breaking three cases (Rottmann, 
Zambrano, McCarthy) see f.e K. Lenaerts, ‘Civis europaeus sum’: from the 
cross-border link to the status of citizen of the Union, Online Journal on free 
movement of workers within the European Union, No 3, 2011, p. 6-17. 
93 C-135/08 Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449. 
94 See D, Kochenov, B. Pirker, Deporting the Citizens within the European 
Union: A Counter-Intuitive Trend in Case C-348/09, P.I. V Oberburgermeisterin 
der Stadt Remscheid, 19 Colum. J. Eur. L. 369, 390 (2013), p. 373. 
95 See ibid, p. 372. 
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excluded from the society by deportation. The approach of 
the CJEU accepts that long-term residents are not accepted 
as full members of the host Member States’ society. This 
approach is understandable: it is based on a clear vision of 
fully integrated (potentially federal) EU where the EU 
citizenship will really become an outspread over national 
disparities in relation to person’s rights,96 at least after some 
(considerable) time of stay in a host Member States. For this 
understanding of the EU integration and conception of free 
movement rules decisions in Tsakouridis and P.I. seem 
disappointing and against the previous trends in CJEU’s 
concept of EU citizenship. 
Still, admittedly the evaluation of P.I. may be viewed 
also from a different perspective. First, although the CJEU 
has many times repeated that Member States may 
themselves establish what is part of public security grounds 
based on their national needs, Member States’ choices were 
restrictively scrutinised by the CJEU. Decisions in 
Tsakouridis and especially P.I. seem to take more receptive 
approach to interest of Member States, potentially with the 
possibility to include in their public security definition all 
crimes enumerated in art. 83 TFEU. Still, it must be 
emphasised that when applying public security grounds in 
individual cases Member States are not absolutely free and 
conditions for their use persist. Namely they are still bound 
by the requirement to base its decisions on the personal 
conduct of the individual and to properly evaluate the level 
of integration in the host Member State as is set up in art. 28 
                                                          
96 In this regard we might recall the arguments of AG Cosmas in Albore case 
who accepted at the stage of integration at that time that a discriminatory 
treatment based on nationality might be accepted.  
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para 1 of the Directive 2004/38 and its interpretation in the 
case-law.  
Interestingly, some scholars read these cases as a shift 
from equal rights speak to the actual evaluation of existing 
integration for the migrant EU citizen. They refuse to 
overvalue the conceptual consequences of these cases to EU 
citizenship.97 In this respect it is noteworthy that AG Bot in 
his opinion, while rejecting to evaluate crimes committed by 
Mr. P.I. as imperative ground of public security, came to the 
conclusion that Mr. P.I. was not actually sufficiently 
integrated and could not benefit from the enhanced 
protection under 3 para of art. 28.98 Let us recall that 
according to the Directive national court should consider not 
only how long the individual concerned has resided on its 
territory, but also his/her age, state of health, family and 
economic situation, social and cultural integration into that 
State and the extent of his/her links with the country of 
origin.99 An increasing emphasis on the requirement of 
proper integration in the host Member States may well be 
acceptable as it would put more emphasis not only on the 
criminal acts concerned but also the real status or links of 
the person in the society of the host Member State. 
Maybe one positive aspect may be added. The new line 
of case-law shows more alert of the social and political 
developments in Member States in relation to the EU 
integration. The immigration not only from third countries 
                                                          
97 Comp. D., Thym, The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and 
Social Benefits for Economically Inactive Union Citizens, Common market Law 
Review, 52: 17-20, 2015, p. 37-38. 
98 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 6 March 2012 in case C-348/09 
P.I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheidpoint, ECLI:EU:C:2012:300, 
point 49. 
99 See, P.I., point 32. 
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but also from other Member States is an increasingly 
sensitive issue and an expulsion of the foreigner even after 
10 years residence might seem as an adequate response to 
extremely noxious deeds committed in the local community. 
The EU law does not in principle obstruct it; or in other 
words it leaves the decision to the national level, namely to 
national courts. This may be also grasped as an increased 
trust in the system of national values and needs (including 
the notion of public security) which are evaluated and 
applied by national judiciary. 
 
5. Final conclusions 
It was shown that the notion of public security developed 
across market freedoms and the CJEU regularly cross-refers 
to case-law from various areas of EU law including in 
external relations. It was reiterated similarly in other areas 
not covered in this chapter, for example in relation to the 
Directive on admission of students from third countries,100 
in the context of prohibition of sex discrimination in 
national military forces101 or EU asylum law.102 It might be 
                                                          
100 Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of 
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, 
unremunerated training or voluntary service, OJ 2004 L 375, p. 12. See case C-
544/15 Sahar Fahimian v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2017:255 
101 Directive 76/207. See especially cases C-273/97 Angela Maria Sirdar v The 
Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence, ECLI:EU:C:1999:523 or C-
186/01 Alexander Dory v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2003:146. 
102 See art. 24 of Directive 2004/83 of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as 
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted, OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 12–23 and a recent 
case C-373/13 H. T. v Land Baden-Württemberg, ECLI:EU:C:2015:413, point 
78; art. 7 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 
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added that the use of public security exception was also 
covered in a separate secondary legislation adopted several 
years ago also in relation to transfers of defence products in 
the EU.103 
An important principle repeated the case-law is that the 
public policy and public security concepts should preserve 
values of individual Member States. These values and their 
weight are not static and can differ in various periods. In 
principle the CJEU seems to accept it and developed a 
general definition leaving it for Member States to give it life 
in individual cases. Nevertheless, the CJEU was also ready 
to closely examine national practise with an emphasis put 
on the idea of undisturbed internal market and later 
integration of all free moving EU citizens without economic 
status. This approach conceived the potential restrictions by 
Member States to a necessary minimum, with a strong 
emphasis on the principle of non-discrimination. Any 
national measures must step over a very high threshold of 
necessity or proportionality principles. 
Yet, in recent decisions the CJEU seemed to give more 
space to include into public security exception also criminal 
acts whose effect on security of the whole or at least part of 
the population is uncertain. These tendencies set up in 
Tsakouridis and P.I., interestingly both cases being decided 
                                                          
24.12.2008, p. 98–107 and a recent case C 601/15 PPU J. N. v. Staatssecretaris 
van Veiligheid en Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:2016:84, points 66-67. 
103 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works 
contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or 
entities in the fields of defence and security; and amending Directives 
2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, O.J. 2009, L 216/76. for a detailed analysis see 
M. Trybus, L. R. Butler, The internal market and national security: 
Transposition, impact and reform of the EU directive on intra-community 
transfers of defence products, Common Market Law Review 54: 403–442, 2017. 
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by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU, were also reflected in 
the subsequent case-law, with an emphasis put on real 
integration of the person concerned in the host Member 
State.104 The CJEU was strongly criticized by part of 
academia for this line of case-law and interprets it as a step 
back and misinterpretation of the term imperative grounds 
of public security.  
On the other hand, this approach also seem to put more 
emphasis not on values of the society rather than on the 
institutions of Member States and also on rather 
underdeveloped obligations linked to EU citizenship.105 
Thus it leaves more discretion to Member States to reflect 
these aspects in the process of expulsion. It might be added 
that a more cautious approach in migration issues can also 
be traced in other decisions, creating more limits for rights 
of migrant EU citizens.106 
The time will show whether this case-law will really set 
up a new trend in the CJEU approach to EU citizenship and 
migration or whether it will be silently left to oblivion. 
 
 
                                                          
104 See in relation to third country nationals – family Members of EU citizens, 
f.e. C-378/12 Nnamdi Onuekwere v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Second Chamber) of 
16 January 2014, EU:C:2014:13. For a commentary see f.e S. Coutts: Union 
citizenship as probationary citizenship: Onuekwere, Common Market Law 
Review 52: 531–546, 2015. 
105 Comp. L. Azoulai, S. Coutts, Restricting Union citizens’ residence rights on 
grounds of public security. 
Where Union citizenship and the AFSJ meet: P.I., Common Market Law Review 
50: 553–570, 2013., p 544 and 569. 
106 This concerns f.e. rights to social benefits; in that regard see f.e. H. 
Verschueren, Preventing ‘Benefit Tourism’ in the EU: A Narrow or Broad 
Interpretation of the Possibilities Offered by the ECJ in Dano? Common Market 
Law Review 52: 363–390, 2015. 
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